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Abstract
The focus of this thesis by publication is the response of the settler-colonial state,
criminology and the wider academy, to two inter-related wicked problems confronting
the policy sector, firstly the over-representation of Indigenous peoples in the formal
criminal justice system and second, Indigenous peoples’ critique of the response of the
state and the Academy to the issue of continued Indigenous over-representation in the
criminal justice system.

The author was motivated to undertake this thesis due to the following:


that the over-representation of Indigenous peoples in the formal criminal justice
system has been a statistical fact in settler-colonial societies (e.g. New Zealand,
Australia, Canada and the U.S) for close to thirty years;



the persistence of this situation despite significant political, media, academic and
policy attention to this issue over that time period;



a significant amount of the material produced on the issue of Indigenous overrepresentation has been completed without direct input from Indigenous peoples;
and



the Indigenous voice has been particularly silent (or silenced) in the work
produced by criminologists working in settler-colonial contexts.

The thesis is made up of eight published articles that have been placed in three interrelated three sections. Section one is made up entirely of one published work. This
paper (Paper 1) offers a broad theoretical discussion of the colonial projects, the policy
levers and interventions developed and utilised by state functionaries in response to the
4

two broad wicked problems discussed above. Section two contains Papers 2, 3, 4 and 5.
The papers in this section provide an empirically-informed critique of the various ways
through which the discipline of criminology has contributed to the state’s colonial and
neo-colonial processes. The original contribution of this material lies in the fact that
Paper 4 provides one of the first empirically informed analyses of the impact of
increasing globalisation of crime control policy on Indigenous peoples, while Papers 2,
3, 4 and 5 combine with Paper 1 to expose the range of projects through which the
discipline has, to paraphrase Agozino (2003), continued to support the settler-colonial
state’s criminalisation of Indigenous peoples.

In Section three the focus moves to the role of the state and is made up of Papers 6, 7
and 8. Each of the papers offers a case study that highlight way(s) in which the settlercolonial states nullifies Indigenous input into the development of crime control policies
for issues of concern to Indigenous communities. The intent of this section is to identify
and analyse the range of strategies deployed by the state to placate Indigenous dissent,
and maintain its hegemony over responses to social harm.

Keywords
Authoritarian criminology, colonial projects, colonialism, counter-colonial criminology,
criminology, evidence-based policy, Indigenous peoples, Indigenous emancipatory
methodology, Indigenous standpoint, informal justice, Māori, myth, policy industry,
research ethics boards, ritual, settler-colonialism, Waitangi Tribunal, youth gangs.
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Every colonised people – in other words, every people in whose soul an inferiority
complex has been created by the death and burial of its local cultural originality –
finds itself face to face with the language of the civilising nation: that is, with the
culture of the mother country. The colonised is elevated above the jungle status in
proportion to his adoption of the mother country’s cultural standards.

He

becomes whiter as he renounces his blackness, his jungle.
Franz Fanon (1968: 18).
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PART I

Overview of the Research

13

Motivations
The principal motivation for this thesis is the author’s concern at the lack of attention
given by state policy makers and administrative (authoritarian) criminologists, to
indigenous experiences of crime control as practised in settler-colonial contexts (see
Tauri, 2013c; 2015). Although growing steadily, the academic lexicon that privileges
the Indigenous experience is relatively small, especially when compared with the
material generated by western criminology over the past century (Agozino, 2004).
Unfortunately, as Agozino (2003; 2004) and Tauri (2013c; 2015) demonstrate, much of
what is published about us has rarely been created with us, and meeting the needs is
designed to meet the needs of the state and the non-Indigenous members of the
academy. In many instances the data used to inform criminological commentary on
Indigenous peoples is gathered ‘from afar’ through the use of statistical analysis and
other forms of non-engaging methods (see Deckert, 2014; 2015). In contrast, a majority
of the material included in this thesis was generated from direct engagement with the
experiences and views of Māori and other Indigenous peoples. Some of the contributors
work in the Academy, others for government agencies, and still others work directly
with their communities as social service providers. It is hoped that in privileging the
experiences and perspectives of Indigenous peoples, this thesis will assist the
development of a critical Indigenous justice scholarship that offers an empowering
alternative to the hegemony the settler-colonial state, aided by western criminology,
currently holds over the development of ‘legitimate knowledge’ about Indigenous
peoples’ experiences of crime control.
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The lack of Indigenous voices within the cacophony of noise that emanates ceaselessly
from the discipline of criminology, is made obvious in the contemporary moment by the
frequent neglect by administrative and/or authoritarian criminologists to investigate
the impact that the globalisation of crime control is having on Indigenous peoples
(Tauri, 2013c; Tauri, 2014a). As demonstrated in Paper 4 (see Tauri, 2014a), the
critical study of the globalisation of crime control is especially important to Indigenous
peoples because of its close association with the recent, rapid expansion of the
restorative justice industry.

Of particular concern

to Indigenes is the industry’s

marketing of boutique products such as youth conferencing and sentencing circles as
Indigenous-inspired products; a strategy that has facilitated the successful crossjurisdictional transfer of these products, while also negatively impacting moves by
Indigenous peoples to develop their own justice processes (ibid).

Another neglected issue is the role the Academy itself plays in disempowering
Indigenous peoples, especially in the realm of knowledge construction. In response, the
thesis includes material produced to challenge the hegemony the academy holds over
institutional research ethics processes, and frameworks for determining what is/is not
appropriate knowledge in relation to Indigenous experiences of crime control (Tauri,
2013c; 2014b).

Any thesis that claims to offer a critical analysis of the impact of crime control on
Indigenous peoples cannot do so without engaging with the processes utilised by the
settler-colonial state to formulate policy. For this reason, the thesis contains three
papers designed to address the politics of settler-colonial policy construction (Tauri,
15

2013c; 2015; Tauri and Webb, 2012). Collectively, the papers demonstrate that far
from being an ‘evidence-based’ process, the crime control policy process utilised in
settler-colonial contexts like New Zealand is heavily impacted by the politics of necessity,
including silencing (or redirecting) critical voices, especially those emanating from the
Indigenous perspective (Tauri, 2009b).

Before launching into a thorough overview of the key themes of the papers contained in
the thesis, it is important to set out the epistemological and methodological frameworks
that underpin the authors approach to research.

The Epistemological Stance of the Researcher
In his ground breaking work ‘Counter-Colonial Criminology: A Critique of Imperialist
Reason’, the Nigerian scholar Biko Agozino (2003) entered the criminological
knowledge wars that developed during the 1970s and 1980s about what did/did not
constitute valid criminological knowledge. Employing a rather crude binary, the debate
occurred between the hard scientists of administrative criminology - those who follow
the precepts of scientific research (marked by adherence to specific ‘scientific’ research
principles such as objectivity, distance from research subjects, etc) and who tend to
“believe that commitment is undesirable in social sciences” - and on the other side,
‘standpoint’ researchers who argued that “objectivity is impossible or undesirable”
when pursuing knowledge through social research (Agozino, 2003: 157). Agozino
offers a slightly different formulation of the researcher/participant relationship to these
two positions, one that exhorts the researcher to move from “[the] false dichotomy
between objectivity and commitment”. Instead Agozino (ibid: 157) endorses committed
16

objectivity as a position that “capture[s] the inextricability of the articulation of the
processes of commitment and objectivity” that are key to meaningful social inquiry.

In one of his last significant works, ‘The Criminological Imagination’, the late Jock Young
(2011) provided a potent critique of both the power of the scientific discourse to
dominate social inquiry and its many shortcomings when confronted with the often
messy arena Schoen (1973) refers to as the ‘social context’. Young (2011: 62) argues
“how can it be, in a hyper-pluralistic world where creativity and self-invention is a
priority, where the solidity of the world is increasingly shaky, and where reflexivity is
the order of the day, that such a mechanistic ideology [such as the ‘scientific method’ in
social inquiry] can flourish”? More pointedly, Young charts the rise of a fundamentalist
positivism within social inquiry “which attempt[s] to generate fake objectivity by
postulating a yawning gap between the observer and the observed” (ibid: 65). Young
(ibid: 65) further argues that the creation of the tyranny of distance between the
knowledgeable, distant (scientific) observer and the ‘othered’ (the observed, analysed,
critiqued and controlled research population) is “unique in the annals of othering”.
While at face value this position offers a powerful statement of the link between the
scientific method and the process of othering, it is a highly contestable statement when
considered against the extensive literature exposing the othering practices deployed by
colonial (and now, neo-colonial) states during the colonising processes; many of which
are arguably being deployed extensively in the settler-colonial moment (Agozino, 2003;
Fanon, 1967; Smith, 1999). Putting this important point aside for now, we are able to
accept that Young’s critique of the distancing techniques favoured in administrative
criminology’s preference for external observations and numerical analysis is profound.
17

It was also highly impactful for the methodological framework employed in this thesis –
a rejection of non-engaging methodologies (in particular quantitative approaches
devoid of any engagement with Indigenous peoples with regards design, data gathering,
analysis and dissemination) that mirrors the sentiments expressed in the following
quote, in which Young (ibid: 66) states that:

It is usually – although not always – underpinned by the notion of deficit – but as it
aspires to a scientific rendering of reality, it conceives of such an othering in a
numerical fashion. Notably it attempts to project onto human reality an underlay
of numbers, a quantifiable frame on which human action can be seen to hang.
Further it claims that such a depiction in number and equation, in graph and in
Greek symbolism gets down to the heart of the matter – portrays the true nature
of what is actually going on in human conduct.

Importantly, for the construction of the Indigenous emancipatory methodology
employed by the author (as discussed in detail below), Young’s critique involves the
recognition of difference as key to critiquing the researcher as outsider basis to
positivistic notions of researcher objectivity, in particular his argument (ibid: 66) that
“[s]ociological investigation occurs in a world which is stratified by class, gender, age,
race and ethnicity. At the very least it involves relations of class. The poor are not some
inhabitants of a distant island, they are an integral part of our (middle class) material
existence”.

18

If a fundamental rationale for the importance of objectivity in social inquiry is the need
to accurately describe social experience and social context, then one can argue that our
methodology must be such that it privileges the perspectives and experiences of the
(Indigenous) Other (Cohen 1988; Smith, 1999). It should strive to be emancipatory;
supportive of those groups marginalised and/or subjugated within the settler-colonial
context (Agozino, 2003). For this reason the empirical research that informed the thesis
was based on a set of epistemological principles designed to enable me to undertake an
Indigenous emancipatory methodology, the key principles of which are set out in the
following section:

The Underlying Principles of an Indigenous Emancipatory Methodology
Objectivity is the process of taking a position
Nagel (1986: 7) argues that “[t]he limit of objectivity... is one that follows directly from
the process of gradual detachment by which objectivity is achieved”. In comparison,
Agozino argues that to ensure objectivity within social inquiry presupposes
positionality, which Agozino (2003: 163) described as “the procedure of taking a
position without concealing or distorting oppositions to the position taken”. Thus,
within Agozino’s schema, the concepts of objectivity and subjectivity, in terms of how
one positions themselves in the research context, are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. As Deutscher (1983: 2) explains, “[e]very detachment is another kind of
involvement – the idea of complete objectivity as complete detachment is a complete
fraud”. Rather than seeking gradual or even total detachment (if that is indeed possible)
from the social context within which my research took place, instead I sought to speak
with empirical authority about the life-world of Indigenous peoples by purposely
19

standing within the social context of their lived experience. Objectivity was ‘achieved’ by
the fact that I, as a criminologist and social researcher, was an ‘outsider’ through the fact
that I was not Stolo, was not a practitioner or Stolo justice, or indeed was not of the
same Iwi (tribe) of the majority of Maori interviewed, or worked for the social service
organisations to which they belonged. ‘Positionality’ came from choosing to engage
directly with my participants in the design phase, the engagement phase and the data
collection phases of the research. The position taken was of a researcher politically
committed to the cause of enhancing Indigenous peoples’ self-determined practice
within the realm of justice (see below).

Objectivity does not preclude advocacy or politics
As Agozino (2003: 166) states “[i]t is always good for those who have a voice to speak
up for the silenced rather than hide behind the mask of scientific objectivity to speak
only about silences”. He further indicates that the process of advocacy must involve
engagement with the Other because “... it will be even more commendable for scholars
to speak in solidarity with the oppressed rather than simply speak for them as their
silence implies voicelessness” (ibid: 166, emphasis Agozino’s).

All research is political
The committed objectivity upon which this thesis is based recognises the political bases
of all research. As Agozino (2003: 167) argues “[s]ocial scientists may pretend that they
are studying race relations... with point-of-viewlessness, but their findings eventually
inform political practices of different tendencies”. The empirical material contained in
this thesis is political in that it 1) derives from my own preconceived bias, namely as a
20

Indigenous political activist and as an Indigenous scholar who rejects the notion that
social inquiry must derive from a ‘pure objectivity’, 2) privileges the perspectives,
experiences and issues of Indigenous peoples, 3) critically analyses the activities of the
powerful, such as policy makers, criminologists, and criminal justice institutions; and 4)
offers solutions to criminological and policy praxis that empowers Indigenous peoples
in their struggle for self-determination.

The Focus of the Research
The methodology discussed in the following section was designed to enable the
researcher to explore the following broad questions:
1.

What techniques of neutralisation and control if any, are employed by the policy
sector in its attempts to deal with the wicked problems of Indigenous overrepresentation and resistance?

2.

What part does criminology/the academy play, if any, in the settler-colonial state’s
war of manoeuvre against Indigenous self-determination in the realm of justice?

3.

How has the settler-colonial state responded to Indigenous challenges to, and
resistance of, its hegemony over justice?

4.

What effect, if any, is the expansion of a globalised crime control market having on
indigenous peoples in neo-colonial jurisdictions?

Methodology and Methods
The process of engagement
A number of methods were employed to support the development of the thesis. In line
with the principles of an Indigenous Emancipatory Methodology outlined previously, the
21

methods employed were designed to facilitate in-depth engagement with Indigenous
justice practitioners, researchers, scholars and programme providers. The material is
also informed by significant correspondence (via phone, email and skype, as well as
face-to-face meetings) with a number of non-Indigenous, critical scholars from various
countries, colleagues with long histories of researching with Indigenous peoples. As
such, much of the work contained in the thesis was informed by participants’ first-hand
experiences of the workings of the criminal justice systems deployed in settler-colonial
societies. Their views and experiences were also sought on the Academy’s response to
Indigenous justice activism, knowledge production, and of Indigenous justice processes,
both ‘traditional’ and/or imported from external, globalised sources.

It was not the purpose of the research to focus on the performance of state functionaries
in developing Indigenous-specific crime control policies or interventions. The focus
instead was on general issues that arise from the politics of crime control, namely the
impact of the globalisation of crime control interventions on Indigenous peoples
residing in settler-colonial societies; and the role of criminology and the wider academy,
in the continued subjugation of Indigenes through their ongoing support for
authoritative criminal justice (Tauri, 2014a).

The engagement setting
The participants
The views and experiences of research participants from Canada (specifically, the Stó:lo
First Nation of the Fraser Valley, British Columbia), New Zealand, Australia and the US
informed the eight papers included the thesis. Research participants were selected
22

either by the researcher or a relevant organisation, such as an Elders’ Council. The
selection criteria was based on their knowledge of and/or involvement in Indigenous
justice practice, Indigenous political activism, and/or the state’s policy development and
implementation process. Overall, up to 60 participants took part in the study.

Participants were drawn from three principle ‘justice communities’, namely:


Members of Indigenous communities/Iwi (tribes) especially those involved in
responding to social harm in indigenous communities, including practitioners,
providers and activist/academics (32 individuals in total). For example, the paper
on the globalisation of restorative justice was directly informed by the experiences
of members of the Stó:lo First Nation, in particular the impact of the interjurisdictional transfer of the Family Group Conferencing (FGC) forum on their
justice aspirations and practices as they sought to resurrect their own traditional
processes. Similarly, the experiences of Indigenous and critical, non-Indigenous
academics and researchers from New Zealand and Canada were canvassed to
inform development of the critical analysis of the impact of the academy’s ethics
processes on the development, ownership and dissemination of Indigenous
knowledge.



Members of the academic community and researchers from Canada and New
Zealand whose research and activism focuses on state delivery of criminal justice
services to Indigenous communities, and state responses to Indigenous justice
activism and scholarship (18 individuals in total).

Engagement with this

community focused on their experiences of the development of crime control
policies and interventions and transfer between jurisdictions and the impact of
23

this activity on Indigenes; and the impact of academic research ethics processes on
the development and dissemination of Indigenous knowledge.


Government officials: involved in the development of policies and interventions
focused on Indigenous offending and victimisation were interviewed to inform the
papers on authoritarian criminology and the globalisation of crime control
products, such as the FGC (10 individuals in total). Interviews were carried out
with policy workers in New Zealand and Canada. Engagement with this group
focused on:


the rationale behind the development of crime control policies and
interventions, particularly those aimed at Indigenous peoples; and



their views on, and/or experiences of the transfer and importation of crime
control products across jurisdictions.

Research methods
A number of research techniques will be utilised to enable information related to the
key questions/themes of the project:

Individual, unstructured qualitative interviews: Were used to record the experiences of
key informants who preferred to be engaged with as individuals (as opposed to
participating in hui/focus groups). The interviews were conducted using a narrative
style based on a semi-structured schedule built upon key themes, rather than a list of
closed, restrictive questions.

This technique is considered more appropriate for

engaging with Indigenous elders, academics and practitioners (see Smith, 1999),
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although altered slightly for interviews with non-indigenous public servants. In total 26
individual interviews were carried out during the research from 2010 to 2013.

Focus group/hui: Were employed where necessary and appropriate. Engagement with
Indigenous participants combined individual interviews (in the case of academics,
researchers and political commentators) and hui (for engagement with providers,
practitioners, Elders’ Councils, etc).

The engagement with the Stó:lo First Nation

followed the tikanga (values or rules) set by elders/elder councils and, therefore,
privileged a hui-type form for gathering data (see Haig-Brown and Archibald (1996);
Rigney (1999) for discussion of the development of appropriate, empowerment-focused
research engagement techniques with Canadian and other Indigenous peoples). In all,
twelve focus groups/hui were held with Indigenous Elders’, practitioners and
community members. Some of the focus groups were purposely arranged for the study,
while others were arranged for other reasons (Indigenous business, conferencing
related to social harm, etc), and to which the researcher was invited to participate.

Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is made up of three parts that contain the substantive materials (Parts II, III
and IV), and an appendices (Part V):

Part II – Conceptual and theoretical discussion
This section provides an introduction to the primary conceptual and theoretical
framework for the thesis. It brings together the key arguments and findings into a
coherent whole and analyses in detail the colonial projects formulated and utilised in
25

settler-colonial societies that impede the ability of Indigenous peoples to achieve a
measure of self-determination in the justice sphere.

Part III – Published papers
This section presents the eight published papers that make up the thesis; including:

Paper 1: Criminal Justice as a Colonial Project in Contemporary Settler-Colonialism
This paper offers an Indigenous-centred, critical perspective on the colonial projects
(Thomas, 1994) employed in settler-colonial contexts to negate, or at the very least
nullify, the negative impact of two inter-related wicked problems that are deemed
peculiar to these jurisdictions: the high levels of Indigenous over-representation in the
criminal justice system, and the impact of Indigenous resistance to the hegemony of the
imposed, criminal justice systems deployed by settler-colonial states. The paper is
comprised of three inter-related parts; the first two outline the construction and
deployment of colonial projects in the colonial and neo-colonial contexts, wherein it is
argued that the matrix of criminal justice was foundational to the state’s attempted
eradication of, and eventual socio-economic marginalisation of Indigenous peoples. The
final part offers an argument that the continued success of criminal justice as a
(neo)colonial project, stems from its parasitic relationship with the discipline of
criminology.

Together, these supportive colonial projects deployment against

Indigenous peoples demonstrate that structural violence continues to be a significant
component of social control in the neo-liberal, neo-colonial context.
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Paper 2: Indigenous Critique of Authoritarian Criminology
Biko Agozino (2010: i) has described the discipline of criminology as “a ‘control-freak’”;
one whose imperialist reasoning is most evident when supporting “the [contemporary
states] exercise of internal colonialism and neo-colonialism” within settler-colonial
societies. In recent times the development of supposed evidence-based crime control
policy throughout Western jurisdictions appears to have reinvigorated administrative
criminological formations to the extent that they once again dominate policy discourse
relating to the issues of Indigenous over-representation and critique of the operations
of criminal justice. This paper seeks to explore this state of affairs by firstly, providing a
critical examination of the role criminology plays in the continued neo-colonial
subjugation of Indigenous peoples and secondly, the role that myth construction and
maintenance plays in the hegemonic activities of a particularly authoritarian form of the
discipline. A critical analysis of two articles from a recent Australian and New Zealand
Journal of Criminology special edition on Aboriginal violence (2010) highlights the core
features and, arguably, the key failings of this authoritarian criminology in relation to its
response to Indigenous justice issues: namely a preference for undertaking research on
instead of with Indigenous peoples, the privileging non-engaging research
methodologies and the potent use of myth to promote practitioners’ views of the world
and silence the Indigenous voice.

Paper 3: A Critical Appraisal of Responses to Māori Offending
This article critically analyses the role that criminological theory and specific policy
formulations of culture play in the New Zealand state’s response to the overrepresentation of Māori in the criminal justice system. Part one provides an overview of
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the changing criminological explanations of and responses to, Māori offending in New
Zealand from the 1980s onwards and how these understandings continued colonialist
approaches to Māori and crime, into the neo-colonial context. In particular we chart the
shift in policy development from theorising Māori offending as attributable to loss of
cultural identity, to a focus on socio-economic and institutional antecedents and finally
through the risk factors, assessment and criminogenic needs approaches that have
gained prominence in the current policy context. In part two the focus moves to the
strategies employed by members of the academy to elevate their own epistemological
constructions of Māori social reality within the policy development process.

In

particular, the critique scrutinises recent attempts to portray Indigenous responses to
social harm as unscientific and in part responsible for the continuing overrepresentation of Māori in New Zealand’s criminal justice system. The purpose of this
analysis is to focus the critical, criminological gaze firmly on the activities of policy
makers and administrative criminologists in relation to Māori as Indigenous peoples

Paper 4: An Indigenous, Critical Commentary on the Globalisation of Restorative Justice
The study and impact of the globalisation of crime control policies and interventions has
recently begun to receive significant attention from critical indigenous scholars.
Reasons for the increased focus on this issue include the restorative justice industry’s
increasing utilisation of so-called indigenous philosophies and practices in the design of
its various products; the pervasive use of indigenousness imagery, and emphasis on the
supposed 'indigenousness' of the industry's products, as displayed in much of its
marketing material. A further motivation is the increasing popularity of supposedly
indigenous-inspired restorative justice initiatives, in settler-colonial societies and
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increasingly

throughout

Western

jurisdictions

experiencing

significant

over-

representation of minorities in their criminal justice systems. The purpose of this paper
is to provide an Indigenous critique of the globalisation of restorative justice and the
industry’s utilisation of indigenous practices, symbols and philosophies. The paper
focuses on the impact that the international transfer of restorative products is having on
relationships between Indigenous peoples and central governments in neo-colonial
jurisdictions, particularly New Zealand and Canada, especially Indigenous peoples drive
for greater self-determination in these jurisdictions.

Paper 5: Resisting Condescending Research Ethics in Aotearoa New Zealand
Indigenous commentators have long expressed concerns with the impact upon them
and their communities, of the research-related activities of government agencies and
academic institutions. More recently, the critical Indigenous gaze has focused upon the
activities of Research Ethics Board’s (REB) and their members.

Specific concerns

include the preference of REBs for Eurocentric conceptualisations of what does/does
not constitute ethical research conduct, and the privilege accorded liberal notions of the
autonomous individual participant at the expense of communitarian approaches to
ethical conduct and knowledge construction. Informed by the author’s reflections on
the REB process, those of Indigenous Canadian and New Zealand research participants,
and the extant literature, this paper begins by critiquing the processes employed by
New Zealand REBs to assess Indigenous-focused or Indigenous-led research in the
criminological realm, before ending with a call for Indigenous peoples to resist the
condescending ethos of the Academy’s ethics processes, by developing REBs that work
for the self-determination for their peoples.
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Paper 6: Ritual and the Social Dynamics of Policy Making in New Zealand
This paper focuses on the activities of the Policy Industry for the following reasons; i)
the industry has the ability to significantly impact on our lives through its close
relationship with Cabinet, the development of legislation and access to extensive
budgets for policy development and implementation; and ii) to demystify the
mythological world policy makers encapsulate themselves within. I attempt to do this
by referring to specific case studies based on inter-agency projects I participated in over
the past decade in the crime control policy sector.

Paper 7: The Waitangi Tribunal and the Regulation of Māori Protest
Much of the current academic and political discourse related to the development and
operations of the Waitangi Tribunal over its first twenty years portray it as a forum that
provided Māori with a meaningful avenue for settling Treaty grievances compared to
the formal legal systems performance in the preceding 100 years. In contrast, we argue
that from its inception and throughout much of the 1980s, the Waitangi Tribunal
functioned primarily as an informal justice forum that assisted the New Zealand state’s
regulation of Māori Treaty activism during the transition from a Fordist to a PostFordist mode of capital accumulation.

Paper 8: The Politics of Gang Research in New Zealand
Like many other Western jurisdictions over the past sixty years, New Zealand has had to
contend with episodes of moral panic regarding the activities of youth gangs. The most
recent episode occurred in 2005-2007 and was spurred by a perceived escalation in
inter-gang conflict and violence in the Counties Manukau areas within greater Auckland,
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New Zealand. This particular episode was unique in the New Zealand context for the
level of attention given to youth gangs by the government and policy makers. This
paper reports on the authors’ experiences of carrying out research on the youth gang
situation in Counties Manukau as part of an inter-agency project to develop a response
to gang-related violence. Particular attention is paid to the ways in which government
officials attempted to mould the research process and findings to suit an already
emerging policy framework, predicated on supporting ‘business as usual’, at the
expense of research participants stated desire for great autonomy to develop and
delivery appropriate youth services to their communities.

Part IV – Discussion
This section provides an overview of the linkages between the eight papers and how,
collectively they meet the aims of the thesis.

Part V – Appendices
This part provides evidence of permission to include published papers, of peer review,
and statements from co-authors.

Significance of the Thesis
The significance of this thesis can be summarised as follows: First, the thesis examines
topics that were previously unexplored, underdeveloped, or analysed using research
that did not involve direct engagement with Indigenous peoples and their experiences.
For example, to date, little of the criminological literature on globalisation explores the
Indigenous experience. As such, this thesis offers one of the first empirically informed
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works on two interrelated issues with the contemporary globalisation of crime control
policy, and the increasing development of markets for crime control products.
Employing an Indigenous Emancipatory Methodology the paper utilises the real world
experiences of Indigenous peoples to demonstrate the nefarious impacts of the
globalisation of crime control policies and products, especially those emanating from
the expanding restorative justice market. Despite the fact that most of those involved in
this industry and plying their policies and franchised programmes on the globalised
market are not Indigenous, nevertheless they regularly use Indigenous cultural artefacts
in the design and, most importantly, to market their products (Tauri, 2009b; 2014c).

Second, another original feature of this thesis is its attention to the intersection of the
criminal justice sector and academic criminology, and the impact this relationship has
on Indigenous peoples residing in settler-colonial jurisdictions. Again, little literature
has been developed, especially from within the discipline, that focuses critically on this
important policy intersection. As one of the few criminologists to write on this subject,
Biko Agozino (2003; 2004) has demonstrated that not only is the relationship parasitic
and self-serving but also rarely is it of value to Indigenous peoples. And perhaps more
importantly, the discipline has a significant historical blind spot, namely its lack of
acknowledgement of the role it played in the colonial subjugation of Indigenous
peoples.

The papers contained in this thesis titled ‘Indigenous Critique of Authoritarian
Criminology’ and ‘Criminal Justice as a Colonial Project in Contemporary SettlerColonialism’, carry on the key theme of the intersection of the justice system and the
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human sciences in developing what Thomas (1994) called colonial projects;
technologies of social control deployed by the state that facilitate the ongoing
subjugation and criminalisation of Indigenous peoples in the settler-colonial context.
The papers further demonstrate that the discipline itself has an important, and
potentially damaging contemporary blind spot, namely the role many of its
practitioners play in silencing the Indigenous experience of criminal justice, through the
privileging of Eurocentric theories, and control of academic institutions of the research
context, especially what does/does not constitute appropriate research ethics.

And thirdly, a further significance of the thesis might at first glance appear to be more of
a weakness, namely the seemingly eclectic range of issues covered in the eight papers.
In fact the eclectic range of issues covered throughout the papers is purposeful, for it
demonstrates the array of colonial projects, technologies of control, policies, strategies
and so forth, that are arraigned against Indigenous peoples in the settler-colonial
context, and especially within the grand colonial project of criminal justice.

The papers are grouped into three interrelated sections: the first, represented by Paper
1, provides a theoretical and conceptual argument that the criminal justice system, in
partnership with the discipline of criminology produces a range of colonial projects that
further the settler-colonial states subjugation of Indigenous peoples. Section two is
made of Papers 2, 3, 4 and 5. The common conceptual thread linking them is a critical
focus on the strategies of disempowerment deployed against Indigenous peoples and
their knowledge by the academy, ranging from criminology’s silencing of the Indigenous
voice by restricting access to the policy making process, through to attempts to
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delegitimise Indigenous knowledge by controlling definitions of right and ethical
conduct through institutional (western) research ethics processes that sideline
communitarian approaches to determining ethical conduct and informed consent, and
finally to the use of Indigenous cultural artefacts to sell Eurocentric crime control
products on globalised crime control markets. Lastly, section three offers papers 6, 7
and 8, all of which provide case studies that demonstrate how the state sector
subjugates Indigenous peoples through the process of policy development; whether
through the construction of judicial processes that corral Indigenous critique within
informal justice mechanisms, or deploying ritual and myth to control policy
development for social issues of significance to Indigenous peoples, such as youth
justice and gang-related crime. The criticism of eclecticism, if made, has some validity.
In response we argue that they appear eclectic because of the very fact the state and the
academy deploy a range of colonial projects to ensure their domination of the definition
of and response to, the social issues facing Indigenous peoples.
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PART II

Conceptual and Theoretical Discussion

Criminal Justice and the Academy’s Response to Indigenous Peoples: A
Counter-Colonial Critique
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Introduction

Security? Culture? The rule of law? In the meantime, I look around and wherever
there are colonisers’ and colonised face to face, I see force, brutality, cruelty,
sadism, conflict, and, in parody of education, the hasty manufacture of a few
thousand subordinate functionaries.
Caesaire (1972: 21).

It has been argued that law and justice in contemporary western societies reflect the
subjectivity and epistemology of the dominant culture, or more specifically of white,
wealthy men (Ramsley and Marchetti, 200). This dominant subjectivity has also been
presented as both the object and the subject of the law/justice nexus. It is the object in
that it is he whose behaviour and sensibilities that the law has in mind when it
assembles its proscriptions and remedies. It is his perception of what constitutes a just
response to a social harm that dominates the development of policies, legislation and
‘effective’ interventions.

And, perhaps most importantly, it is this subject who

constructs the law itself (Fitzpatrick, 1992; Hudson, 2006). Some have argued that
through its discourse, practices and mythologies, criminal justice in Western, settlercolonial contexts continually invokes and reproduces white, masculine subjectivity of
both ‘the law ‘and the proper maintenance of social order (Agozino, 2004; Fitzpatrick,
1992; Naffine, 1990).

The case that western criminal justice is white man’s justice (or at least the white,
middle class male perception of ‘it’) is sufficiently well established in criminology and
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legal scholarship that it need not to be re-litigated in detail here. Suffice to say that the
general charges brought against conventional western criminal justice systems with
regards responses to the issue of difference, (be it related to cultural practices, ethnicity
and so on) is that they all too often fail to protect members of minority ethnic groups
and Indigenes from harms they experience by virtue of their ethnicity and/or their
colonised status (Cunneen, 2005; Jackson, 1992; Tauri, 2011b).

Furthermore,

considerable evidence exists that demonstrates that settler-colonial justice systems are
significant players in the ongoing subjugation of Indigenous peoples, minorities,
immigrants, and other groups defined by the state as sufficiently ‘Other’, or potentially
menacing to the social fabric, to warrant significant surveillance from the institutions of
crime control (Anthony, 2013; Tauri, 2013c; Wacquant, 2009). It is further argued that
minorities, immigrants and Indigenous peoples are discriminated against because they
are often over-penalised for indiscretions compared to non-Indigenous groups
(Cunneen, 2006; Harris, 1999; Kitossa, 2014). A primary cause of this discriminatory
practice are the influence of historical, but still powerful perceptions that Indigenes lack
the core characteristics of white, middle class masculinity (Cunneen, 2005) in much the
same way that feminist theorists have argued that women are (see Drucilla, 1991;
Smart, 1990).

Critics of western criminal justice systems point out that law treats Indigenous peoples
in the same way that dominant society treats them: law cannot be expected to remedy
injustices legally before they are recognised as injustices socially (Jackson, 1992). We
might view this process at work in the length of time it has taken for racialised or
ethnicised harms to be taken seriously by law. More often than not, legal/criminal
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justice progress occurs in response to demands from Indigenous social movements, and
the commentaries and actions of Indigenous organic intellectuals, those individuals who
straddle the academic and political contexts and seek to provide empirical gravitas to
Indigenous radicalism (Poata-Smith, 1996). While law/justice can be on the side of
progressive social movements, and while one could point to some instances where
law/justice has achieved some success in bringing about progressive change, the
law/justice processes applied in settler-colonial contexts have rarely led progressive
movements, but simply acted upon or reacted to them (Fitzpatrick, 1992).

Moving from documenting injustices to looking at the roots of these injustices in the
constructions of law/justice and the liberal philosophies on which western law is based,
reveals the closures of law/justice and the limits of justice that can be expected. With
regard to the situation of women, MacKinnon (1991) has argued that liberal justice only
provides redress for women who can demonstrate that they are ‘the same’ as men, or at
least the same as white, middle class men. Women who are ‘like men’ will be treated
equally with men by law when it is asked to redress harms or claim rights to those
aspects in which they have established themselves as the same.

For example,

professional women doing the same work as male colleagues have a reasonable chance
of success in bringing complaints against unequal pay. On the other hand, aspects of
their lives and personalities in which they are not perceived as the same as men will not
receive equal treatment or redress for harms. Thus, it has been more difficult for
women to gain rights relating to their bodies rather than to property or life in the public
sphere. Abortion rights, fertility rights, maternity rights, and rights that provide redress
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for sexual and other forms of gendered violence, remain contested and only partially
available (Lacey, 1998, Savell, 2002).

The response of law/justice systems to Indigenous peoples residing in settler-colonial
contexts is comparable in many ways to the treatment of (white, western and other)
women in this regard: in order to gain the rights and remedies for wrongdoing they
have to demonstrate that they are ‘the same’ as white men. And, in recognition of the
class-based foundations of capitalist law, they must be the same (or near enough) to
white, middle class men in attitude, conduct and ‘breeding’ (Barak et al, 2001; Mann,
1993). Again, professionals or property-owners who suffer harms or injustices in
relation to these attributes (for example, discrimination in the work place, burglary and
robbery) will find themselves supported by the law (at least in principle). However,
when Indigenous demands for justice concern acts or omissions directly related to their
indigeneity and status as Indigenous peoples, these demands are more often than not
contested, marginalised or ignored (Fitzpatrick, 1992; Tauri and Webb, 2011). Justice
is, therefore, too often confined to issues or episodes in which Indigenous claimants are
‘like white men’ in their mode of being in the world.

For Indigenous peoples and other ethnic minorities residing in Western jurisdictions
such as the United States, this means that there were no rights extended to slavery
because the conditions of slavery were unlike the conditions of white male free citizens
(Agozino, 2003). Law specified and regulated the rights of slave-owners, but as Patricia
Williams (1991: 154) remarked, “the legal system did not provide blacks, even freed
blacks, with structured expectations, promises or reasonable reliance’s of any sort”. In
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the colonial context, the laws protecting the land rights of free white men were not
extended to Indigenous peoples whose customary land ownership practices were
undermined by an economic system designed to finance individuals. Disregard for
Indigenous peoples’ beliefs and practices relating to land tenure was the norm, and laws
enabling settlers to take land at will were passed with regularity in the colonial contexts
of New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the US (see, Belich, 1995; Churchill, 1997 and
Pratt, 1992).

As demonstrated in Papers 2 and 6 of this thesis (Tauri, 2013c and Tauri, 2015), as
western societies supposedly became more responsive to Indigenous demands for selfdetermination, attempts to remedy these have further demonstrated the whitemaleness of law and criminal justice, and therefore the importance of this sphere of
policy for the continued hegemony of settler-colonial government. These responses
further highlight the limits of the justice that can be obtained by subordinated social
groupings in the settler-colonial context. Criminal justice responses to sexual and
domestic violence, for example, reveal the dependence of law on stereotypes of male
and female sexual roles (rape/consensual sex); and dependence on the idea of the
behaviour of ‘the reasonable man’ (provocation/self-defence) further illustrates the
(white)maleness of criminal law (O’Donovan, 1993).

Similarly, wavering over

definitions of racial crimes and differences in sentencing attributable to the ethnicity of
victims further demonstrate the entrenched whiteness of criminal law in settlercolonial (and most other western) jurisdictions (Cunneen, 2006). Critical race theorists
have demonstrated that the racialisation of crime, the criminalisation of, and the
discriminatory sentencing and lack of serious legal response to attacks on the persons
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and property of minorities, are, at base, structural. In other words the racialised
practices of crime control agencies do not emanate from individual jurists’ racist beliefs
or the actions of ‘a few bad apples’ within the police, but primarily from the ideological
constructs that drive institutional culture and practice (Hall 1980; Jackson, 1988; 1992;
Schur, 2002).

In the following section we discuss the processes through which white man’s law was
imposed upon Indigenous peoples in the colonial context and seek to uncover the
various colonial projects utilised by policy makers - and criminologists - to impose the
colonial will upon the Indigenous context. In turn this section lays the foundation for
identifying the colonial projects that form the basis of the role played by contemporary
criminal justice in the continued subjugation of Indigenous peoples residing in settlercolonial societies.

The Imposition of Criminal Justice and Settler-Colonial Subjugation

Colonisation is always lethal to the colonised.
Oliver (1995: 19).

Prior to colonialism and the insertion of a capitalist mode of production within
Indigenous contexts, the unification of social production and social cohesion was
achieved within relatively small, localised communities (Fitzpatrick, 1992). During the
growth of capitalism this organic unity was dissolved through the destruction of precapitalist production units and relations of dependence. In time they were replaced by
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the laws of the market and the phantom objectivity of the capitalist state and western
modes of law (Spitzer, 1982). It was this centralised form of legality and mode of
production that was forced upon Indigenous peoples during the colonisation process
(Agozino, 2004). The part played by the imposition of European law and criminal
justice on the process of colonial subjugation of Indigenes cannot be overstated. By the
end of the nineteenth century Indigenous control of traditional justice processes had all
but ceased across all colonial contexts (Griffiths, 1993; Pratt, 1992; Rogers, 1987; Ward,
1995).

During the European and American imperialism of the eighteenth and

nineteenth centuries, Eurocentric legal systems were superimposed on large regions of
Africa (Abel, 1979; Chanock, 1978; Okoth-Ogenda, 1979), the Americas (La Prairie,
1992) and the Pacific region (Brennan, 1993; Cunneen, 2005; Fitzpatrick, 1980;
Hazelhurst, 1995; Pospisil, 1979 and Ward, 1995). We might refer to this era as the first
wave of the globalisation of Western crime control. The second, which is taking place
now, provides the focus for the fourth paper included in this thesis (see Tauri, 2014a).

The imposition of European law and institutions of crime control played a significant
part in the colonisation process, especially as they were often deployed to “civilise and
enlighten colonised peoples; to reshape their family lives, work habits, land ownership
practices, and ways of handling conflicts” (Merry, 1992). European law and criminal
justice were, therefore, important projects in the colonialist drive for hegemony over
the settler context (see Tauri, 2014c; and discussion below). Later, they provided
significant support for the attempted eradication of cultural and social differences as
various settler societies moved into the assimilationist era of ‘late colonialism’ (Gadacz,
1987).
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While each colonising power inevitably wants its form of governance, its hegemony, to
prevail, there was no one colonial response to existing indigenous processes for dealing
with social harm. Responses varied according to time, location, and the people who
were driving colonisation and those being colonised. As some exponents of postcolonialism contend, the colonial process is not a fixed one. It is a process is by
necessity, malleable; able to be altered or redirected to suit the prevailing socio-political
and geographical conditions. Indeed colonialism, and its successor neo-colonialism, is
best described as “a structure[s], not an event” (Wolfe, 1999: 163), one that is made up
of hegemonic projects that arise from the ensuing conflict between the forces of
colonisation and Indigenous peoples resistance to it (Proulx, 2001; Tauri, 2014c; see
discussion below).

The negative other - the colonialist construction of Indigenous criminality
One of the significant features of the colonialist the imposition of supposedly ‘liberal’
western crime control systems, was the degree to which Indigenous peoples and their
justice processes were excluded. Critics of liberalism point out that the exclusions and
closures of liberal justice are not accidental oversights, but are inevitable because of the
impact of liberal political philosophy. Said (1978, 1993) and Gilroy (1993) point out
that liberalism needs the irrational, uncivilised, black, oriental and Indigenous Other
who is delineated by their lack of everything that supposedly distinguishes the
reasonable ‘man’ of Western socio-legal mythology. The Other is defined by their lack of
democratic governance, their religious, custom-centred rather than rational legal
systems, their lack of adherence to Western notions of human rights and their lack of
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scientific achievement: in other words, they are distinguished by their lack of
enlightenment (Smith, 1999). The narratives which construct this Otherness, these
‘natives without rational law’ were crucial for justifying hegemonic planned acts of
subjugation, such as colonialism and slavery (Fitzpatrick, 1992).

They were also

important for the constitution of the Western subject’s idea (ideal) of (his/her) selfidentity. As argued earlier, liberalism recognises claims to justice made by those who
demonstrate their possession of the qualities of the liberal (white, middle class male)
subject. Each subject must suppress his/her inherent traits of Otherness (the child
and/or the savage within) to demonstrate that he/she is one of the civilised, and not a
‘native’ (Velverde, 1996).

Arguably, the creation of the Other, he/she who sits outside the constituency of justice
because of his/her supposed racialised deficiencies, is a linguistic necessity. The binary
structure of our language means that we tend to recognise or define one thing by
contrast with it’s supposed opposite. The imperative of the negative (Indigenous) Other
demonstrates that liberal societies are constantly producing and reproducing divisions;
between the rational and irrational, the deserving and undeserving (welfare recipient,
victim, etc), the civilised and the uncivilised1.

As settler-colonial societies move,

theoretically at least, towards more equal citizenship in broad notions of ethnic, gender
and sexual difference, new distinctions may open up between groups within populations
residing in the nation-state.

1

Immigrants or refugees who accept the Australian,

Durkheim (1985) makes a similar argument when he talks of the necessity of crime for the positive
functioning of modern society. According to Durkheim, crime is a sign of a healthy society, one based on
mutual obligation and recognition of a set framework of norms. Legitimation of these norms is aided by
the construction of outsiders; deviants who, through society’s negative response to their rule breaking,
highlights for all, the negative ramifications of breaking social norms.
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Canadian, New Zealand, or more broadly the Western, civilised way of life are
distinguished in positive terms from those who do not: followers of non-Christian
religions are divided into the moderate and the fanatical and, in the post-9/11 era,
foreign nations are divided into the democratic and the anti-democratic (‘for US’, or
‘against US’). To move beyond white man’s justice, new models must be able to dissolve
the logic of identity; the logic by which justice will only be possible if claims are based
on being the same as the mythological white, male, reasonable person of law. To begin
this process, we must start by critiquing white man’s law and related Eurocentric
conceptualisations of what is/is not social harm and how best to/not to respond to ‘it’.
And, as criminal justice is a fundamental ingredient in the construction of the social
Other (see Becker, 1963 and Dotter, 2004) in the colonial context, any critical analysis
of settler-colonialism must be informed by an Indigenous critical standpoint at injects
the Indigenous perspective into the process.

Until now, much of the critique of liberalism, and the law, has come from critical schools
of (Western) theory; radical criminology, left realism, Marxist criminology and various
forms of feminist criminology. To date there has been little concentrated critique of
liberalism, or law and of criminal justice based on a critical Indigenous perspective.
Because of this, other, mostly non-indigenous voices have spoken on our behalf about
‘our’ experiences and perspectives (see Tauri, 2013c for a thorough discussion of this
issue)2.

Some, including Chris Cunneen, Thalia Anthony and Harry Blagg in the

Australian context, have produced exemplary work that demonstrates the power of
2

Tauri (2013c, 2015) contends that much of the criminological literature on indigenous/ethnic minority
issues originates from government sponsored research. More often than not indigenous participants
have had little input into the development of the methodology, analysis and dissemination, and rarely
do they have direct input into policies and interventions that result from said research.

45

emancipatory research, especially when our experiences form the basis of the work.
Unfortunately, more often than not the work of non-Indigenous scholars is created
without our input, with the resulting material reflecting the views of the white middle
class academics and the policy sector of the supposed Indigenous problem (see Deckert,
2014; Tauri, 2013c). Sometimes the approach and resulting publications take what
Tauri (2013c) and Tauri and Webb (2012) call an authoritarian criminological stance,
an epistemological and methodological position seemingly driven by a colonialist,
paternalistic sense of duty to protect the native, mostly from ourselves. Unfortunately,
while practitioners are willing to uncover the psycho-social determinants of Indigenous
crime (especially of the violent kind), they too often ignore the structural, violent,
disempowering actions of the settler-colonial state to which they often lend their
expertise. To counter the white maleness of so much criminological musings on the
Indigenous problem, we must construct our own theory of colonialism and analysis of
the colonial projects that make the hegemony of white law possible in this, the settlercolonial context.

Constructing a Theory of Social Control in Settler-Colonial Contexts

The dominant discourse on globalisation is the history of the winners, told by the
winners.
de Sousa Santos (2006: 395).

In support of the Indigenous emancipatory methodology that drove this thesis, theory
must be made to work for the Other, and utilised in such a way as to give authority to
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the experiences of those too often silenced. Such as approach sits in contrast to the
grand theorising of the European academy where:

The Other is cited, quoted, framed, illuminated, encased in the shot/reverse shot
strategy of serial enlightenment. Narrative and the cultural politics of difference
become the closed circle of interpretation. The Other loses its power to signify, to
negate, to initiate its own historic desire, to establish its own institutional and
oppositional discourse. However impeccably the content of an ‘other’ culture may
be known, however anti-ethnocentrically it is represented, it is its location as the
closure of grand theories, the demand that, in analytical terms, it be always the
good object of knowledge, the docile body of difference, that reproduces a relation
of domination and is the most serious indictment of the institutional powers of
critical [Eurocentric] theory (Bhabha, 1994: 46).

Building on Bhabha’s argument, the purpose of this section is to provide the theoretical
foundations through which contemporary Indigenous experiences of the imported
criminal justice ‘systems’ that dominate settler-colonialism can be fully expressed.

Colonialism or neo-colonialism?
Throughout a number of the papers that make up this thesis, the author refers to the
current relationship between Indigenous peoples and settler-colonial states as one that
reflects a settler-colonial context. In order to preface descriptions/definitions of this
term, we must first untangle it from the on-going debate within colonial studies and
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critical race theory with regards the relevance of the term ‘post-colonial’, as opposed to
‘neo-colonial’, to describe the current socio-political status of settler-colonial societies.

Despite limitation with the term itself, the body of work emanating from the
Postcolonial School has had a significant impact on Indigenous scholarship. As Paolini
(1999: 50) writes:

… one of the principle moves of postcolonialism has been to deconstruct the
Eurocentrism of Western scholarship… in the process, postcolonialism has
empowered the so-called subaltern or postcolonial subject in a reinscribed
narrative of imperialism and colonialism in which [Indigenous] identity is
recovered.

Osterhammel (1997: 16-17) presents colonialism as a process through which a foreign
power rules or seeks to rule over a particular, demographic majority, which entails:

... a relationship of domination between an indigenous (or forcibly imported)
majority and a minority of foreign invaders. The fundamental decisions affecting
the lives of the colonised people are made and implemented by the colonial rulers
in pursuit of interests that are often defined in a distant metropolis. Rejecting
cultural compromises with the colonised population, the colonisers are convinced
of their own superiority and of their ordained mandate to rule.
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However, not all colonial contexts evolved in the same manner. Recent scholarship
demonstrates significant variations in the formulation of the socio-economic
domination of Indigenous peoples (see Hopkins, 1999; Osterhammel, 1997; Veracini,
2010).

For example, Hopkins (1999: 215) differentiates between colonialism and control from
afar (post-colonialism) compared to colonisation from within (neo or settlercolonialism) when he writes that “... where white settlers became numerically
predominant, colonial rule made peoples out of new states; where indigenous societies
remained the basis of government, the state was fashioned from existing peoples”. The
settler-colonial phenomenon is predicated upon the domination of the Indigenous Other
from within. In this situation the colonisers cease being colonisers from afar and
become ‘indigenous’ at the point that demographic majority is achieved and control of
government and governance is attained (Veracini, 2010: 5).

Hence we have the

colonialism at a distance model prevalent in the sub-continent and Africa (minority rule,
Home Office policy interspersed with native social control mechanisms, administration
via Subaltern’s) versus the settler-colonial model where colonial rule is facilitated in
part through imported institutions of social control such as courts, law, the legislative
process and institutionalised policing (Wolfe, 1999).

The importation of these

institutions is supported through the developing capitalist mode of resource extraction
and economic regulation, and the systematic eradication of indigenous life-worlds and
their core institutions (Braudel, 1986; Venn, 2006). The contention here is that the
way(s) in which social order is achieved and maintained reveals that there are clear
distinctions between jurisdictions resulting from the form of colonialism they were
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subjected to. Differences are also present in the overall attitude towards Indigenous
peoples, with colonialism at a distance characterised by an indispensability of
indigenous bodies, in particular their labour – a master-servant relationship - compared
to an attitude of dispensability within the settler-colonial domain emphasised in the
following quote by Wolfe (1999: 163):

The primary object of settler-colonisation is the land itself rather than the surplus
value to be derived from mixing native labour with it.

Though, in practice,

Indigenous labour was indispensable to Europeans, settler-colonisation is at base
a winner-takes-all project whose dominant feature is not exploitation but
replacement.

The logic of this project, a sustained institutional tendency to

eliminate the Indigenous population, informs a range of historical practices that
might otherwise appear distinct – invasion [and domination] is a structure not an
event [emphasis added].

From the moment of first contact between Indigenous peoples and colonisers, various
technologies of power were deployed to expedite European control of the Indigenous
context. During the initial phases of colonialism, military action and religion were the
dominant strategies in the pursuit of colonial domination (de Silva, 2001). Through
religious conversion Indigenous peoples could be transformed from innocent but
savage beings into “knowledgeable (proper) subjects” (ibid: 427) made ready for
participation in a European dominated post-colonial, capitalist society (see also Tauri,
2014b). Moving into the latter stages of colonialism, the impact of the Enlightenment
saw science, or more accurately the racialised application of scientific knowledge,
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displace religion as a key strategy of colonial subjugation. Evoking Foucault, de Silva
asserts that power over the colonial social context requires the manipulation,
classification and identification of bodies, and as such “…. a whole new field of science
emerged within the ‘empty souls’ of slaves, the Indigenous, the ‘oriental’ were
transformed into ‘racial bodies’” (ibid: 427). It is through these technologies of power
that the ideological authority of the coloniser over the colonised moved from
emphasising differences in the sou,l to Darwinist-inspired ‘natural’ differences in
biology, genetics and intellect.

While the technologies of power resulted in the

development of different strategies of control (the church, moral-related laws, vs. antiassociation laws and the like – see discussion below of colonial projects), their sociopolitical aims were similar: to provide the ideological justification for the subjugation,
and in some instances the physical genocide, of Indigenous peoples (Tauri, 2013c;
2014c).

Colonial and settler-colonial attempts at dominating the Indigenous Other rely on a
range of technologies, or what Thomas (1994) refers to as colonising projects (see
Tauri, 2014c). According to Bhabha (1994: 94-120) one such technology or project is
stereotype, which entails the use of language and signifiers (linguistic or symbolic) that
denote a fixity in the ideological construction and (re)presentation of the Indigenous
Other (or indeed, of any identified ‘problem population’): “it connotes rigidity and the
unchanging order as well as disorder, degeneracy and daemonic repetition... [it is] a
form of knowledge and identification that vacillates between what is always ‘in place’,
already known, and something that must be anxiously repeated...”. Thus we read of
various stereotypes of Indigenous peoples that primordialise them; representing them
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as having unalterable states of being, whether of mind, physicality and/or social mores.
These stereotypes are exemplified in ideological constructs such as ‘the savage Red
Indian’, the ‘drunk Aboriginal’, the ‘sexually insatiable Black slave’, the ‘happy (but dim,
guitar strumming) Māori’, and so on (Kidd, 1997). The colonial project of stereotype
transcends the physicality and intellectual boundaries of the Indigenous Other, and
provides fixity of their supposed uncivilised beliefs, social behaviour and institutions,
exemplified in the child-like nature of our nativistic and/or pan-theist religious systems
(Fitzpatrick, 1992), or the quant, myth-based processes we use for responding to social
harm (Jackson, 1992).

The part that colonial projects like stereotype play in the

negative Othering of Indigenous peoples cannot be overestimated, for as Bhabha (1994:
100) maintains:

... colonial discourse [is] an apparatus of power and its predominant strategic
function is the creation of a space for a ‘subject peoples’ through the production of
knowledges in terms of which surveillance is exercised whilst seeking
authorisation for its strategies by the production of knowledges of coloniser and
colonised which are stereotypical but antiethically evaluated. The objective of
colonial discourse is to construe the colonised as a population of degenerate types on
the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest and to establish systems of
administration and instruction (emphasis added).

The localised and partial nature of colonial projects allows for the different impacts of
colonialism on Indigenous peoples in settler-colonial societies, where the impacts may
vary relating to different projects, whilst allowing for the overall impact – social and
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cultural dislocation – to manifest (Proulx, 2003; see also Tauri, 2014c for full discussion
of the concept of colonial projects).

Historical examples of colonial projects
As reported in Paper 1 (Tauri, 2014c), a significant project in the colonial context was
the ‘civilising mission’, a key driver of which was the purposeful destruction of the
native residing within the Indigenous person, and his/her replacement by the civilised,
‘westernised’ Christian (Cunneen, 2011: 5). The civilising mission in colonial contexts
like New Zealand and Australia involved an ideological and policy-based pincer
movement involving education and religious institutions. Over time, colonial education
policies forbade the teaching of Indigenous culture and language, policies given
particular potency with the advent of Mission Schools and the forced removal of
Indigenous children to these establishments (Cunneen, 2011; Milroy, 1999). In the
Canadian context the residential school system began in the 1870s and lasted as an
official component of Federal education policy until the 1980s. The policy involved a
network of schools nationwide, run by Catholic, Anglican, Presbyterian and United
Churches. Many thousands of Indigenous children were removed and spent their
formative years in these schools. Milroy (1999) relates how the system was a churchstate partnership, with the Department of Indian Affairs providing the funding, setting
of standards and practices and exercising direct legal control over the Indigenous
children who were considered wards of the state.

Similarly, Cunneen (2011) relates that in the Australian context, Australia Aboriginal
children were forcibly removed from their families and communities in a purposeful
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policy of assimilation that lasted sixty years or more. In some states and territories of
Australia, Aboriginal children were placed in church-run establishments, while in
others, such as New South Wales, the institutions were the responsibility of the colonial
state. However, regardless of the source of authority, church or state, the focus of
pedagogy and curriculum was the same – to kill the ‘native within’ (NISATSIC, 1997), as
Cunneen (2011: 5-6) relates when he writes that:

Both the Canadian and Australia authorities saw the removal process as part of a
civilising mission and spiritual duty to uplift the ‘natives’. By today’s standards
the assimilationist ‘civilising’ process would be condemned as ethnocide or
cultural genocide and properly considered as a state crime.

Combined with criminal justice policy and practice, modes of domination such as
residential schools and forced removal of children provide further examples of how
colonial discourse and practice “organised social existence and social reproduction” in
the colonial context (Proulx, 2002: 42; see also Foucault, 1977). And, as demonstrated
in papers included in this thesis (Tauri, 2013c; Tauri, 2014c), they also provide concrete
processes for the continued subjugation of Indigenous peoples within the settlercolonial context.

Contemporary (settler) colonial projects
Proulx (2003: 43-51) describes how some of the key colonial projects of the
assimilationist phase of colonisation, such as the residential school program in Canada,
have either ceased to be used or had their form and delivery significantly altered.
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Albeit, while the education and child care and protection processes remain important
social control institutions, it can be argued that the form in which these colonial projects
are delivered has altered (see later discussion). In both the New Zealand and Canadian
context we can measure the cessation of specific colonial projects such as residential
schools in Canada, and the legal assault on Māori cultural transmission, with the move
from assimilationist discourse and policies towards integrative, then multicultural, and
of late, self-determination/reconciliation rhetoric and policy (Tauri, 1999).

The fact that specific colonising projects and strategies went out of style or were
refashioned is to be expected: every colonial epoch produces projects designed to shore
colonialist hegemony in order to contain and control Indigenous peoples. However,
what is more permanent is the interconnected nature of colonial (and neo-colonial)
governance; a highly sophisticated, layered process involving interrelationships
between the state (made up of the legislature, Cabinet, the policy-making and service
delivery institutions), and civil society. Within the state edifice Woolford imagines the
process of colonial government as a highly sophisticated mesh made up of inter-locking
levels, from the outer meta-level, to meso and micro levels, each containing colonial
projects of varying complexity and interconnectedness. The former are key edifices of
the colonial context and provide the superstructure upon which settler-colonialism
survives. At this level we find the institutions of social control, including education,
child care and protection, and health services. It is also the level at which we find a
colonial project of particular potency, the criminal justice system. The potency of this
macro-level colonial project comes from the authority it derives from being the site of
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the contemporary, neo-liberal states deployment of legitimised violence to facilitate
social order within the body politic (Haleh Davis, 2011).

The implementation of a Western European legal jurisdiction and criminal justice
system, were central platforms for the subjugation of Indigenous peoples in all colonial
contexts. These edifices were especially important for supporting the civilising mission
that was foundational to colonial policy (Merry, 2000; Proulx, 2003; Tauri, 1998). As a
sub-component of the law, criminal justice was a powerful (civilising) colonial project in
two specific ways: 1) it ensured that the definitions of what constitutes crime and social
harm were based on Eurocentric definitions of those terms; and 2) it provided a ready
platform for the deployment of structural violence by the state against Indigenous
peoples who did not adhere to Western standards of behaviour - those who dared
challenge the hegemony of the colonial state, or who were simply residing on good
pastoral and mining land (Tauri, 2013c; 2014c).

Other powerful colonial projects intersect, feed off and support one another in this
manner. For example, Fridieres (2000: 215-219) describes the intersections between
government and economic policies supportive of corporations, as well as the activities
that created and maintain welfare dependency on Indigenous reserves. These activities
provided significant stimuli for the urban migration that occurred amongst many
Indigenous communities from the 1950s onwards. In turn, this phenomenon brought
with it the social, cultural and economic dislocation of Indigenous communities, the
results of which are summarised by Proulx (2003; 53; see also Sinclair, 1997) who
writes that:
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The colonial and postcolonial colonial context... has destroyed Aboriginal social
orders, stability and cultural integration leading to a disjunction between ends and
means within Aboriginal cultures resulting in crime and social disorder.
Assimilationist social policy and laws, coupled with culturally different judicial
philosophies and practices, are central to this process.

The Settler-Colonial State/Criminology Nexus

[W]e live in an era of postmodern imperialism and manipulations by shapeshifting colonial powers; the instruments of domination are evolving and
inventing new methods to erase Indigenous histories and senses of place.
Therefore, ‘globalisation’ in Indigenous eyes reflects a deepening, hastening and
stretching of an already-existing empire.
Alfred and Corntassel (2005: 601).

The rise of the industrial revolution in 19th century Western Europe saw the parallel
development of the human sciences based on empiricist methodology. The human
sciences placed in the hands of the propertied, moralising classes, the tools to identify,
name and (arguably) combat the moral sewage that continuously threatened to spill out
from the geographic space of the damned (see Christie, 2000). One key science of
morality was, and remains, criminology, the conception of which can be pinpointed
during this historical, intellectual epoch (Agozino, 2003; Foucault, 1977). Traditional
criminology, a discipline joined at birth to the developing Western, capitalist state,
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continues to thrive through its sustained focus on the behaviours and attitudes that
fuelled its conception – emotionality, incontinence and contamination (Guarino-Ghezzi,
2002; Messerschmidt, 1986). Referring to the intellectual and moral foundations of
‘traditional’ criminology, the Italian theorist Ruggiero (2000:1) states that:

“[t]here are imaginary geographies which place imperfect minorities in
marginalised locations: in a social elsewhere. These locations consist of protected
zones which ensure the reproduction of those who inhabit them, who are
separated from the majorities living outside. These geographies of exclusion
associate elsewhere with that which is contaminated, filthy, offensive to morality
and olfaction” (emphasis Ruggiero’s).

Furthermore, Ruggiero (ibid: 1) argues that traditional criminology “makes filth,
sewers, and excrement, in brief that ‘inferno’ delimited by imaginary geographies, its
main terrain of analysis and development”.

Ruggiero is locating the theoretical

development of criminology and reason de jure, in a specific historical context, namely
the rise of the state as arbiter of social control in the developing capitalist context. He
argues that criminology has always been a keen supporter of state dominated social
control and a significant contributor to the maintenance of capitalist social order
(Agozino, 2003; Becker, 1963).

Indeed, we might argue that from conception

criminology was an intellectually bankrupt discipline, one that was (and still is) focused
on the geographical space inhabited by the socially damned. At the same time its
adherents, at least those of the administrative and authoritative varieties, too often
avert their gaze from the corruption and immorality of the propertied and political
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elites of western, neo-liberal societies. Of course Sutherland (1949), Merton (1938) and
others eventually turned the critical gaze of the discipline toward these social factions.
And it must be recognised that the rise of critical, Marxist, feminist theorists, and of late
counter-colonial criminologists has further problematised the behaviour and morality
of ‘God’s chosen’ (see Agozino, 2003; Simpson, 1989; Spitzer, 1974; Taylor, Walton and
Young, 1973).

However, despite these critical developments, much of the discipline of criminology’s
energy is still focused on the social elsewhere, the sewers, the damned, and their
offspring. This is the case despite the fact that, as Ruggiero so eloquently argues, we can
no longer definitively pinpoint the boundaries that mark the social geography of the
damned, or indeed of the saved. Nor is the perimeter able to be measured and mapped
as conclusively as was once theorised by western criminologists 3. And so, eventually
the gaze of the discipline moved exclusively from the sewers, the social spaces
supposedly marked by impurity and contamination, and discovered that not all was well
in those spaces long thought moral, just and socially cohesive.

This may be the case, but I, along with other critical commentators argue that the
discipline is still heavily wedded to its wet nurse, the state, and much of its activity
serves the state’s criminal justice apparatus. While we might agree with Ruggiero that
the boundaries of the damned may not be so clear cut geographically, if indeed they
ever were, the discipline continues to create symbolic boundaries through its

3

One might argue that the new technologies of the developing crime science, such as data mapping,
represents another chapter in illuminating the borders of social deviance (see Leipnik and Albert,
2003).
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theoretical and foundational precepts: offender/victim, exclusion/inclusion and
punishment/reintegration.

Furthermore,

criminologists

sometimes

advance

Indigenous subjugation through the physical act of being a criminologist; particularly
when they choose to job for the state by accepting contracts to carry out research on
Indigenous peoples, or on Indigenous issues that are formulated without the meaningful
involvement of Indigenous peoples. This issue is compounded when they choose to
proselytise from afar on the state of hell through surveys and statistical analysis of the
social context, while rarely moving the manhole cover and descending into the sewer to
observe what is going on (Tauri, 2013c; Young, 2011).

There are specific communities and groups of individuals who continue to be privileged
with the gaze of traditional criminology. In many respects they are the same folk devils
that have dominated the historical development of social and criminal justice policy,
namely those living in the social elsewhere and who threaten to pollute society with
their immorality, emotions and lust. These reformulated, contemporary folk devils who,
arguably, brought about the neo-liberal ‘risk society’ (Garland, 2001), include the
unemployed, the indigent, travellers, women of low moral character, religious
fundamentalists (of all faiths), working class youth, and ethnic minorities.

In the

colonial/neo-colonial context, one such group has always been, and remain, the
Indigenous peoples (Cunneen, 2008; Palys, 1993 and Tauri, 2009).
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Criminology and the Colonial Enterprise

As if to show the totalitarian character of colonial exploitation the settler paints
the native as a sort of quintessence of evil. Native society is not simply described
as a society lacking in values, but also the negation of values… the enemy of
values… the absolute evil… corrosive… destroying… disfiguring…
Fanon (1968: 31-32).

This thesis is focused as much on exploring the discipline of criminology’s role in the
settler-colonial states continued subjugation of Indigenous peoples, as it is about the
role of the criminal justice system and its policy functionaries in this process (see
Papers 1, 5, 7 and 8 in this thesis). The reason for this is that the two entities, the policy
industry and the academy, are heavily interlinked, with the academy often providing the
intellectual silage that nourishes the development of crime control policy and
legislation. In the meantime, the policy industry exerts philosophical and analytical
control over the academy through heavily prescribed research contracts and ideological
exhortations that we strive to be ‘of utility’ to the state and its policy functionaries by
producing knowledge that equates with their understanding of the social context
(Brickey, 1989; Tauri, 2009; Walters, 2003). Given the depth of this symbiotic, parasitic
relationship, one cannot analyse the policy sector’s role in the continued subjugation of
Indigenous peoples in settler-colonial contexts, without analysing the role of supportive
disciplines such as criminology (Tauri, 2013c). The work of Lynch (2000), Beirne
(1993) and Foucault (1977), the humanist-psychologist, Seymour Halleck (1967) and
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Agozino (2003; 2004), is instructive for analysing the historical and contemporary role
of criminology in the settler-colonial subjugation of Indigenous peoples.

In his influential work on the development of criminology, Piers Beirne (1993: 5),
talking of the intent of one of criminology’s founding fathers, Beccaria, writes that:

Beccaria’s chief objective in [On Crimes and Punishment] was the application to
crime and penal strategies of the ‘science of man’, deterministic discourse
implicitly at odds with conventional assumptions about the exclusively humanist
and violitional bases of ‘classical criminology’.

Beirne’s assessment of Beccaria’s intentions countered what had been a long trend in
criminological reflection on the discipline’s historical roots, where much of the focus
was on the conception and birth of the discipline within the wider context of humanist
and Enlightenment thinking. A standard creation myth of the discipline is that Beccaria
and his contemporaries were driven to develop criminology through their adherence to
humanist ideals borne of the Enlightenment movement. Through the development of
the discipline its early practitioners sought to relieve society from the suffering caused
by crime, and reconstruct western systems of justice to reflect the enlightenment ideals
of rationality, scientific method and objectivity (Carrabine, Cox, Lee, Plummer and
South, 2009). In contrast, Agozino, Beirne and Lynch challenge the established origin
myths by presenting the critical determination that criminology is largely an oppressive
construct; or as Lynch (2000: 146) contends “… up to this point the history of
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criminology has been the story of humanly created methods of oppression told from the
oppressor perspective”.

According to Lynch (2000: 147), from its inception criminology has been defined by two
characteristics: to generate scientific knowledge about crimes and criminals that would
enable society to control crime; and concern for humanity and humanitarian issues,
“especially those associated with rectifying the brutal, inhumane and arbitrary
conditions of punishment”. In contrast, Beirne et al contend that criminology is not just,
nor ever solely concerned with ‘curing crime’ or advancing humanitarian causes. Yes,
criminologists have written about these issues, but the focus is about much more than
providing the discipline with methodological rigour; it is also useful for insulating the
discipline from external criticism of its Eurocentric orientations. Instead, they build on
the work of Foucault and Halleck and argue that during the rise of capitalism,
criminology emerged as a part of the apparatus of the science of oppression established
by Enlightenment philosophy.

Of course, this is not usually the way the Enlightenment movement and its intellectual
endeavours are depicted. More often it is presented as a revolutionary rupture from
past theorising on the human condition; an intellectual paradigm that generated an
enlightened view of human beings and human social organisation that in turn, produced
a positive progression in human social and intellectual development (Dupre, 2004;
Rabinow, 1984). However, Lynch (2000: 148-149) contends that there is a dark side to
the Enlightenment, from which criminology was born.

This element of the

Enlightenment, especially the move from theory (of crime causation) to practice
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(developing scientific responses to crime and testing policies and interventions), is
where we expose the connection between criminology, crime control policy and the ongoing subjugation of Indigenous peoples in the settler-colonial context described in
Papers 1 and 2 (Tauri, 2013c and 2014c).

The Enlightenment and the darkness of the (colonial) criminological enterprise
In their critique of Enlightenment, Agozino, Beirne, Foucault and Lynch argue that it is
no accident of history that Enlightenment scholarship arose along with capitalist
systems of production. Indeed, Enlightenment theorising of the social context can be
regarded as a mechanism that supported and legitimised capitalist social relationships;
in particular the uneven distribution of political authority and access to resources
(Bratton and Denham, 2014; Meiksis Woods, 2002). From a social control perspective,
the Enlightenment can be viewed as driven in part by two contradictory, albeit interrelated concerns revealed by Lynch (2000: 148: Lynch’s emphasis ) in the following
quote: “[o]n the one hand, Enlightenment scholarship concerns the conditions of human
freedom. On the other hand, and quite ironically, it is also about those conditions of
control necessary to maintain freedom”. According to this perspective, controls on
human behaviour are a necessary component for establishing and maintaining freedom,
based on the utilitarian precept of the greatest good for the greatest number. Individual
freedom, in other words, is subservient to the conditions for the broadest degree of
social freedom of the majority (Gaus, 1999).

From a critical Indigenous perspective, what is at issue here is the meaning of the ideal
(or idea) of social freedom and how this freedom is to be defined and attained and by
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whom. The marriage of Enlightenment perspectives and capitalism provides insight
into the historical emphasis of criminology on the geographies of disadvantage so
eloquently expressed by Ruggiero. The subservience of individual freedom to social
freedom (to the greater good) was a key foundational precept of Enlightenment
scholarship, and it was later to become a (if not the) principle philosophical construct of
the discipline of criminology (Ferri, 1901). What constitutes social freedom is defined
by and based on rules, largely rules of law, which contained a definition of rights. The
definition of rights these rules contained presupposed an array of social, economic and
political relationships that “privileged the rights of property holders over others”
(Lynch, 2000: 148). Consequently, the specific rules and rights that criminologists since
the classical theorists have endorsed, have advantaged property holders over others –
or perhaps more accurately in the colonial context, European settler communities
seeking to strip land from Indigenes and maintain their right over that land and the
resources it held (Jackson, 1992).

Lynch (2000: 148-149) argues that given its roots in Enlightenment philosophy, it
should come as no surprise that the history of western criminology has focused on
efforts to:
i)

legitimise control of the dangerous classes that had spread rapidly throughout
Europe during the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, and in the U.S. in the late 19th and
20th centuries. In the contemporary era, criminology continues to focus its efforts
on controlling the dangerous classes. Over time, there has also been “a tendency to
expand the idea of the marginal classes to include racial and ethnic minorities”
[emphasis added];
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ii)

spread conditions conducive to inculcating discipline and related work habits, or,
as Foucault suggest, methods for rendering the body (politic) docile.

These

practices, which show up in a variety of criminal apparatus, target the dangerous
classes and problem populations like Indigenous peoples, migrants, the unemployed, and so forth; and
iii)

regain control over the penal process and power structure that had gradually
begun to be eroded by mass-responses toward public corporal punishments
during the Middle Ages (Foucault, 1977).

In the contemporary period, the

problem is somewhat reversed, as crime control has come to cater to the desires
of the public who, over time, have internalised the ideology of capitalism.

There were many and varied mechanisms constructed from Enlightenment philosophy
to facilitate social control and uphold the rights of propertied classes. Criminology
developed as one (although perhaps the most important) of those intellectual
paradigms concerned with controlling the free and unfettered creativity of the criminal
(read dangerous) class (Halleck, 1967). According to Lynch (2000), criminology can be
viewed as a method of legitimising mechanisms of oppression that target the dangerous
class, which I argue, includes Indigenous peoples residing in contemporary settlercolonial contexts:

In short, criminology is one of the disciplines that establishes the conditions
necessary for maintenance of the status quo of power. It can only do so by
oppressing those who would undermine the status quo. In this sense, criminology
must be viewed as a ‘science of oppression’ (ibid: 149; emphasis added].
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Criminology as a science of oppression
The Enlightenment and the rise of the capitalist mode of production can be understood
only through reference to each other.

Enlightenment scholarship emphasised the

principles of rationality, objectivity, individualism, efficiency (of production and
maintenance of social order) and the sanctity of property rights. Each in itself is a key
principle driving the expansion of capitalist modes of production in Western Europe,
and later in the colonising contexts of the third and fourth worlds (Agozino, 2003;
Lynch, 2000). Viewed this way, the Enlightenment was not the distinct fissure from a
past intellectual, economic and social epoch that it is sometimes described, but
“[r]ather, it was more simply a means of stating and organising the materialist
groundings now propelling society following the Middle Ages” (ibid: 149). A key set of
intellectual systems provided the impetus for the propulsion of capitalism, in the first
instance the ‘body sciences’, including biology, chemistry, dietetics and others.

According to Foucaultian analysis, the human sciences, with their focus on classification,
division and ordering, provided invaluable knowledge of the (potential labouring)
population esssential for the continued expansion of the capitalist mode of production
(Foucault, 1970; 1977). These sciences of counting, classifying and knowing populations
consciously adopted the methods of the hard sciences, thus conceptualising the social
context as a subject appropriate for scientific analysis. This process of adaptation
helped spread scientific rationalisation through the developing human (social) sciences
and in turn expanded throughout the new discipline a propensity for treating human
subjects, and their social contexts as mathematical abstractions. According to Young
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(2011), this development came at a cost, in that the more human behaviour was
quantified and abstracted from the social, the more we became dehumanised, stripped
of our subjectivity, and turned into objects of investigation that could then be better
manipulated and controlled.

We might ask ‘what specific role did criminology play in this process’? Lynch (2000:
150) begins to answer this question by arguing that:

Criminology is a device – as both a structure and a discourse – which has enacted a
very powerful mechanism not only for repressing/oppressing the deviant
(criminal justice apparatus), but also for turning people into deviants to be
controlled and feared.

The sciences of the Enlightenment established the intellectual conditions that
legitimised the criminological focus on the dangerous classes when the discipline began
its intellectual evolution from the mid-19th century onwards (Agozino, 2004). The
importance of criminology for the development of capitalism comes from the key role it
played in identifying, classifying and, ultimately developing responses to individuals
and groups considered a threat to the hegemony of the capitalist mode of production.
Lynch identifies the importance of criminology, and criminal justice, for capitalism,
thus:

These attacks centred on the populations that most threatened those who
Enlightenment philosophy benefited: the newly emergent property classes. It was
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during the late 1700s that criminology, guided by the glow of Enlightenment
scholarship, most fully emerged as the science of oppressing the marginalised.

Criminology and the ‘Othering’ of the Indigenous
In his inaugural Professorial lecture at Queen’s University, Belfast in 2005, Phil Scraton
(page 3) wrote “[n]o group conceives itself as the One, the essential, the absolute,
without conceiving and defining the Other. The Other is the stranger, the outsider, the
alien, the suspect community: Otherness begets fear, begets hostility, begets denial”
(emphasis Scraton’s). There have been many ‘others’ throughout the relatively short
histories of what are now referred to as social democracies, such as African-Americans
in the USA, proletarians residing in capitalist economies, travellers throughout western
Europe, and women and girls throughout patriarchies (Scraton: 2005: 3-4). To this list
we can add Indigenous peoples in the settler-colonial societies of Canada, the US,
Australia and New Zealand (Tauri, 1996).

The process of othering is well and truly established in criminology, linked as it is to the
process of defining what and who is criminal and/or deviant. Criminalisation as a
process does not occur in a vacuum but derives from and sustained within a climate of
historical and contemporary politics, economic conditions and dominant ideologies,
evolving within the determining contexts of social class, gender, sexuality and race
(Cunneen, 2011). As a process, criminalisation is consistent with a politics of otherness,
of economic marginalisation, social exclusion (Wacquant, 2009), and, in the case of
Indigenous peoples, socio-cultural genocide (Churchill, 1990). To gain legitimacy as a
process supportive of exploitation and marginalisation, criminalisation requires
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ideological sustenance. As Cohen (1972) and Hall et al (1978) have demonstrated, the
ideological framework supporting the process of criminalisation centres on identifiable
individuals and groups, folk devils were constructed and represented as a threat to the
maintenance of social order. The criminalisation of an identified problem population is
in part fuelled by moral panic, an overreaction to perceived criminality or social danger
that sustains the economic and political hegemony of specific ethnic groups and/or
classes (Goode, 1994).

However, it is short sighted to think of moral panics and the process of criminalisation
as simply ideological constructs: for the individuals and communities at the centre of
their construction and deployment, they result in real, tangible experiences. They often
result in concrete responses and actions from the agencies of social control such as
targeted policing and increased surveillance (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994).

The

process of criminalisation, therefore, produces social, political and material
consequences for individuals and communities on the receiving end of the attentions of
the agents of crime control. And we can state with certainty that one of the groups
consistently targeted for such attention in settler-colonial contexts, are Indigenous
peoples (Tauri, 2014c).
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Criminology, Settler-Colonialism and Indigenous Peoples

If criminology ever is to decrease inequalities in justice, the field must first come
to grips with whether criminology itself contributes to discrimination, social
inequalities and crime.
Jacques and Wright (2010: 384).

In this section, it will be argued that criminology has played a significant role in the
colonial and neo-colonial subjugation of Indigenous peoples. The foundations for this
argument are laid by identifying the role the discipline has played, and continues to play
in the process of social control.

Black (1976: 105) defines social control as “the normative aspect of social life. It defines
and responds to deviant behaviour, specifying what ought to be: What is right and
wrong… Law is social control”, and furthers this argument by stating that as the law is
regulated via the state, therefore law is “government social control” (ibid: 2). If we take
this proposition as a truth statement then we can posit that much of criminology,
especially of the Authoritarian form discussed in Tauri (2013c) where many of its
practitioners define and respond to crime as those terms are constituted by
functionaries of the state, is itself a key functionary of social control. As Jacques and
Wright (2010: 390, emphasis added) argue “[t]o the degree that criminology is applied
science, it is social control”.
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Jacques and Wright (2010) employ the pure sociology of Black (1976; 1983) to expand
their argument that criminology is a form of social control, and to fully encompass the
role it plays in propagating social inequalities.

In pure sociological terms the

reproduction of social inequalities refers to social processes which maintain or decrease
the low social status4 of certain actors in specific social contexts. In Black, Jacques and
Wright’s schema, the more an individual or group becomes subjected to the application
of state law/justice the more that individual or group’s social status is decreased. As
criminological research shows, the application of law occurs more often when
individuals are low in social status. And because the subjection of law leads to lower
social status (or simply compounds it), the discriminatory behaviour of law against low
status individuals and groups results in the reproduction of social inequalities because
subjection to law further reduces those actors’ (already relatively low) social status
(Jacques and Wright, 2010).

So, how does criminology figure in this process? Quite simply, if, as happens more often
than not, criminology follows the policy predilections of state functionaries by focusing
its attention on the acts and actors that governments define as criminal and seeks to
apply its ‘science of crime’ to the measurement and analysis of these groups (the
socially damned), then criminologists have the potential to be significant contributors to
the reproduction of social inequalities (see Tauri, 2013c). For example, referring to the

4

In the language of pure sociology, social structure is defined by the relative social status of every actor
(person or group) involved in a social situation, and also by the relative social distance between every
actor involved in that situation. According to Black (1998) there are at least five kinds of social status
and three kinds of social distance. The five kinds of social status are vertical status, radial status,
corporate status, symbolic status, and normative status.
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process of the selection of participants in criminological research, Jacques and Wright
(2010: 392) state:

If... lower status offenders are more likely to be recruited for offender-based
research, and greater recruitment to criminological research leads to lower levels
of social status, then the argument can be made that offender-based research is
involved in the reproduction of social inequalities.

As many critical criminologists (and even some conservative commentators) have
demonstrated the justice system can and does, discriminate. It responds differentially
to crime and to offenders depending on a range of innate or ideologically-derived
factors or measures, such as the socio-economic status (class), race (ethnicity), sexual
orientation, age, and so on (see Greenberg, 1993; Tombs and Whyte, 2003). In the
following section I discuss the way(s) in which the discipline has assisted in framing
Indigenous peoples as a problem population in the settler-colonial context.

Elsewhere I have analysed various strategies, or technologies of control formulated by
the settler-colonial state response to the wicked problems wrought by Indigenous overrepresentation in criminal justice, and Indigenous resistance to the imposed justice
processes (see Tauri, 1999; 2005). One of the key drivers for the author’s choice of
subject matter for the eight papers that make up the thesis, was the inter-related issues
of the lack of critical commentary on the settler-colonial states response to Indigenous
crime and Indigenous resistance to the imposed justice ordering, and the historical lack
of attention paid by the discipline to Indigenous experiences of criminal justice and crime
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control policy. The following section provides an overview of the Indigenous experience
of the activities of the state and criminology in the ‘justice space’, and highlights some of
the main findings presented in the eight papers contained therein.

Criminal Justice and Indigenous Peoples
There can be no doubt that the Indigenous experience of criminal justice should be
profound concern to all, as on all four settler-colonial contexts (New Zealand, Australia,
Canada and the US) Indigenous peoples are significantly over-represented in all
statistical indices related to that sector5. However, the contemporary settler-colonial
state’s concern for Indigenous overrepresentation is not simply predicated on the
statistical and risk profiles associated with Indigenes. In all settler-colonial jurisdictions
the criminal justice system and its agents have been the focus of significant criticism
and political agitation by Indigenous activists (Jackson, 1992; Poata-Smith, 1996; Victor,
2005).

Some Indigenous and non-Indigenous critical scholars have advanced the

argument that the enhanced policing of Indigenes emanates in part from our resistance
to the imposition of colonialism and neo-colonialism (see Jackson, 1988; McNamara,

5

From the statistics presented below it is immediately apparent that Māori representation in crime
statistics is disproportionately higher on a population basis than for other ethnic groups in New
Zealand. In 2009, for example, the total police apprehensions were 235,684. Out of this total:

Māori accounted for 98,893 apprehensions or 41.9 percent of the total;

Pacific peoples accounted for 21,563 or 9.1 percent of the total; and

New Zealand Europeans accounted for 105,778 or 44.8 percent of the total (Statistics New
Zealand (2010).
Finally, Māori imprisonment rates are also disproportionately high. The latest updated figures from
the Department of Corrections (December 2009) show that out of a total of prison population of 8244
(inclusive of inmates on remand):

Māori accounted for 50.8 percent of all inmates;

those identifying themselves as Pacific Peoples accounted 11.9 percent; and

those identifying themselves as New Zealand European or Pakeha accounted for 33.5 percent of
the total.

74

1995; Palys, 1993), and, in particular, towards the imposed Eurocentric justice systems
(Monture-Angus, 1995; Quince, 2011; Tauri, 1996; Tauri and Webb, 2011; Victor, 2005).

The contemporary state’s response to the dual issues of over-representation and
counter-hegemonic activity of Indigenous peoples, have elicited a range of policy
responses, beginning with integrationist policies and interventions, such as borstals in
New Zealand, to corrective training and residential schools in Canada (see Tauri, 2013a;
2014c). The rise of Indigenous activism against the legitimacy of the formal justice
system saw the advent of a range of interventions aimed at alleviating the Indigenous
over-representation problem and our critique of the imposed justice ordering (Tauri,
2005).

The following section provides a brief overview of some of the colonial projects
deployed by settler-colonial states, heavily supported by members of the academy, in
response to the wicked problems associated with their Indigenous peoples. We can
summarise these projects as falling under the headings of indigenisation, culturalisation
and globalisation:

Indigenisation
Indigenisation has been described as the purposeful (targeted) involvement of
indigenous peoples and organisations in the delivery of existing socio-legal services and
programmes (Havemann, 1988).

For example, indigenisation initiatives became a

popular policy response in Canada during the 1980s; and involved the development of
programmes for providing policing services to Indian Reserves and communities; the
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use of native court workers to provide assistance to indigenous defendants in court; and
increasing attempts to develop community-based sentencing and correctional
alternative for Indigenous offenders (Griffiths, 1988; Harding, 1991). The focus of this
form of indigenisation is the incorporation of Indigenous human capital within the
justice system; a process that takes place without, or in lieu of, alterations being made to
the structure of criminal justice that exists in settler-colonial contexts.

The underlying practice-related principle of the indigenisation process is that involving
more indigenous people in the criminal justice system will enable the institutions to
deliver more culturally responsive programmes (Morse, 1988). However, in contrast
McNamara (1995: 3-4) highlights the tokenistic basis to this strategy when he argues
that:

The dominant element of the majority of aboriginal justice reforms that have been
implemented since the 1970s [in Canada] have been committed to the assumption
that ensuring justice for aboriginal peoples need not involve questioning the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system, nor the endorsement of autonomous
aboriginal justice values and dispute resolution processes.

Morse (1988: 12) further highlights this argument when he contends that “… these
[indigenisation] initiatives can very easily be directed toward assimilating and pacifying
the indigenous population rather than respecting their unique legal position within the
nation as a whole”. Lastly, Tauri (1998; 2005) argues that rather than leading to
enhanced, positive engagement with the criminal justice system, indigenised initiatives
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have largely increased the process of pacification and recolonisation of Indigenous
peoples.

The culturalisation of criminal justice
From the late 1980s onwards the response of settler-colonial states to the Indigenous
problem took a new, arguably more sophisticated turn, gradually moving from a focus
on increasing the number of Indigenous officials, to a process of policy and practicerelated culturalisation.

This process entailed the planned strategy of co-

opting/incorporating select elements of indigenous life-worlds into the justice system,
and more particularly, on to interventions implemented by criminal justice officials
(Tauri, 2005). In relation to the new, sophisticated strain of indigenisation, Havemann
(1988: 83) argued that:

Despite its appearance as more benign than the model of pure imposition the
integrated or indigenised model is one in which the coloniser preserves aspects of
the indigenous social control system, primarily in order to utilise its authority to
support new patterns for domination.

The culturalisation process involves the incorporation of indigenous philosophies or
practices within the formal system by adding indigenous ingredients in the form of
specific terms, phrases and cultural practices that government officials consider to be
acceptable elements of indigenous cultural practice (Webb, 2004). Examples from the
New Zealand context include allowing for the recitation of karakia (pray) at the
beginning of restorative justice programmes like Family Group Conferencing (Tauri,
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1999), and blending Māori language and custom within primarily psych-based therapy
programmes (see Department of Corrections, 2007). The co-option strategy therefore,
involves the pre-selection and utilisation of acceptable elements of indigenous culture –
as defined by the policy sector – within justice policies and interventions, in order to
make the formal justice system (appear) more culturally appropriate, and, it is hoped,
engender generic programmes and services more likely to ‘work’ for indigenous
peoples (Tauri, 2005).

By the late 1980’s and early 1990s, the culturalisation of the policy sector had become a
key aspect the New Zealand government’s Māori policy. The importance of this process
in terms of government response to Māori counter-hegemonic politics is especially
highlighted in the following quote from Poata-Smith (1997: 176) who argues that:

the fourth Labour Government (1984-1990) attempted to appease the rising level
of Māori protest in two major ways. The first involved extending the jurisdiction
of the Waitangi Tribunal retrospectively to 1840 and the second involved adopting
the policy of ‘biculturalism’, which was based on the selective incorporation of
Māori cultural symbolism within the institutions of the state (emphasis added).

The use of the strategy of culturalisation was perhaps most pronounced within the
sphere of criminal justice. Programmes and policies that fell in this category in the New
Zealand context include the Department of Correction’s tikanga (definition) and
responsivity programmes, the Department for Courts District Court Restorative Justice
Pilot Projects, and the youth justice-focused Family Group Conferencing forum. A key
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feature of all three interventions is the fact that they are based on Western theories,
concepts and practices of effectively responding to offending behaviour. However, they
were made distinguishable from other programmes because of the fact that elements of
indigenous (Māori) cultural philosophy and practice were ‘added-on’ (Tauri, 1999).

Perhaps the most well-known case study in the art of culturalisation is the Family Group
Conferencing initiative New Zealand introduced to the world in the late 1980s. The FGC
process was introduced to overcome a number of the shortcomings identified with a
youth justice system dominated at the time by what criminologists described as a
welfare approach6 (Morris and Maxwell, 1993).

Undoubtedly, a key focus of the

legislation that gave birth to the FGC was concerned with addressing the
disproportionate number of Māori youth being processed through the system. Becroft
(2002) argues that two specific components were included to promote participation by
young Māori offenders and increase the likelihood of positive outcomes for the Māori
community, namely:


the inclusion of whanau (family), hapu (sub-tribe) and iwi (tribe) in repairing the
harm caused by offending behaviour; and



the opportunity to have the conference in familiar, culturally appropriate
surroundings, including the marae (meeting house).

6

The welfare approach considered offending to be caused by remedial family or individual dysfunction.
Young people were considered to be a symptom of such dysfunction. Decisions concerning a young
person’s offending behaviour and future were made by professionals who largely had no previous
relationship with the young person. The response to the offending was proportionate to the perceived
cause of the offending, rather than the nature of the offending itself (O’Connor, 1997).
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Advocates of the FGC make a number of claims about the relationship between the
conferencing format, Māori justice practices, and the role the forum has played in
satisfying Māori concerns with the criminal justice system. For example, it is often
claimed that:
i)

because the conferencing process and Māori justice practice have restorative
elements, the conferencing process therefore provides Māori with a culturally
appropriate avenue for addressing their justice needs (Olsen et al, 1995); and

ii)

the conferencing process is an example of the system’s ability to culturally
sensitise itself, and empowers Māori to deal with their youth offenders in
culturally appropriate ways (Maxwell and Morris, 1993).

Unfortunately the results of empirical research on the FGC forum do not support these
claims. For example, in relation to i) above, Maxwell and Morris (1993) found that the
majority of FGC’s involving Māori were held in the offices of government agencies; only
five percent were actually held on marae. A similar review processed a decade later
found the situation had not substantially changed (see Maxwell, Kingi, Robertson,
Morris and Cunningham, 2004) despite the continued importance of marae to
contemporary urban and rural Māori communities, the lack of significant impact of the
Act and the forum to reduce Māori youth engagement with the system, and continued
criticisms of the precedence given to government dominated sites for dealing with
Māori youth offending (see Nga Kaiwhakamarama I Nga Ture (1998) and Tauri, 2004).

For some Māori, initiatives that fall into the co-option category, including the FGC
forum, are inadequate for addressing the problem of Māori over-representation. Māori
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criticisms of the co-option strategy centre on two key issues: The first is that the
initiatives represent a piece-meal approach to the recognition of the validity of Māori
justice practice, and are formulated on the continuing assumption that the present
system of criminal justice, whilst flawed, is ‘the best we have’, or, more accurately, the
best we will ever get. Therefore, given the Eurocentric system is the only legitimate
institutionalised approach to social harm, the best we can manage is minor tinkering in
order to enhance its cultural appropriateness for Māori (Tauri, 1998). The second issue
is that the recent trend for allowing Māori limited authority to deal with the offending of
their own, represents a continuation of the historical strategy of co-opting Māori justice
for the purpose of legitimising the imposed criminal justice system, and has little to do
with Indigenous empowerment and self-determination (Jackson, 1995; Tauri, 1996b).
Jackson (1995:34) summarises Māori criticisms when he argues that:

[j]ustice for Māori does not mean the attempted grafting of Māori processes
upon a system that retains the authority to determine the extent, applicability,
and validity of the processes. No matter how well intentioned and sincere such
efforts, it is respectfully suggested that they will merely maintain the co-option
and redefinition of Māori values and authority which underpins so much of the
colonial will to control. A ‘cultural justice system’ controlled by the Crown is
another colonising artefact (emphasis added).

Contemporary responses
Since the early 2000s there has been a considerable amount of strategic activity across
New Zealand’s criminal justice sector aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of crime
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control activity. Significant policy initiatives have included the Effective Interventions
work-stream (2006-07), which involved the Programme of Action for Māori (PoAfM),
and most recently, the Drivers of Crime Strategy (2009/10 and ongoing).

The

motivations for these high level, inter-agency projects were issues commonly found in
contemporary settler-colonial jurisdictions, namely a) the lack of impact from past and
current policies on rates of offending and imprisonment, b) increasing fiscal crises
resulting from exponential rise in prison musters, c) repetitive crises of legitimation
with the general public arising from a and b; and d) continuing high levels of indigenous
over-representation and critique (Tauri, 2009b). The strategies and the PoAfM contain
references to Māori over-representation and a range of activities that agencies claim are
designed to respond to this issue. However, overall the majority of initiatives fall under
the culturalisation strategy while others provide the impression of activity but are
designed to ensure that the status quo remains.

The PoAfM provides a recent example of the latter.

Created through joint effort

between the Ministry of Justice and Te Puni Kokiri and signed off by Cabinet in 2007, it
contained a range of initiatives including:


an engagement process with Māori providers and offenders to gauge their views and
experiences of the criminal justice system;



selection of a suite of initiatives (originally six and later expanded to up to twelve)
focused on Māori offending that would receive cross-agency funding and then be
evaluated to demonstrate the effectiveness of ‘Māori approaches’;



assessment of the effectiveness of the criminal justice sectors spend on Māori; and



an inter-agency fund for supporting practical Māori initiatives.
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While the PoAfM was a joint effort between the Ministry of Justice and Te Puni Kokiri, in
reality it was sidelined from the beginning by the lead agency in collaboration with
other justice sector agencies. Altogether the PoAfM contained up to twelve inter-related
projects, including the four outlined above. Only a handful were completed, including
the engagement process (although the final report has still be officially released and is
now seven years overdue) and the selection and funding of a select group of by Māori,
for Māori initiatives. Those that were completed were carried out by Te Puni Kokiri, the
junior partner. The majority of the significant tasks sat with the Ministry of Justice and
apart from a research project on the subject of bias, were never fully initiated, let alone
completed. From the beginning it was clear to Te Puni Kokiri officials that the Ministry
of Justice was reluctant to carry out any activities that would require critical scrutiny of
the criminal justice sector. For this reason the critical review of the sector’s spend on
Māori was never completed and the development of a funding mechanism specific to
Māori initiatives failed to progress past low level discussions with sector agencies
(Tauri, 2010).

Why the reluctance of the Ministry of Justice (specifically) and the wider justice sector,
to respond seriously to the issue of Māori over-representation and Māori critique of
their activities? There are a number of reasons we can draw from, but the following are
the most likely:


an historical lack of capability within the criminal justice sector to develop Māori
policy and engage meaningfully with the range of Māori communities, in particular
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‘problem populations’ like Māori inmates, ex-inmates, and gang members (Tauri
and Roguski, 2012);


an over-zealous commitment to Eurocentric theories on the causes of, and
responses to, crime, such as the Psychology of Criminal Conduct (Department of
Corrections) and Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (Ministry of
Justice), which in turn block officials’ ability to seriously consider alternatives to
Eurocentric approaches, including Indigenous theories and justice practices
(Tauri, 2013c);



the justice sector’s historical reluctance to allow internal (by other government
agencies) and especially external scrutiny of the effectiveness of its initiatives or
the resources it spends on crime control (Tauri, 2013c; Tauri and Webb, 2012);
and



a paternalistic attitude to Māori organisations and Māori communities in
particular, and the community sector overall (see Tauri, 2009b; 2010).

Taken together, all the above provide us with some understanding as to why it has
proven extremely difficult for Indigenous outsiders to influence change in the justice
systems of settler-colonial jurisdictions (Tauri, 2009b).

What is pertinent to the arguments presented in this thesis, is the extent to which
criminology, or more accurately, criminologists, have been involved in the settlercolonial state’s continued utilisation of culturalisation to develop ‘Indigenous’ policy
and intervention (e.g., Maxwell and Morris, 1993). As disclosed in specific papers in the
thesis (Tauri, 2013c; Tauri, 2014a; Tauri and Webb, 2012), restorative justice provides
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one of the key areas where the strategy of culturalisation and the parasitic relationship
between members of the Academy and the state, is most evident. The reliance of the
state on members of the Academy to provide policy-relevant knowledge, and of the
Academy for symbolic legitimation and funding via the state, has created a situation
where the grafting of the Indigenous life-world on to imported, western crime control
initiatives remains the norm. At the same time, meaningful critique of the suitability of
said initiatives for Indigenous peoples is largely absent from the research and analytical
activities of state officials and their criminological advisors (Tauri, 2014a). And, to
complete this overview of Indigenous perspectives, it is the increasingly globalised
nature of crime control that has added a new and potentially virulent problematic to the
relationship between Indigenous peoples and the settler-colonial state.

The globalisation of Indigenous justice

It is… important that traditional decision-making processes are not repackaged by
white professionals and presented to families as an innovative new practice, only
serving to reinforce experiences of colonial superiority.
Steve Jackson (1998).

It is not only the policy and legislative activities of settler-colonial governments that is
impacting Indigenous peoples’ determination to attain some form of jurisdictional
autonomy. We have to also be mindful that we are living in an increasingly globalised
world and, as related in Paper 4 (Tauri, 2014a), the policy and justice sectors are not
immune to their phenomena. One of the defining features of the growing globalisation
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of restorative justice has been the popularity of FGC-style initiatives in the settlercolonial jurisdictions of Canada, the United States and Australia.

The exportation of the FGC forum to these jurisdictions has been heavily influenced by
the arguments and representations from advocates of the FGC that were discussed
earlier: namely, that the FGC provides a forum that empowers Māori (an indigenous
people) and enhances the ability of the criminal justice system to culturally sensitise
itself and effectively utilise indigenous justice philosophies and practices (see Olsen et
al, 1995; Maxwell and Morris, 1993; LaPrairie, 1996). In response to these arguments
we have countered that the forum represents the co-option of Māori cultural practices
into New Zealand’s youth justice system. The forum signifies the continued willingness
of the State to disempower Māori by employing their justice processes while denying
them a significant measure of jurisdictional autonomy. What is now of concern to some
Māori is that our justice philosophies and practices are now being used to disempower
other Indigenous peoples (see Tauri, 2004 and 2009).

Arguably, this situation is particularly noticeable in the Canadian context (Victor, 2011).
For example, in 1997 Gloria Lee, a member of the Cree First Nation in Canada, published
an article titled The Newest Old Gem: Family Group Conferencing. In this paper, Lee
expressed strong concerns for the fact that the imported FGC forum was being forced
upon Canada’s Indigenous peoples at the expense of their own justice mechanisms and
practices.

Lee (1997: 1) argued that “… First Nation communities are vigorously

encouraged to adopt and implement the Māori process and to make alterations to fit the
specific community needs, customs and traditions of people who will make use of the
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new process”. Lee’s statement of concern is both powerful and, as the fullness of time
has shown, accurate. It has been a number of years since the publication of that article
and many Canadian Indigenes are struggling to gain support for the implementation of
their own interventions and systems while having to implement culturally alien and
inappropriate interventions (Victor, 2007).

Having faced a sustained period of

colonisation, during which every effort was made to destroy their systems of justice,
indigenes are now facing a new threat in the form of the increasing globalisation of
crime control products (see Jones and Newburn, 2002a and 2002b; Karstedt, 2002) and
in particular, the exportation of the FGC from New Zealand and Australia to the North
American continent (Tauri, 2009b).

What the above discussion signals is that any analysis of the Indigenous experience of
settler-colonial state justice requires a multi-pronged approach cognisant of at least
three truisms, namely 1) that state-related policy making ala Indigenous peoples is
rarely about ‘us’, and especially not about our empowerment, but rather the state’s
ability to respond in ways that silence the hegemonic potentialities of our
policy/political activism and shore up the status quo; 2) that the state is assisted in this
task by the Academy, and in particular by the ‘human sciences’ such as criminology; and
3) that our ability to achieve a measure of self-determination in the realm of justice is
being severely hindered by the increasing globalisation of crime control, a process that
in turn is increasing the impact of the parasitic relationship between the state and
members of the Academy, on Indigenous peoples (Tauri, 2014c).
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PART III

Published Papers

The following section presents the eight papers that constitute the thesis in consistent
format. This required changes to the formatting of some of the papers from that used
when they were published. In most cases the changes are minimal, involving alterations
to font, footnoting and referencing. For example, in a published paper a reference might
appear as Tauri: forthcoming, but appears here as Tauri, 2014c as it was published after
the original citation.
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Paper 1

Criminal Justice as a Colonial Project in
Settler-Colonialism

Juan Marcellus Tauri

(2014) African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies, special edition:
Indigenous Perspectives and Counter-Colonial Criminologies, 8(1), pp 20-37.

Introduction

The challenge of ‘being Indigenous’, in a psychic and cultural sense, forms the
crucial question facing Indigenous peoples today in the era of contemporary
colonialism – a form of post-modern imperialism in which domination is still the
Settler imperative but where colonisers have designed and practiced more subtle
means (in contrast to the earlier forms of missionary and militaristic colonial
enterprises) of accomplishing their objectives.
Alfred and Corntassel (2005: 297-289).

The quote from Alfred and Corntassel that starts this paper marks out the problem-field
in which the notes assembled in the following pages are to be inserted. What follows
are ‘notes’ inasmuch as they represent the tentative explorations of a working paper on
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a criminological question that has only recently been explored seriously by ‘western’
criminology: what role, if any, does criminal justice play in the settler-colonial states
subjugation of Indigenous peoples (for recent Indigenous-informed examples see
Agozino, 2003; Blagg, 2000b; 2008; Cunneen, 2006; Tauri, 2013c)?

This paper offers an Indigenous-centred, critical perspective on the colonial projects
(Thomas, 1994) employed in settler-colonial contexts to negate, or at the very least
nullify, the negative impact of two inter-related ‘wicked problems’ that are deemed
peculiar to these jurisdictions: the high levels of Indigenous subjugation within and by
the criminal justice system, and the impact of Indigenous resistance to the hegemony of
the imposed, criminal justice systems deployed by settler-colonial states. The paper is
comprised of three inter-related parts; the first two outline the construction and
deployment of colonial projects in the colonial and neo-colonial contexts, wherein it is
argued that the matrix of criminal justice was foundational to the state’s attempted
eradication of, and eventual socio-economic marginalisation of Indigenous peoples. The
final section offers the argument that the continued success of criminal justice as a
(neo)colonial project, stems from its parasitic relationship with the discipline of
criminology. Together, the continued deployment of these mutually supportive colonial
projects against Indigenous peoples demonstrates that structural violence (Galtung,
1969) continues to be a significant component of social control in the neo-liberal,
settler-colonial context.
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Colonial Projects and Settler-Colonialism

The civilising process is not about the uprooting, but about the redistribution of
violence.
Baumann (1995: 141).

In his critical commentary on the role of the discipline of Anthropology in the
subjugation of Indigenous peoples, Nicholas Thomas identified a set of processes of
social control, which he refers to as colonial projects that were fundamental to the
successful establishment of a settler colony, and subjugation of the Indigenous
inhabitants. Thomas (1994: 105) describes these projects as “socially transformative
endeavour(s) that [are] localised, politicised and partial, yet also engendered by longer
historical developments and ways of narrating them”. Furthermore, they are:

often projected rather than realised; because of their confrontations with
indigenous

interests,

alternating

civilising

missions

and

their

internal

inconsistences, colonial [and neo-colonial] intentions are frequently deflected, or
enacted farcically and incompletely (Thomas, 1994: 106).

Thomas argues that from the moment of first contact European colonisers utilised
colonial projects to expedite the eradication, or failing this, the subjugation of the
Indigenous peoples they encountered in new territories. During the initial phases of
colonisation, mutual benefit from trade in goods and religion were key projects for
advancing the ‘civilising’ mission of colonialism (Cassidy, 2003). Religious conversion
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in particular, was considered vital for transforming Indigenous peoples from savage
beings into ‘proper Christian subjects’ (Kidd, 1997) and better enable them to
participate in the post-colonial society to come. Later, the impact of Enlightenment
thinking saw science and education displace religion as key colonial projects in the
colonising endeavour (Lynch, 2000).

Through these projects the ideological and

practical focus of settler-colonial strategy changed from saving our souls, toward
policies and interventions that facilitated our removal from our lands, and preparing us
to participate in the emerging capitalist economy. Underpinning these policies was the
development of ideological rationales, inspired by Social Darwinism that constructed
Indigenes as inherently inferior - biologically, genetically and intellectually - to
Europeans.

Malik (1996) and Wolfe (2010) refer to this change in ideological

construction of Aboriginality as the racialisation of colonialism.

A key colonial project that arose from the racialisation of colonial ideology, were
identity categories (Maddison, 2013). These included the introduction of measurements
of indigeneity based on blood quantum (for example ‘full’, ‘3/4’, ‘half-Māori’ and so
forth: see Meredith, 2006). Relatedly, a raft of projects arose aimed specifically at
‘breeding out’ the Indigenous, exemplified in a range of eugenics programmes, such as
forced sterilisation, that were deployed across Canada, Australia and the U.S in the latter
half of the 19th, and early part of the 20th centuries (Grekul et al, 2004; Lawrence, 2000).
The eugenics programmes were in turn supported by a range of projects focused on
eradicating Indigenous peoples ability to practice their culture, most notably in the form
of child removal programmes and residential/native schools, especially in the Canadian,
U.S and Australian contexts (see Bartrop, 2001; Trocme, Knoke and Blackstock, 2004;
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Woolford, 2013). The eradication of Indigenous culture through education policy was
supported by the introduction of legislation in all settler-colonial jurisdictions aimed
specifically at banning or criminalising the practice of Indigenous ritual and culture.
Notable examples include legislation banning the potlatch ceremony in Canada (Jonaitis,
1991), the Sun Dance in the U.S (Jorgensen, 1972), and Māori religious practice in New
Zealand (Stephens, 2001).

And lastly, there are the colonial projects that can be

collectivised under the heading of ‘structural violence’, exemplified by direct military
action, forced removal of children, and the policies and actions emanating from the
developing criminal justice system, much of which was imported intact from the
jurisdictions of the European colonisers (Merry, 2000; see discussion below on
structural violence).

The numerous colonial projects that littered the settler-colonial landscape formed a
complex ‘web’ of subjugating strategies across a range of social and economic policy
platforms. Underpinning these were colonial states’ judicious deployment of structural
violence (Churchill, 1997). It was a web from which a single colonial project could be
deployed discretely to overcome ‘wicked problems’ that evolve from state-Indigenous
interactions; wicked problems being those social issues that arise, at least in the eyes of
the state, as exclusive to problem populations and, as a result, define them as such. Or,
as often happened, the state combined projects in co-ordinated campaigns of
subjugation, such as the combined strategies of police deployment, child removals and
reservations schools deployed in the American, Canadian and Australian jurisdictions
throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The sophistication of the
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web and in particular, its co-ordination, is beautifully captured by Strakosch and
Macoun (2012: 45) who write that:

There are a number of ways to eliminate Indigenous political difference: by
physically eliminating Indigenous peoples; by severing their physical connections
to lands that lie at the heart of their political systems; by breaking down families
and communities; by drawing Indigenous polities into the state and reforming
them; and by entering into explicit, contractual exchanges (such as treaties) which
publicly erase the political distinctions between coloniser and colonised.

Furthermore, the centrality of structural violence to the pursuit of ‘colonialist’ justice
(or perhaps more accurately, social control), and the interconnected nature of its
deployment is exemplified in Fanon’s (1963: 38) statement that:

The colonial world is a world cut in two. The dividing line, the frontiers are shown
by barracks and police stations. In the colonies it is the policeman and the soldier
who are the official, instituted go-betweens, the spokesmen of the settler and his
rule of oppression... [i]n the colonial countries... the policeman and the soldier, by
their immediate presence and their frequent and direct action maintain contact
with the native and advise him by means of rifle-butts and napalm not to budge. It
is obvious here that the agents of government speak the language of pure force
(Fanon, 1963: 38).
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Colonial Projects in the Neo-Colonial Context

Our respective geographical locations are framed by nation states such as the USA,
Canada, Australia and New Zealand where colonisation has not ceased to exist; it
has only changed in form from that which our ancestors encountered.
Moreton-Robinson (2009b: 11).

How are we to contextualise the ground upon which the neo-colonial marginalisation of
Indigenous peoples within settler-colonialism is constructed and maintained? Some
perceive it as a figuration (see Powell, 2011) or, as discussed previously, a structure
(Galtung, 1969; Strakosch and Macoun, 2012) that is supported by both real and
symbolic violence against Indigenous peoples that has, over time, become ‘cultural’;
evolving from a process to a permanence within the body politic of settler-colonial
societies (Galtung, 1990). As postulated recently by Woolford (2013: 172-173; 174, see
further discussion below), these various modes of epistemic violence (Kitossa, 2014)
exist within an overarching web that facilitates the colonial subjugation of Indigenous
peoples, via a “mesh that stretches itself across the content, operating through various
nodes or sites that change, or take different shape, across time and space”.

Structurally, settler-colonialism is visualised by Woolford (2013: 172) as a “series of
nets that operate to constrain [Indigenous] agency”, and are inter-linked at the macro,
meso and micro levels. The first (macro)-level net spreads across the entire sociocultural realm of a settler-colonial society and involves the dominant subjugating
processes of social activity, including the economy, government (including the
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development of laws and subscription of the right to use violence) and religion.
Woolford (2013: 172) contends that “[i]t is at this broad level that dominant visions of
the colonial order are negotiated: for example, the formulation of the so-called Indian
problem in Canada”, and by extension the ‘Aboriginal problem’ in Australia, the ‘Indian
problem’ in the U.S, and the ‘Māori problem’ in New Zealand. In the context of criminal
justice, we have the wicked problem of Māori /Indigenous over-representation,
represented in governmental discourse as a ‘fact of (criminal justice) life’ that poses a
significant social problem and threat to social order requiring meaningful intervention.
The ‘Māori problem’ is described in governmental and media discourse as being so
significant that New Zealand’s crime problem would likely disappear if not for the high
level and ongoing nature of Māori offending, because we are ‘full of crime’ (Otago Daily
Times, 2012). At this level of netting significant ideological and policy-related resource
is concentrated at the ‘Māori problem’. This comes in various forms, including high
rates of surveillance of Māori by the institutions of social control, and political attention
to the vote winning potentialities of addressing the wicked problem of Indigenous
crime.

Supporting the macro-level is what Woolford (2013: 172) described as the upper-meso
level, namely the bureaucratic field of government, where “one finds the institutional
netting that brings together various state and state-sponsored agencies that are
essential to the operations of contemporary settler-colonialism, namely policing, the
legal system, the military and health, education and welfare policy sectors. Supporting
the upper-meso institutions is a layer that features the service delivery mechanisms
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that enable the practice of settler-colonialism to be facilitated. In the education sphere
this includes:

a variety of schools (e.g., reservation and non-reservation; federal and mission,
day and boarding) form a network of interactions, as they cooperate and compete
with one another, depending on various circumstances (ibid: 172).

At the upper-meso level of criminal justice we observe the strategic deployment of
militaristic-style policing of Indigenous protest, the significant focusing of policing
resources and power against Indigenous individuals and communities in the form of
stop-and-search powers and 3-strikes

legislation (Cunneen, 2006).

Policing,

corrections, child care and protection services, the policy industry and the courts all
provide avenues through which Indigenous peoples are governed ‘differently’ in terms
of the depth, form and effects of policing. Arguably, this represents a contemporary
manifestation of the racialised policies of policing developed during the colonial context
(Auger, Doob, Auger and Driben, 1992; Cunneen, 2006; Harding, 1991; Moyle, 2013;
Tauri, 2009; 2014c).

Finally we arrive at the micro-level layer of netting where the structural violence of
settler-colonialism is operationalised and delivered on the ground. In the education
sphere this occurs via the implementation of repressive policies by specific schools
(Woolford, 2013: 172):
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[W]hich connects parents, children, teachers, principals, and communities in
interactions defined by regionally-adapted techniques of governance and control,
and a local actor-network that involved not just humans, but also non-human
actors like disease, poverty, animals, and territory in local experiences of
assimilative schooling.

Within the criminal justice sector the micro-level net is operationalised through,
amongst many possible examples, the targeted stratagem’s of police district
commanders against problem populations, the purposeful targeting of Indigenous
individuals and communities by racist (or poorly trained) police officers, and the
uneven application of discretionary powers.

Other practices include individual

departments choosing to ignore existing Indigenous practices and programmes in
preference to imported western crime control initiatives (see Tauri, 2011b and further
discussion later in this paper).

We contend that similar to Woolford’s education-focused case study, the criminal justice
system is a key colonial project within the armoury of the settler-colonial state. It is a
project built around a sophisticated web across the macro, meso and micro levels of
settler-colonial society or more particularly, settler-colonial ‘government’. Furthermore,
we argue that the criminal justice system’s importance as a colonial project has
intensified in the last century because of the supposed diminished ability of the
contemporary neo-liberal state to legitimately deploy direct violence (for example,
military operations), or hard-line assimilatory policies that characterised previous
colonialist attempts to subjugate Indigenous peoples. In other words, the killing times
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are over, but epistemic and structural violence are still essential colonial projects in the
on-going, contested process of settler colonisation, and its form, more often than not,
manifests through the application of crime control policies, legislation and practices
(Churchill, 1997; Cribben, 1984).

Following the post-war internationalisation of human rights, the strategic, purposeful
use of violence as a social policy tool for controlling problem populations, was deemed
unacceptable (Bauman, 1995). Similarly, the racist assimilatory policies that had sought
the eradication of our Indigenous souls, rather than the destruction of our physical
bodies, were also challenged and, rhetorically at least, replaced with more acceptable
policy discourses such as ‘integration’ and ‘reconciliation’.

In the context of

contemporary settler-colonialism, structural violence is expressed much differently in
practice when compared to its deployment during the colonial era. Today the structural
violence of the colonising project is perpetrated against Indigenes in the form of
militaristic-style policing strategies, the biased application of public disorder offences
and discretionary powers, and the criminal justice-led large-scale removal of
Indigenous children and youth to detention centres, and Indigenous adults to the prison
system (Blagg, 2008; Cunneen, 2006; Kitossa, 2014)7. The colonial projects that enable
the deployment of structural violence by the developing colonial state, supported by the
ideology of (genocidal) eradication, have become, at least at the surface of practice
rather than intent, bio-political inasmuch as the state now seeks to govern and contain
7

Clear exceptions to the new form(s) of supposed humane colonialism arise from time to time,
demonstrating that the ideals and practices of old colonialism never fully vanish from use. Instead, they
change shape and form in response to re-configured versions of the wicked problems that arise from timeto-time in neo-colonial contexts. The most recent significant example was the Australian Federal
government’s implementation in 2007 of the Northern Territory Emergency Response in relation to a
perceived rise in Aboriginal sexual and physical child abuse (Altman and Hinkson (eds.), 2007; Altman and
Russell, 2012).
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Indigenous peoples through ever more sophisticated projects that focus on
administering life, rather than eradicating it, in order to “[R]ationalise problems posed
to governmental practice by phenomena characteristic of a set of living beings forming a
population: health, hygiene, birth rate, life expectancy, race” (Dean, 2010: 118-119).

Doing Imperialism Quietly? Criminal Justice and Structural Violence and SettlerColonialism

Around the turn of the century there emerges a mythic, masterful silence in the
narratives of empire, what Sir Alfred Lyall called ‘doing our Imperialism quietly’.
Bhabha (1994: 177 – emphasis added).

Importantly, for the arguments made in this paper, settler-colonialism is not defined or
constructed through a “moment of transformative restructuring” that leads to the
context moving to a decolonising moment, or for that matter, ‘post’ the subjugation of
resident First Nations. As Strakosch and Macoun (2012: 43) contend:

[This] has not occurred in settler colonies such as Australia, Canada and New
Zealand. This [post-colonialism] locates ‘real’ colonialism in the past, and assumes
that now policy must deal with the ‘legacies’, ‘heritage’ or ‘reverberating
aftermath’ of colonialism in today’s world.
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In all settler-colonial societies crises are regularly projected ‘out from’ Indigenous
communities, on to the state, whose task it is to fix whatever is ailing its Indigenes at a
particular socio-historical moment. As Moreton-Robinson (2009a: 61) describes it,
these crises are “constructed as something extraordinary and aberrant requiring new
governmental measures” (such as the Australian Federal governments Northern
Territory Emergency Response, see Altman, and Hinkson, 2007). This process, which
Moreton-Robinson describes as the ‘state-of-exception thesis’ and Boulden and Morton
(2007: 163) as ‘emergencies’, are managed as events that have “…. a political style, one
that we have become increasingly use to since September 11”. It is an alarming world,
alerting people to immediate dangers to life, health and property. Sometimes the
dangers are real, sometimes they are imagined; and sometimes they are a complete red
herring. These (often contrived) emergencies are employed in part to rationalise the
state’s exceptional interference in the lives of Indigenous peoples. They serve both an
ideological and functional role in colonial and neo-colonial contexts, including
rationalising the use of structural violence to support the ongoing subjugation of
Indigenous peoples.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the structural violence of the criminal justice
systems of the settler-colonial state, especially its key role of sequestering Indigenous
peoples within state-controlled, closed institutions. The role of criminal justice system in
the modern European state is well established as reflective of the desire for internal
control of populations and of their labouring capacity (Wacquant, 2009), characterised
by the workings of the sequestering institutions so powerfully identified by Foucault
(2000) - most notably prisons, asylums and workhouses. In the settler society context
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we might add to this list of closed institutions youth borstals, residential schools and the
penal reserves and reservations of North America and Australia (such as Palm Island,
see Anthony, 2009. See also Churchill, 1997; Harris, 2004 and van Krieken, 1999),
which were used as ‘camps’ for concentrating large groups of Indigenous individuals,
and sometimes entire Indigenous communities who were deemed surplus to the
developing capitalist mode of production (Rombough and Keithly, 2005).

More

recently, the significant, and consistent over-representation of Indigenous peoples in
youth detention centres and adult prisons, has been referred to by O’Connor (1994) as
the ‘new removals’ and by Cunneen (1997: 2) as the ‘new stolen generations’ where
“[t]he high levels of criminalisation and subsequent incarceration of Indigenous young
people in Australia effectively amounts to a new practice of forced separation of
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children and young people from their families”.

When taken together these examples of sequestration correspond with what Harris
(2004) calls the management of dispossession, a slowly evolving set of colonial projects
located principally at the meso-level of Woolford’s schema due to their primary purpose
- the removal of the Indigenous individual from his or her cultural context. These
projects evolved within the settler-colonial contexts as primary sites for disciplining
Indigenes at the point where “physical power moved into the background (while
remaining crucial), and the disciplinary strategies associated with the management of
people, nature, and space, came to the fore” (Harris, 2004: 174).

Arguably the settler-colonial state has become much more subtle and manoeuvrable in
terms of the development and employment of colonial projects. No longer able to
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maintain legitimacy by deploying racist, assimilationist strategies, such as the forced
removal of our children under targeted policies8, or specific legislation banning
language and cultural practices, or indeed replicating the physical genocide of the
Indian Wars carried out in the U.S, or the killing times in Australia (Barkan, 2003; Neu,
2000; Riethmuller, 2006), the neo-liberal settler state nonetheless deploys
structural/epistemic violence as a colonial project against Indigenous communities. In
the guise of youth detention, prison and child care and protection processes (O’Connor,
1994), the colonial projects of removal and sequestration remain significant structurally
violent strategies deployed by the settler-colonial state in its ongoing ‘war of
manoeuvre’ against Indigenous resistance to assimilation, and at times, annihilation.

The Interconnectivity of the Criminal Justice Web
Colonial projects intertwine and overlap, continuously morphing into new ‘technologies
of control’ that enable the settler-colonial state to control populations that are deemed a
‘problem’. Thus in the Canadian context, we can trace the residential school morphing
into the prison industrial complex, which is arguably now a primary site through which
the colonial policies of integration and assimilation are perpetuated in the
neo(liberal)colonial context (Proulx, 2002). In relation to criminal justice, we see the

8

The strategy of child removal as a colonial project is no longer characterised by direct violence, such as the
Australian policy of using police and armed forces to enter Aboriginal communities to make forced
removals that was prevalent from the late 1900s to the mid-twentieth century (Cunneen, 1997). It can be
argued that the process has been replaced with one akin to Bauman’s (1989) rationalised process of
modern bureaucracy and the rise of risk-based systems for analysing populations. In this context, the
direct violence of old-style removals has been replaced with risk-based evaluation that aids to identify
high-risk individuals, families and communities in need of surveillance and intervention. In all settler
colonial contexts, Indigenous communities are judged high-risk in relation to child care and protection
matters (Moyle, 2013). This results in high levels of surveillance, high rates of reporting, investigation and
of child removals.
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silent yet nonetheless ‘violent’ imperialism of settler-colonialism present in Mallea’s
(2000: 27) description of service delivery in Canadian prisons where:

European culture dominates in the prison system and there is racism among the
staff… Prisons provide the same extreme form of isolation which was the
experience by children in the residential schools... One program called Teen
Challenge is now operating within some Manitoba prisons. Teen Challenge is a
drug rehabilitation program based on fundamentalist Christianity. It bans the
practice of Native spirituality within the program and preaches that such
spirituality… is the occult.

Mallea’s description of authorised in-prison programmes in Manitoba relates to the
argument made here that criminal justice is a key project for the dissemination of
structural violence, through the fact that the site of isolation from one’s cultural context
and pseudo-religious/scientific-programming - the prison - becomes a primary venue
for the continued subjugation of the Indigenous life-world. Arguably, this attempt is no
less violent than projects utilised during the colonial context; if one accepts that the
forced imposition of non-Indigenous religious belief and practice is ‘violent’, coupled
with the ‘violence’ of the imposition of psycho-therapeutic service mechanism of a
Eurocentric drug rehabilitation programme, and removal and isolation from one’s
Indigenous community in a decidedly ‘non-Indigenous’ institution.

By banning

Indigenous spirituality from the context of rehabilitative service delivery, the violence
of isolation that occurs through the act of incarceration, is exponentially enhanced
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through the concomitant violence generated by denigration of the Indigenous lifeworld.

The (Ordinary) Structural Violence of Settler-Colonial Criminal Justice

The etiological myth deeply entrenched in the self-consciousness of our Western
society is the morally elevating story of humanity emerging from pre-social
barbarity.
Bauman (1989: 12).

We can anticipate significant disagreement from some with the argument that criminal
justice represents as a key site through which the settler-colonial state manifests the
colonial project of structural violence against Indigenes. An early example of this view
is espoused by Anthony Giddens (1985) who, during his critique of Foucault’s
perspective on power and the state, argued that the French theorist’s emphasis on
coercive, closed institutions was too constricted to enable a sophisticated analysis of
power and social control in contemporary Western societies.

Giddens (quoted in

Gledhill, 2000: 17; emphasis Gledhill) preferred instead “a more general shift in the
sanctioning capacities of the state from the manifest use of violence to the pervasive use
of administrative power”. This change in modes of social control from violence (or at
least the threat of it) to the use of administrative, disciplinary technologies to elicit
internal pacification of the population, is evidenced by contemporary police forces and
the science of policing replacing violent policing, such as the deployment of military
troops and military action, as fundamental to the practice of social regulation. It also
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signals the compartmentalisation of policing within the sophisticated, bureaucratic
mechanisms of codified law, incarceration, parole and probation. Giddens gives much
weight in his analysis of contemporary social regulation to the supposed diminution of
violence resulting from the contemporary state’s steady movement towards facilitating
internal pacification of the ‘population’ through administrative power. As such, he
argued that a distinguishing feature of this mode of regulation of a population is the
withdrawal of the military from direct participation in the internal affairs of the state.
Within Giddens’ schema, criminal justice, including policing, when compared to the
violence deployed in support of the colonial enterprise, represents a form of ‘quiet
imperialism’.

Indigenous and critical sociological scholarship exposes the Eurocentric bases of this
type of theorising of the ‘pacifist’ exercise of power by the contemporary settler state.
For example, an extensive literature demonstrates the explicit violence of policing in
neo-colonial jurisdictions, both historically and contemporarily (see Churchill, 1997;
Wilson, 1998 for the North American context, Watson, 2009 for the Australian, and
Jackson, 1988; Pratt, 1992 for New Zealand). Violence as a coercive tool of social
control is fundamental to the formation and enduring hegemony of the modern
(neoliberal) capitalist state. Indeed, as Bauman (1989) succinctly demonstrates in his
sociological study of the holocaust, violence as a project for controlling a population is
not only possible in a ‘rationally’-derived polity, but is in fact the end point of the
development of this so-called science of state craft:
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Once the hope to contain the Holocaust experience in the theoretical framework of
malfunction (modernity incapable of suppressing the essentially alien factors of
irrationality, civilising pressures failing to subdue emotional and violent drives,
socialisation going awry and hence unable to produce the needed volume of moral
motivations) has been dashed, one can be easily tempted to try the ‘obvious’ exit
from the theoretical impasse; to proclaim the Holocaust a ‘paradigm’ of modern
civilisation, its ‘natural’, ‘normal’ (who knows – perhaps also common) product, its
‘historical tendency’ (Bauman, 1989: 5-6: emphasis Bauman’s).

Bauman (ibid: 6: emphasis Bauman’s) further argues that “[i]n this version, the
Holocaust would be promoted to the status of a truth of modernity (rather than
recognised as a possibility that modernity contains)”.

In effect, Bauman counters

Giddens’ (mis)representation of modern state-craft characterised by the diminution of
violence as a biopolitical strategy of control or as something that, when it does arise,
represents an aberration, the rending of evil through the fabric of civility that cloaks
‘western civilisation’.

Instead, as Bauman (1989: 18) contends, there is nothing

inherent in the instrumental rationality of contemporary state-craft that makes it
singularly incapable of deploying structural violence, in fact:

The bureaucratic culture which prompts us to view society as an object of
administration, as a collection of so many ‘problems’ to be solved…. as a legitimate
target for ‘social engineering’… was the very atmosphere in which the idea of the
Holocaust could be conceived, slowly yet consistently developed, and brought to
its conclusion.
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To consider contemporary settler-colonial policing as part of the diminution of violence
as a key colonial project within the settler-colonial context, is to gloss over the fact that
structural violence continues to be a significant strategy in the state’s ongoing
pacification of their Indigenous peoples and other dispossessed populations.

The

evidence of the continued importance of this particular colonial project to the settlercolonial state is extensive: we see it used in its commonly described ‘direct’ form as a
response to Indigenous activism, such as at Bastion Point and Wounded Knee in the
1970s (D’Arcus, 2001; The Waitangi Tribunal, 1987), Oka in the 1990’s (Kalant, 2004)
and most recently against the Mi’kmak First Nations resistance to gas mining in the
Canadian province of Nova Scotia (2013). The violence deployed in these contexts was
strategic, planned, and purposeful. As such, it stands in stark contrast to the supposed
benign use of administrative power that Giddens’ and others present as characteristic of
western, (neo)liberal government (Hayek, 1944; for critical discussion of this
perspective see Oksala, 2011 and Springer, 2011). Second, we can observe in the
structural violence of contemporary criminal justice systems the pervasive, militaristicstyle over-policing of people of colour in Western jurisdictions, evidence of bias and
racism in the way police use their discretionary powers, courts their discretion in terms
of prison sentences or community sentences, and correctional services through the
denial of the legitimacy of the Indigenous cultural context as a source of rehabilitative
practices (Aboriginal Justice and Advisory Committee, 2000; Cunneen, 2006; Harding,
1991; Perry, 2006; Webb, 2004).

Recently, a number of commentators have begun theorising the contribution of law and
justice institutions in the “historical and ongoing contested subjugation of Indigenous
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peoples”, most notably Smandych (2013: 92), Veracini (2007) and Wolfe (1999). The
work of all three demonstrates that a key logic of settler-colonialism is the elimination
of the Indigenous peoples. Cited in Smandych (ibid: 93), Wolfe conceptualises the
settler-colonial logic of elimination as more than just the liquidation of Indigenous
peoples, but also:

In common with genocide as Raphael Lemkin characterised it, settler-colonialism
has both negative and positive dimensions.

Negatively, it strives for the

dissolution of native societies. Positively, it erects a new colonial society on the
expropriated land base… In its positive aspect, elimination is an organising
principal of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superseded)
occurrence. The positive outcomes of the logic of elimination can include officially
encouraged miscegenation, the breaking-down of native title into alienable
individual freeholds, native citizenship, child abduction, religious conversion,
resocialisation in total institutions such as missions or boarding schools, and
whole range of cognate biocultural assimilations.

Why, might we ask, does Wolfe represent native schools, child removal and other
similar colonial projects, as ‘positive’ manifestations of the colonialist logic of
elimination? Smandych (2013) attempts to address this issue by arguing that when
compared to physical genocide via warfare, these strategies are ‘positive’ in that they do
not seek to replace Indigenous societies in their entirety, but to control and corral;
Paradoxically, by (forcibly) bringing Indigenous people together in these institutional
settings, resistance and socio-cultural regeneration is enabled. As Smandych (2013)
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relates, resistance and counter-resistance by both settler-colonialists and Indigenous
peoples, continues to structure and reframe settler-colonial societies, and ensures that
the ‘end point’ of the logic of elimination remains elusive.

And importantly, as

Smandych (2013: 93) further argues, the logic of elimination “continues into the
present” in the guise of the supposedly ‘quiet imperialist’ projects discussed previously.
But as we have discussed here, the centrality of the criminal justice system to the
ongoing colonialist agenda, demonstrates the continued importance of ‘old colonial
projects’ - most especially of structural violence, to the settler-colonial context.

Closing Comments

Aboriginal people were modernity’s ‘waste’: the criminal justice system became
one of a number of sites of waste management for those stigmatised as belonging
to a doomed race, and a warehouse for those who resisted the process.
Blagg (2008: 21).

How is it then, that supposedly ‘liberal’, democratic, Western nations such as New
Zealand, Australia, Canada and the U.S are portrayed in this paper as anything but
‘liberal’ when it comes to their use of the structural violence to effect the (continued)
marginalisation of their Indigenous peoples?

For an answer we might refer to

Foucault’s conceptualisation of the ‘illiberality of liberal government’, where supposed
liberal governments act in ways that mirror authoritarian regimes by implementing
policies with prejudice, and sometimes with violence, against targeted sections of the
population:
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[A]s was evident in recent revelations about the way in which liberal-democratic
states (like those in Scandinavia) have, in the course of the twentieth century,
practised forced sterilisation in the name of a eugenic Utopia on certain of their
populations. Even more pervasive has been the tendency within certain states
(Australia, Canada), having ceased to attempt actual genocide, to commit forms of
cultural genocide upon indigenous people within their borders in the name of
their own well-being, such as in the case of the removal of children from their
parents and families. While the bio-political imperative does not account for all
that bedevils liberal-democratic states, it is remarkable how much of what is done
of an illiberal character is done with the best of bio-political intentions (Dean,
2010: 156).

Perhaps it is simply a continuation of the overwhelming ‘will to control’ that was so
crucial to the original pioneering endeavours of the early colonialists. Or is it because
we Indigenous peoples are what might be called an unfinished project that impedes the
neo-colonial (and neoliberal) state from announcing the end of colonialism? It should
be remembered that we were meant to accept the gift of civilisation, but instead had the
temerity to resist, seeing colonisation for what it really meant – the eradication of
ourselves and our culture. We were also meant to die out; unable to cope with the
ravages of western disease and the superiority of ‘western civilisation’, but instead we
reproduced at much higher rates than the colonialists. When these events failed to
transpire it was believed that policy, and the march of the capitalist free market
economy – the end points of social evolution - would bring about our assimilation or
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integration and see us forever discard our archaic cultural practices and languages.
Instead, we revitalised our cultures, exerted our rights to self-determination and began
actively challenging the hegemony of many of the institutions, policies and
interventions supposedly implemented to ‘reduce our risk to society’, including the
criminal justice system (Tauri, 2005).

As unfinished business we are an embarrassment to the settler-colonial state, because
our very existence calls into question the legitimacy of settler-colonialism and the
effectiveness of the supposedly benign, enlightened types of colonial projects now in
vogue. Unfortunately, the criminal justice system makes a lie of claims that the settlercolonial state no longer has need of structural violence to control its problematic
Indigenous populations, or that settler-colonialism represents a quieter (meaning less
assimilatory) process of subjugation. Instead, the policies and actions of the agents and
agencies of crime control demonstrate that structural violence remains a significant tool
of subjugation of Indigenous peoples in contemporary settler-colonialism.

112

This extract is taken from the author's original manuscript and has not been edited. The definitive, published,
version of record is available here: http://www.palgrave.com/gb/book/9781137008688#aboutBook
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Indigenous Critique of Authoritarian Criminology

Juan Marcellus Tauri

(2013) K. Carrington, M. Ball, E. O’Brien and J. Tauri (Eds.), Crime, Justice and Social
Democracy: International Perspectives. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 217-233.

Introduction
Biko Agozino (2010: i) has described the discipline of criminology as “a ‘control-freak’;
one whose “imperialist reasoning” is most evident when supporting “the [contemporary
state’s] exercise of internal colonialism and neo-colonialism” within settler societies. In
recent times the development of supposed evidence-based crime control policy
throughout Western jurisdictions appears to have reinvigorated administrative
criminological formations to the extent that they once again dominate policy discourse
relating to the issues of Indigenous over-representation and critique of the operations
of criminal justice. This chapter seeks to explore this state of affairs by firstly, providing
a critical examination of the role criminology plays in the continued neo-colonial
subjugation of First Nations and secondly, the role that myth construction and
maintenance plays in the hegemonic activities of a particularly authoritarian form of the
discipline. A critical analysis of two articles from a recent Australian and New Zealand
Journal of Criminology (2010) special edition on ‘Aboriginal violence’ highlights the core
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features and, arguably, the key failings of this authoritarian criminology in relation to its
response to Indigenous justice issues: namely a preference for undertaking research on
instead of with Indigenous peoples, the privileging non-engaging research
methodologies and the potent use of myth to promote practitioners views of the world
and silence the Indigenous voice.

A Brief Outline of Australasian Criminology

What is criminology? A control-freak discipline!
Agozino (2010: i).

The assumption that those who read this chapter will be familiar with the broad history
of the discipline of criminology is no doubt justified. Therefore, this allows me to make
a sweeping glance over this history as it pertains to the formation of the discipline in
Australasia9. Of course we all know that the power of positivistic, administrative or
Eurocentric criminology, call it what you will, was seriously challenged in the 1960s
onwards by the advent of various ‘critical’ criminologies. These critical perspectives
shared in common a rejection of (amongst other things) servicing the needs of the state
and the overwhelming focus on ‘individual antecedents’ of criminality.

What

distinguished these approaches from administrative formulations was their focused,
critical gaze on the institutions of social control, and the impact of divisive, disempowering
social structures (Scraton and Chadwick, 1991; see also Carrington and Hogg, 2012: 4748).
9

The term Australasia is used as a collective term for the separate, neo-colonial jurisdictions of Australia
and New Zealand.
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Muncie (2000) argues that the radical critique was so vociferous that some on ‘the left’
anticipated the demise of criminology itself or at the very least a ‘retrenchment’ of the
administrative and positivistic varieties. This supposition seriously overestimated the
power of the radical perspective while underestimating the resilience of positivist,
Eurocentric forms of criminology. It ignored the fact that even if the individualised,
Eurocentric focus of administrative criminology for a time lost its shine in terms of
dominating journal and book publications, academic awards and the like (a highly
debatable supposition), its tendency for theoretical imperialism and its sycophantic
relationship with the state ensured it continued to receive the attentions of policy
makers (Kitossa, 2012; Tauri, 2009).

By the end of the 1980s the rejuvenation of law and order politics in the United States
under Reagan, and Great Britain under Thatcher, brought with it the resurrection of an
administrative criminology revived after the suffocation of the ‘nothing works’
paradigm of the 1970s. Once again, positivistic criminologies were invited back into the
governmental fold as Western jurisdictions turned increasingly to ‘tough on crime’
approaches to social harm (Shichor, 2000; Walters, 2006).

The resurrection of

administrative, embedded criminologies10 entered its end game in the mid-1990s when
policy industry’s in various Western jurisdictions implemented so-called evidence
based policy (EBP) processes that the likes of
10

Tony Blair and his New Labour

Elsewhere, Carlen (2010) and Carrington and Hogg (2012) have advised against imagining
criminologies to the point of creating monolithic constructs and intellectual dichotomies such ‘critical’
vs. ‘administrative’ approaches and such like. Carrington and Hogg (2012: 46-47) argue that “[s]uch
exercises in distancing…. have borne little intellectual fruit over the years, let alone in the present when
critical work in criminology has become unmistakably ‘mainstream’ in Australia… as elsewhere. While
acknowledging the validity of this critique in terms of the eclectic nature of the discipline and the fact
that all criminologies can ask critical questions, the historical and contemporary role of the discipline in
subjugating Indigenes is readily identifiable via critical analysis via an Indigenous Standpoint; as will be
demonstrated in this chapter.
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government predicted would bring about the end of ideological policy making (Marston
and Watts, 2003)11. Instead, we had entered a new world in which evidence derived
from scientific research, would dominate policy development (Walters, 2008). The rise
of EBP meant that that once again, positivistic, administrative criminological
approaches became the acceptable face of the academy for policy makers (see Parsons,
2002). The situation was the same in various neo-colonial contexts, except for the
preference of New Zealand and Australian administrative criminology practitioners and
policy makers to look to Europe and North America for theoretical and empirical
inspiration (Carrington and Hogg, 2012: 48; Tauri, 2009; Webb, 2003).

To infer that criminology, or at least particular derivatives of the discipline are
‘Eurocentric’ is not to ignore variations in epistemological, methodological preference
and theoretical nuances that exist in our eclectic discipline.

However, from an

Indigenous Standpoint the term encapsulates the cultural, social and economic roots of
the European academy’s intellectual evolution. As Agozino (2003; 2010) and Cohen
(1988) contend, the colonial enterprise that took place from the 16th to the 19thand
early 20th centuries12 was central to the theoretical and empirical evolution of the

11

Much like the radical perspectives’ predictions of the demise of administrative criminology or
Fukuyama’s (1992) ‘end of history’, Blair et al’s announcement that EBP would facilitate the end of
ideology and politics in policy making has been shown to be wishful thinking (for example, see Tauri,
2009 and Walters, 2009).

12

It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a thorough overview of both the intellectual development
of the discipline of criminology, or of its grounding in the imperialist policies of Western colonisation of
Indigenous peoples. The former point has been made in detail elsewhere, although unsurprisingly
critical analysis of the role of the discipline in the cultural and physical genocide by colonising powers of
Indigenous peoples is sparse (although see for examples Cohen, 1988, Jackson, 1988; Pfohl, 1994). The
following quote from Agozino (2010: i) is suffice at this point to position criminology firmly as a key
technology of social control in the colonial era: “[c]ontrol-freak criminology was there from the
beginning of imperialism when the attempt to pacify the rebellious natives and stabilise foreign
domination of finance capital was politely referred to as the ‘native question’… to which the answer was
a pattern of pacification that has been identified as gun-boat criminology”.
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discipline of criminology. The imperialist underpinnings of contemporary criminology
is eloquently captured in Agozino’s (2010: vii) observation that:

It was at the height of the slave trade that classicism emerged to challenge the
arbitrary nature of punishment in medieval Europe but this insight was not
extended to enslaved Africans who were arbitrarily victimised even when they did
nothing wrong. However, it was not until the height of colonialism in African and
Asia that Europe discovered the new ‘science’ of criminology as a tool to aid the
control of the other – a supposed advancement on classical philosophies of justice.

The Hegemony of Authoritarian Criminology in Australasia
The issue of Indigenous over-representation in the criminal justice system has been a
significant focus of criminological work in Australasia for the past quarter century.
Until the advent of the ‘golden age’ of Indigenous-informed, Australian criminology in
the 1980s and 1990s, much of the initial academic material was generated by those
working within the administrative criminological vein. During this period a group of
mainly European criminologists published extensive material that privileged the
Aboriginal experience of crime control policy and gave voice to their issues, much of it
without the requisite filtering processes of the policy industry13 (see Clifford, 1982;

13

The situation is significantly different in that very little material that privileges the Māori experience of
criminal justice processes was produced during this era. Criminologists and policy makers tended to
offer a steady diet of Eurocentrically-centred, uncritical policy statements, exemplified by the
Reoffending by Māori (RoBM) project led by the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Māori Development
(see Williams, 2001). An exception is Moana Jackson’s ground breaking 1988 report He Whaaipanga
Hou (Māori and the Criminal Justice System), Jackson 1990; 1992, 1995a; 1995b and in terms of
historical work, chapter two of John Pratt’s (1992) Punishment in a Perfect Society, and Alan Ward’s
(1995) A Show of Justice: Racial Amalgamation in Nineteenth Century New Zealand. What little
criminological material was being produced on Indigenous issues, for example components of
Newbold’s 2000 publication Crime in New Zealand, were based on the privileging of Eurocentrically
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Cunneen, 1992; 1994; 1997; 1999; Blagg, 1997; 1998; 2000b; Dodson, 1994). This body
of work represented a significant change from the diet of government funded material
that masqueraded for ‘objective’, ‘value-free’ research we had been subjected to in the
past14. The period from the late 1990s onwards has seen a re-empowerment of neoconservative, state-centred criminological perspectives on the Blackfella/Māori
‘problem’. Unfortunately, as will be discussed later in the chapter, much of the material
emanating from this perspective adds to the discipline’s sad history of abetting the
subjugation of First Nations, proving that the Eurocentric, embedded components of the
discipline are failing to learn from the discipline’s abusive past.

Contrary to the claims of adherents such as Weatherburn (2010), the majority of
criminological material that is influencing public policy and media discourse on the
‘Indigenous question’, emanates from approaches that are predominantly quantitative
in method, and largely ‘Aboriginal free’ in terms of data gathering and engagement with
the research population. The body of work that is considered of value to the policy
sector and mainstream media, is predominantly statistically-focused and governmentfunded (see Bond and Jeffries, 2010; Jeffries and Bond, 2010, Marie, 2010; Newbold and
Jeffries, 2010; Snowball and Weatherburn, 2006 and 2007; Weatherburn and Fitzgerald,
2006; Weatherburn, Fitzgerald and Hua, 2003; Weatherburn, Snowball and Hunter,

derived material and not on meaningful engagement (or indeed empirical inquiry) with Māori; a stance
replicated in a recently published chapter on ‘race and crime’ (Newbold and Jeffries, 2010).
14

One significant exception to the rule that government funded material is non-critical, comes in the form
of the 1992 report released by the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody
(RCIADIC).
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2006 for exemplars of the type of material produced by embedded Australasian
criminologists)15.

There are a number of reasons why the material produced by embedded criminological
approaches is proving popular with both policy makers and mainstream media. One
forceful explanation is that the body of work this paradigm produces largely avoids
critical analysis of the policy-making process. It avoids or sidelines complicated, messy
‘structural determinants’ such as racist policing, racist court processes, racist
Government policy and legislation (most recently demonstrated in the Australasian
context by the introduction in 2006 of the Federal Government’s Northern Territory
Emergency Response: see Altman, 2007). These supposedly ‘too hard to measure’
determinants of Indigenous marginalisation are often dismissed through flippant and
empirically weak contentions that institutional bias and structural determination have
dominated (and negatively impacted) Aboriginal policy making (see Marie, 2010;
Weatherburn, 2010 and discussion below). This argument and many others form the
great myths through which administrative, embedded criminologies seek to maintain
hegemony in the race to be ‘of utility’ to the state (see below for in-depth discussion of
the importance of myth for administrative, embedded criminologies).

I argue that the resurrection of administrative criminologies has seen the development
of a form that is particular to settler societies, including Australasia. To this peculiar
form I give the name Authoritarian Criminology. This ‘new’ form of criminological
15

A body of work exists that privileges the Indigenous perspective, but thus far is less likely to impact
policy development and media discourse. For example, see Altman (2007), Bull, (2004; 2009), Cunneen
(2008 and 2009), Tauri (2004; 2009; 2011c); Vivian and Schokman (2009) and Webb (2003; 2004;
2012).
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formulation appears to serve the interests of the neo-colonial state, Eurocentric
academic institutions, and the career aspirations of practitioners. Of lesser concern are
the needs of Indigenous peoples who serve simply as the providers of empirical data for
analysis. As such the practice of Authoritarian Criminology represents a contemporary
exemplar of Agozino’s ‘control freak discipline’.

It is the contemporary form of

embedded criminology that continues the discipline’s history of collusion with the state
and the continued, neo-colonial subjugation of Indigenous populations (as illustrated in
the work of Agozino, 2003; Cohen, 1988).

The pursuit of Authoritarian Criminology is readily identified by the following core
practices of its exponents, including that they:


focus their research and social inquiry on the definition and conceptualisation of
crime as defined by the state;



confine their critical criminological gaze to issues relating to state-defined
problem populations, more often than not people of colour and working class
youth, without significant engagement with individuals or communities from
these populations;



confine their uncritical criminological gaze to state-run justice processes, policies,
legislation and problems and questions that the state deems important for which
they receive remuneration via the establishment of contractual relations;



limit their ‘critical analysis’ of state systems and policies to programme
effectiveness and evaluation largely devoid of historical context and wider
political economy of the state’s dominance of ‘justice’ in the neo-liberal moment;
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empower themselves through the veil of scientism, an ideological construct that
privileges their approach to measuring the Indigenous life-world, whilst
denigrating Indigenous (and other) forms of knowledge that seek to explain the
social world from the perspective of the Other (see, for example, Marie, 2010); and



utilise the process of myth construction and maintenance in a hegemonic exercise
aimed at privileging its ‘way of knowing’ in the policy making process, over that of
potential competitors.

The Mythological Foundations of Authoritarian Criminology

The critique of postmodern thought notwithstanding, it is a fact that many
criminological theorists make extensive use of analogy, myths and literary
allusions in their construction of reality (emphasis added).
Agozino (2003: 110-111).

As Agozino observes, myth construction and maintenance is an essential element in the
development of the discipline of criminology, and its construction of reality. I argue that
as Authoritarian Criminology is geared toward supporting the neo-colonial state and,
either by osmosis or intent, a significant player in the continued subjugating Indigenous
peoples, its myth construction and maintenance activities warrant closer consideration
(Tauri, 2004; 2009).
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Myth, criminology and policy making
For a discipline that is populated by empiricists driven to identify the ‘laws of crime’
through scientific investigation, the claim that it relies on myth for its legitimacy might
appear strange. To understand this claim we need to push aside the veil of scientism
that practitioners surround their practice with and accept that ideological artefacts such
as these are central to the business of ‘doing Authoritarian Criminology’ (or, indeed, any
form of the discipline).

I accept that exponents of Authoritarian Criminology are

genuinely committed to producing ‘scientific’ data on the social world in order to inform
an evidence-based, politically neutral, policy-making process. Unfortunately, those aims
are difficult to achieve when policy making and academic social inquiry are both highly
ideological and political activities. And as they are ideologically and politically driven
they are by their very nature highly dependent on an “alternative dimension of myth”
(Herzog and Abel 2009: 4) to support their hegemonic activities; hence the parasitic
relationship between the two entities. I argue that the myth-making of Authoritarian
Criminology is reflective of the gap and tension between the ‘ought’ and ‘is’
characteristic of institutional, knowledge development practices in the academy and
the public service. Accordingly, the academy’s knowledge construction and policy
development are duplicitous activities where “... the ought provides a fantasised or
glamorised ideal that the is of practices should be achieving” (ibid: 4, emphasis added).

The creation and maintenance of myth is fundamental to Authoritarian Criminology’s
hegemonic endeavours because of the important part it plays in mediating opposition
and “justifying decisions regarding major issues” such as policy, legislation and funding
of both research and interventions (ibid: 5). Myth construction and maintenance is
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particularly helpful for taming internal coordination problems (i.e., competition within
and between various criminologies and, in particular the lived experience of problem
populations, for the attention of the policy makers and their finite resources) and
external one’s (i.e., nullifying the potentially politically damaging impact of independent
scrutiny by Indigenous commentators and more critically inclined criminologists)
“because myths, by their very nature, disguise and manage the emotional impact of the
stories they tell” (ibid: 5). Therefore, myths play a useful role in hiding the ‘real story’
behind the intent and likely impact of Eurocentric knowledge construction.

Myth creation and substantiation run deep through Authoritarian Criminology, and two
recent papers (one substantive and one, while comparatively short, nonetheless
instructive for this discussion) appeared in the Australian and New Zealand Journal of
Criminology (2010 - volume 43(2)) that provide contemporary exemplars of this
process. These are Danette Marie’s Māori and Offending: A Critical Appraisal, and Don
Weatherburn’s Guest Editorial: Indigenous Violence.

The myths that underpin Authoritarian Criminology are clearly identifiable in the work
of Weatherburn and Marie in particular and other similar work (see references bottom
of page 118). Analysis of this body of work identifies four key myths central to the
hegemonic activities of Authoritarian Criminology:


the myth of Eurocentric objectivity and the veil of scientism;



the myth of the dominance of Indigenous/communitarian perspectives;



the myth of the Indigenous dominance of evaluation and research on ‘Indigenous
policies’; and
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the myth of the Indigenous dominance of policy making, intervention design and
research is the primary reason for the failure to reduce over-representation.
For the purposes of this chapter, the rest of this section will analyse the use of the
first two myths as exemplified in the Marie and Weatherburn articles.

The myth of objectivity and the veil of scientism
The key to this myth is discourse that presents Authoritarian criminological knowledge
as the valid form for informing policy making because it is derived from scientific
observation of the social context, and its practitioners are both ‘objective’ and ‘valueneutral. In contrast, other forms of knowledge construction are unscientific, ideological,
value-laden and therefore biased. And in this category practitioners place Indigenous
techniques for knowledge construction and dissemination.

Marie’s paper provides a solid example of the type of mythology-driven knowledge
destruction at work. For example, in her paper she makes two significant, albeit poorly
evidenced claims common to the practice of Authoritarian Criminology: firstly, Māori
(Indigenous) formulations of knowledge are ‘unscientific’ and should therefore play no
part in crime control policy development; and secondly, Māori policies and
interventions are ‘unscientific’ because there is no evidence to prove either the theories
upon which they are based or the efficacy of the programmes that emanate from them.

I need to begin my response to these mythological constructs by acknowledging that
Marie’s point about the lack of evidence for Indigenous theories and interventions has
some validity. However, in making her claims Marie appears unaware of the politics of
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crime control policy in the New Zealand context, especially as it relates to the
development of Māori-specific policy. Her apparent ignorance of the ‘politics’ of Māori
policy construction explains her exaggeration of the amount of influence Māori theory
and practices actually has on crime control policy. If she were aware of the politics and
the vast array of documents regarding policy construction across the criminal justice
sector, then she might have chosen to temper her comments on the failure of Māori
approaches by acknowledging the following, fundamental truth about the criminal
justice sector in New Zealand: that it has an extremely poor history of carrying out (or
contracting) ‘scientific’, outcome-focused research/evaluation into the efficacy of it
policies and interventions. This lack of empirical analysis of the crime control in New
Zealand pertains to the entire suite of policies and interventions whether they are
informed by Tikanga Māori, Crime Control Through Environmental Design (CPTED) or
some other theory (see Tauri, 2004; Te Puni Kokiri, 2002).

Marie’s mythological construction of Māori approaches is weakened by a sustained,
critical analysis of the efficacy of her preferred ‘scientifically’-derived interventions.
Nowhere in her paper does Marie provide significant evidence that these category of
programmes (for example, Multi-Systemic Therapy, corrections-delivered criminogenic
programmes, CPTED, etc) are working in any substantial (or empirically verifiable) way
to reduce Māori offending/reoffending. And yet, as will be discussed later, New Zealand
offenders are far more likely to receive the kind of scientifically-derived treatment
Marie supports. In comparison, they are much less likely to take part in Tikangainspired interventions that Marie contends are having a negative effect on Indigenous
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recidivism rates (see offenders’ comments in Te Puni Kokiri, 2007 and especially
Department of Corrections 2009b).

The myth of the dominance of Indigenous/communitarian perspectives
The purpose of this mythical construct would have us believe that the development of
effective solutions to the ‘Indigenous problem’ has been hampered in neo-colonial
jurisdictions by a) the rise of Indigenous cultural ‘theory’, b) the biculturalisation of
state policy, which led to c) the policy sector in Australasia ‘turning away from science’
and embracing cultural perspectives on crime control for First Nations. For the likes of
Weatherburn (2010) this explains the predominance of policies and interventions
geared to conferencing processes, circle sentencing and enhancing the ‘cultural practice’
of agents and agencies and a focus on ‘bias’ and ‘structure’ rather than individual
antecedents of crime. Marie (2010: 283) makes a similar claim when she writes that
Māori ‘theory’ dominates crime control policy development in the New Zealand context.
She goes on to present a misleading summation of Māori theory by erroneously
presenting it as primarily focused on cultural loss as the key determinant of Māori
offending and overrepresentation:

A major assumption of this theory is that the contemporary overrepresentation of
Māori... is best understood as the outcome of Māori experiencing impairments to
cultural identity resulting from colonisation. Central to this theory... is also the
assumption that ethnicity is a reliable construct by which distinctions can be made
between offenders regarding what factors precipitated their offending, as well as
best practices for their rehabilitation... rehabilitation efforts largely pivot on the
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idea that restoring cultural identity will lead to a subsequent number of Māori in
prison.

To support her argument Marie cites Newbold’s (2007) summary of the types of
programmes currently en vogue in corrections.

Yet inexplicably, Marie overlooks

preceding chapters of Newbold’s book which demonstrate that within the Department’s
theoretical paradigm, culture and cultural identity are not given causal power: in other
words, culture neither causes crime, nor is a significant player in reducing it. In fact,
culture (specifically ‘Māori culture’) is confined to the responsivity trance of the
Department’s theoretical and practice framework, where ‘restoring cultural awareness’
is viewed as a helpful process for preparing individual Māori offenders for ‘treatment’
(see Coebergh et al, 2001, especially pps. 15-16; Webb, 2012).

Marie appears be to unaware of the fact that the so-called ‘Māori theory’ she is
critiquing, is in fact a construct of government officials and contractors; a governmental
interpretation of Māori knowledge and cultural practice. What she presents as ‘Māori
theory’ is in fact a policy framework employed by state institutions to indigenise (and
colour) the programmatic requirements of the institutions (see Tauri, 2004; 2009;
2011d; Webb, 2003; 2012). It is difficult to comprehend how Marie could miss this
situation given the documentation she cites are entirely constructed by crime control
agencies and not from external, independent Māori (or indeed, non-Māori) sources.
Marie fails to contemplate that she is not dealing with ‘Māori theory’, or ‘tikanga-based
interventions’, but neo-colonial artefacts of government officials, criminologists and
psychologists ‘jobbing’ for the Crown’s coin and utilised to satisfied the needs of
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agencies, and not Māori (see McIntosh, forthcoming and Tauri, 2004; 2009 regarding
the duplicitous nature of government institutions use of Māori symbols, Tikanga
(theory) and responses to social harm).

The dominance of positivistic theory in

Corrections policy programme, and the subjugation of Indigenous perspectives are
evident in all relevant departmental documents, as demonstrated in the following text
from a Department of Corrections (2009b: 42) review of the effectiveness of
rehabilitation programmes:

It is now generally accepted that treatment programmes should be adapted to
cater for the cultural needs of offenders who participate.

As such, culture

represents an important responsivity issue within offender rehabilitation.
Incorporating culturally-based concepts, imagery and activities into programme
content is regarded as a way of both attracting minority-group participants into
programmes, and ensuring that the programme engages and retains them
(emphasis added).

Weatherburn (2010: 198) accentuates this particular myth of the dominance of
Indigenous perspectives and a focus on ‘structure’ (i.e., ‘bias) in policy responses when
he argues that:

... debate about how to respond to Indigenous violence have focussed less on the
question of how to reduce it than how to reduce the effect of Indigenous violence
on Indigenous contact with the criminal justice system. The general consensus on
this issue seems to be that the best way to reduce Indigenous contact with the
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criminal justice system is to create some tribunal or process that gives Indigenous
community members a voice in how to respond to crime by Indigenous
defendants.

Both Marie and Weatherburn’s positions can be described as mythological constructs.
Neither author appears to have engaged thoroughly with the vast amount of material
generated by administrative criminological and government institutions that
demonstrate the wide array of official responses to Indigenous crime, of which
conferencing processes and liaison officers, etc, form only a small component of an
extensive intervention strategy. Nor have they engaged with the sophisticated material
Indigenous and non-Indigenous have produced examining Indigenous overrepresentation in Australasia or any of settler society jurisdictions. If they had they
would find that Indigenous and critical scholars in New Zealand (including Jackson,
1988; Tauri, 2009; Webb, 2003), Australia (including Blagg 2000a, Cunneen, 2009;
Dodson, 1994 and others), in Canada (Palys, 1993 and Palys and Victor, 2005) provide
sophisticated, multifaceted explanations of the Indigenous experience. This material
also reveals the wide range of interventions, such as habilitation centres, and culturally
and socially specific therapeutic approaches to a wide range of ‘risk factors’, to use the
preferred terminology of Authoritarian Criminology, that Indigenous scholars and
practitioners have designed.

It is accurate to state that issues like bias, institutional racism, colonisation, and
militaristic-style policing strategies are key foci of counter-colonial, Indigenous
criminologies. However, it is duplicitous to argue that they are the only or the most
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predominant factors that Indigenous (and non-Indigenous), critical scholars identify as
key explanations for Indigenous over-representation. The key issue that Marie and
Weatherburn miss is that it is the state that has demonstrated a preference for
‘culturally sensitive processing’ of Indigenous crime, exemplified by agency controlled
programmes such as group conferences, sentencing circles, Indigenous sentencing
courts, Indigenous liaison officers, ‘Memorandum of Understanding’, Aboriginal Justice
Strategies and such like (Tauri, 2011b).

These types of state-centred responses

invariably lack jurisdictional autonomy (for First Nations), legislative weight and
receive significantly less funding in comparison to mainstream policies and
interventions. In reality, a significant proportion of settler state responses to the
Indigenous problem are simply orientalised artefacts that enable the state to be ‘seen to
do something’ while avoiding independent (Indigenous) analysis of the failure of its
crime control processes to provide meaningful justice ‘outcomes’ for subjugated
populations (Palys and Victor, 2005; Tauri, 2011a).

A thorough engagement with crime control texts produced by Government agents (such
as Cabinet papers, key strategies, research documents, etc) demonstrates that the
overarching theoretical paradigms that dominate the sector derive from Eurocentric
theories. Furthermore, the vast majority of interventions that Indigenous offenders
receive emanate from positivistic criminological and psychological paradigms. The
predominant form of ‘therapy’ and crime prevention programmes Māori offenders
participate in are and not, as Marie claims, based on Tikanga Māori. The literature
shows that Marie’s argument that Māori dominate the design of correctional
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interventions and the evaluation and research process16 is nothing more than a
mythological construct. For example, a review of key documents demonstrates that the
dominant theory of the Department of Corrections is the Psychology of Criminal Conduct
imported wholesale in the mid-1990s from Canada (see Newbold 2007; Webb, 2003
and the majority of the department’s policy documents since 1996 including the
Department of Corrections, 2001a; 2001b, 2002 2009a and 2009b. All this material is
available either online and through an Official Information Act request) and life
course/developmental theory (see Department of Corrections, 2007). Likewise, the
Ministry of Justice (2005; 2007) policy programme is dominated by CPTED and
Rationale Choice Theory in relation to its crime prevention work programme and lifecourse and other ‘developmental’ approaches inform youth justice (Becroft and
Thompson, 2006; McLaren, 2000; Ministry of Justice, 2002).

Contrary to the mythic claims of Authoritarian Criminologists such as Marie and
Weatherburn, a thorough review of available research and government texts
demonstrates that:

16

One of Marie’s more contentious claims is that Kaupapa Māori research (KMR) methodology dominates
the evaluative processes of government agencies in New Zealand like the Department of Corrections.
She also argues that the dominance of KRM is blocking the ability of agencies to gather ‘scientific’
evidence of the effectiveness of crime control policies and interventions. In making this claim, Marie
ignores a number of research and policy-related documents that demonstrate that the vast majority of
evaluations carried out by criminal justice agencies in New Zealand utilise standard evaluation and
research methods. If used at all, KMR is usually little more than a sub-component of the entire
evaluative process (see Tauri, 2009: 7). The Department of Corrections 2009 evaluation of Māori Focus
Units and Māori ‘therapeutic programmes’ demonstrates this point clearly. While the contractors
engaged on the projects utilised KMR protocols to ensure ethical engagement with Māori research
subjects, they chose to employ a standard range of evaluative/research methods, including semistructured interviews, psychometric questionnaires and a rehabilitation quotient, for the data gathering
phase of the project.
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1.

Māori theory (Tikanga, kaupapa) does not dominate policy making in any of the
New Zealand’s crime control agencies (see Waitangi Tribunal (2005) for outline of
the dominance of Eurocentric theory);

2.

the vast majority of policy, legislation, intervention design and funding decisions
are informed by Eurocentric, imported ‘theories’ and interventions (for example,
see the Ministry of Justice generated material on the recent Drivers of Crime
project in New Zealand(2009a, 2009b, 2009c; 2009d); and

3.

the vast majority of government spend in New Zealand’s criminal justice system
goes to Eurocentrically-derived crime control programmes17.

Concluding Comments
I have no doubt that some criminologists working in Australasia and within the
identified authoritarian criminological paradigm, will find this chapter challenging. I am
just as certain that my text will be dismissed by some as aggressive and emotional.
These are terms that Indigenous scholars hear too often when members of the academy
chose to avoid engaging with the Indigenous critique. Soynika (1994: xiii-xiv, quoted in
Agozino, 2007: 2) aptly justifies the decision to ‘speak to power’ in such
uncompromising terms when he states that:

[w]hen power is placed in the service of vicious reaction, a language must be
called into being which does its best to appropriate such obscenity of power and
fling its excesses back in its face”, and that “... language must communicate its
17

During the now defunct Effective Interventions initiative (2006-2007) officials from the Ministry of
Māori Development were informed by crime control agencies that Māori initiatives, including
‘counselling’ programmes that derive from non-Māori theoretical sources, received less than 10% of the
sectors spend on therapeutic and other forms of intervention (Tauri, 2011b).
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illegitimacy in a forceful, uncompromising language of rejection, seeking always to
make it ridiculous and contemptible, deflating its pretensions to the core.

Given the mythological nature of so much of Authoritarian Criminology’s work and the
influence it has on policy, the time clearly has come for Indigenous scholars to challenge
the hegemony of criminological practitioners who empower themselves to speak for us,
while employing mythological constructs to silence our voices. This call to arms can be
justified through a number of rationales, although just two will suffice here. The first is
that we have the right to speak for ourselves, which involves critical scrutiny of what
others say and write about us. The second rationale comes in the form of an empirical
question: for all its ‘science’, ‘objectivity’ and generous government support, what
tangible outcomes has Authoritarian Criminology (or more widely, Positivistic
Criminology) delivered to Indigenous peoples? An empirically informed answer to the
question must surely be ‘not much’. Unless of course we measure effectiveness in terms
of more Indigenous peoples in prison, ever increasing police resources employed to
target Indigenous communities, more orientalised, state-centred conferencing models
and more meaningless Indigenous justice strategies.

A peculiar irony of Western criminology is that its administrative formulations and so
much its theories of crime and interventions are constructed in high crime societies
(Agozino, 2010; Cohen, 1988). A further irony is that many Western criminologists
seem to believe it is their duty to ‘teach the coloured folk’ about how to solve their crime
problems by exporting failed policies and theories to ‘Third World’ nations (Agozino,
2004). Worse still is the fact that Authoritarian Criminologists residing in the Third
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World and settler societies (such as Australia and New Zealand) continuously support
the importation of failed, ‘scientific’ interventions, whilst utilising the veil of scientism
to shield their activities from the critical gaze of the Indigenous Other. When challenged
for foisting on our communities alien processes, criminological experts respond by
regurgitating ideological statements about ‘evidence-based policy’, ‘international best
practice’ and the efficacy of ‘acultural interventions’18 (Tauri, 2011c). Like so many First
Nation scholars and justice practitioners I have heard this self-serving rhetoric time and
again.

And yet I never fail to be surprised by the silence that emanates from

Authoritarian Criminology to our simple refrain: ‘why is so much of this criminological
work carried out on our behalf, but without the necessary engagement with our
communities’?

18

An example of this occurred while the author was working in New Zealand’s public service in the early
2000s. An American Professor of Criminology had been invited speak by a core justice agency about
Multi Systemic Therapy (MST). During question time the Professor was informed that Māori and
Pacifica practitioners had long utilised multi-systemic approaches to social harm. He was then asked
what was different about MST, and how it would benefit Indigenous peoples who lived in a very
different social context than North America. The Professor responded that MST had been scientifically
tested, and results showed the programme that reduced crime amongst Afro-Americans and Hispanics.
The Professor’s comparison of the social and cultural contexts of Māori and Pacifica peoples with that of
Afro-American and Hispanic populations in North America highlights a fundamental Authoritarian
Criminological approach to the creation of interventions and to people of colour. Too often
practitioners, like the American Professor, employ orientalising discourses that in one stroke eliminate
perspective-destroying factors, such as the significant variation in strategies of subjugation employed in
different colonial contexts, and the unique cultural, social and political experiences and formation of
Indigenous populations and other ethnic minorities (see Blagg, 1997; Tauri, 1998).
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Introduction
This article critically analyses the role that criminological theory and specific policy
formulations of culture play in the New Zealand state’s response to the overrepresentation of Māori in the criminal justice system. Part one provides an overview of
the changing criminological explanations of and responses to, Māori offending in New
Zealand from the 1980s onwards and how these understandings continued colonialist
approaches to Māori and crime, into the neo-colonial context. In particular we chart the
shift in policy development from theorising Māori offending as attributable to loss of
cultural identity, to a focus on socio-economic and institutional antecedents and finally
through the risk factors, assessment and criminogenic needs approaches that have
gained prominence in the current policy context.

135

In part two the focus moves to the strategies employed by members of the academy to
elevate their own epistemological constructions of Māori social reality within the policy
development process. In particular, the critique scrutinises recent attempts to portray
Indigenous responses to social harm as ‘unscientific’ and in part responsible for the
continuing over-representation of Māori in New Zealand’s criminal justice system. The
purpose of this analysis is to focus the critical, criminological gaze firmly on the
activities of policy makers and administrative criminologists in relation to Māori as an
Indigenous peoples19.

Responding to Māori Offending: An Overview
By the early 1980s the level of Māori over-representation in the criminal justice system
had reached a level that commentators equated to ‘considerable and ongoing overrepresentation’ based upon population (Quince, 2007; McIntosh and Radojkovic, 2012).
This ‘social fact’ prompted a small number of dedicated, inter-agency policy projects20
and the implementation of so-called Māori-specific interventions (see discussion
below).

Despite all this policy attention, the level and nature of Māori over-

representation has remained high ever since. It is because Māori over-representation
became a recognisable statistical issue and received considerable attention from policy
makers from the 1980s through to the 2000s that we have chosen this period as the
19

The term administrative criminology is used to denote criminological research and theorising that is
aimed at enhancing state knowledge of the social context (see Galliher, 1999; Hirschi, 1993). Tauri
(2014c) argues that administrative criminological musings on Indigenous populations can be readily
identified through key characteristics, including confining the focus of criminological inquiry to issues
the state deems important, and state definitions of what constitutes crime, and a preference for using
methodologies that restrict contact with marginalised social groups.

20

Since the mid-1990s government agencies have instigated a number of inter-agency policy projects of
which the issue of Māori over-representation has been a key focus. These include the Reoffending by
Māori (RoBM) project (1996-1999), Effective Interventions (2006-2008) and most recently, Drivers of
Crime (2008-ongoing).
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focus of our analysis. It is, after all, the period in New Zealand’s criminal justice history
that concerted efforts by policy makers to solve the so-called ‘Māori problem’ were
finally made (Tauri, 2011a).

Explanations and responses through the 1980s
Generally, responses by policy-makers and academics to Māori offending in the 1980s
reflected the growing popularity of community-centred responses to offending in
Western jurisdictions grappling with rising levels of crime amongst ‘lower class’, new
migrant and First Nation populations, (Tauri, 1996). A similar response was followed in
the New Zealand context, although policy makers quickly came under criticism for
excluding Māori values, practices and philosophies (tikanga) during the development of
ostensibly Māori-focused interventions (see Jackson, 1988). The 1980s saw Māori
increasingly campaign for significant control of crime control interventions targeted at
Māori offenders and victims. For example, the Ministerial Advisory Committee’s (1986)
review of the Department of Social Welfare, Puao-Te-Ata-Tu, criticised the state’s
delivery of programmes for Māori as ineffective and culturally inappropriate. One
supposed community-centred initiative was the Departments of Māori Affairs, Social
Welfare and then Justice-led Mātua Whangai initiative, which promoted developing
community-led responses to offenders based upon iwi (tribe), hapū (sub-tribe), and
whānau (family) practices (Department of Justice, 1985). However, Williams (2001)
notes that Mātua Whangai underwent a number of changes from 1985, and by the late
1990s it had moved away from the original intent of developing Māori-community
centred approaches, to a limited service provision model that implemented
Departmental aims with programme contractors. These types of community crime
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prevention programmes incorporate features of what might loosely be called Māori
responses to social harm, but the reality was the design and delivery of state-centred
initiatives that ‘added’ Māori cultural elements to existing intervention logic (see
discussion below and Tauri, 1999).

While traditional Māori approaches to social harm were given some attention after the
Department of Social Welfare review, Māori dissatisfaction with the state system failed
to abate, as evidenced by the release in 1988 of Moana Jackson’s report Māori and the
Criminal Justice System: He Whaipānga Hou.

Jackson’s report examined Māori

interaction with the New Zealand criminal justice system through a three year study
involving interviews, focus groups and hui (focus groups/community meetings) with a
range of Māori, including police, correctional officers, policy workers, inmates,
community workers and academics. In his analysis, Jackson argued that Māori justice
practices had been marginalised through colonial practices that imposed British law.
He observed that Māori practices and philosophies were denigrated to the point where
they no longer operated in many Māori communities to a meaningful extent. Jackson
and his participants’ analyses of crime were directed toward a range of antecedents,
including a detailed examination of the marginalisation of Māori by government
institutions, most notably from the social welfare and justice systems.

Māori who participated in Jackson’s research argued that the criminal justice system
reflects a Pākehā (European) theoretical and practice bias, and that this bias was
evident in research into Māori criminal behaviour. It was suggested that policy makers
and members of the academy did not consider Māori experiences of colonisation to a
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degree necessary for informing the development of effective policy. Policy makers were
criticised for their tendency to assume that criminal behaviour by Māori could be dealt
with in the same way as offending by other population groups.

Furthermore,

participants observed that Māori offenders in the criminal justice system had
experienced poor education, difficulties in family upbringing, long periods of
unemployment and other factors which increased the likelihood of offending behaviour.
However, unlike other groups of offenders, for Māori these issues were impacted by a
history of marginalisation from New Zealand society through the process of
colonisation. Participants argued that Māori social deprivations were the result of state
policies that had negatively impacted on Māori social structures, through the active
suppression of Māori culture, and their economic and political autonomy (see Walker,
1990).

To understand Māori offending, Jackson (1988) argued that theoretical

explanations and policy responses had to contextualise Māori experiences in relation to
a history of colonisation:

The monocultural basis of Pākehā research into Māori offending has prevented
recognition of these socio-cultural dynamics and the appropriate mechanisms
needed to understand them. This has resulted in a raft of “explanations” of Māori
crime which reflect considerable monocultural and theoretical bias, but little
effective explanation. Thus the Māori offender has merely been defined as an
urban misfit, a cultural maladept, an educational retard, or the victim of
behavioural labelling, while the socio-cultural forces underlying such descriptions
have been largely unrecognised (p. 26).
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This emphasises the importance of understanding how colonisation shapes
contemporary social relations and contexts, rather than seeking to limit analyses to that
of individual pathology, and decontextualised from the wider social relations in New
Zealand society. Jackson believed Māori philosophies were relevant to understanding
offending, and he argued that tikanga Māori would “… provide some insight into the
complex questions of why some Māori men become criminal offenders and how the
criminal justice process responds to them. It approaches the topic from within a Māori
conceptual framework and seeks to explain Māori perception of the causes and
consequences of criminal offending” (1988: 17). Jackson hypothesised that a Māori
system based upon Māori values and authority to hear and respond, would be able to
better address the Māori offending problem.

Overall, Government Ministers and policy makers have largely ignored Jackson and his
research participants’ argument for increased Māori jurisdictional autonomy. Instead,
the primary policy response largely revolved around the controlled integration of
‘acceptable’ Māori concepts and cultural practices into confined areas of the justice
system (see Tauri, 2011b). For example, in reviewing He Whaipānga Hou, the Courts’
Consultative Committee (1991) (comprised from the judiciary, lawyers and community
representatives) recommended to the then Minister of Justice that culturally
appropriate responses to Māori offending were achievable through existing state
mechanisms. The Committee expressly recommended against transferring criminal
justice-centred processes into distinctly Māori settings.

The Committee especially

argued against marae (meeting houses) being used for court cases (thus ignoring
evidence that historically Māori utilised marae as a site for dealing with social harm –
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see Jackson, 1988). It was argued that court trials could not be easily transposed to the
marae setting while ensuring the integrity of the state process remained ‘intact’.
However, officials did express the view that marae could play a minor role in the formal
justice system through the delivery of community diversion and rehabilitative
programmes designed by the state for the benefit of Māori offenders sometime in the
future21.

In contrast to the position taken by Jackson and his research participants, state officials
made it clear that the only acceptable response to Māori concerns was for offending to
be addressed through the purposeful incorporation of Māori justice and cultural concepts
into the justice system, rather than a separate justice system or any meaningful form of
jurisdictional autonomy (Tauri, 1999). For example, since the early 1990s government
agencies within the justice sector have followed the firm policy of enhancing the
responsiveness of state processes to Māori. The responsiveness strategy was based
around incorporating more Māori values into the justice system. The stated aims of the
responsiveness strategy were to:


identify how to reduce Māori offending and victimisation;



focus on ways to be more effective in service delivery to Māori, and to actively
encourage the positive participation by Māori in such delivery;

21

The government’s perspective changed recently with the introduction of Rangatahi (Youth) Courts in
May 2008. The Rangatahi Court is, in all essence a Youth Court held on a marae with te reo (Māori
language) and Māori protocols incorporated into the process. The purpose of the hearing is to monitor
the young person's completion of his or her Family Group Conference Plan (Ministry of Justice, 2012).
While the Rangatahi Court process signals a willingness on behalf of the New Zealand state to involve
marae in the formal process, the extent to which it results in meaningful jurisdictional autonomy for
Māori remains to be seen.
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explore the scope for greater diversity in dealing with Māori offenders (Justice
Sector Policy Group, 1998: 6).

To achieving the goals of the strategy were various Māori programme and provider
developments funded and controlled by policy makers.

These initiatives were

considered essential to enhancing relationships between the policy sector and Māori
providers and communities. By the late 1990s programmes with a specific Māori focus
being supported or considered by the Ministry of Justice and Department of Corrections
(via the Justice Sector Policy Group, 1998: 79) and set firmly in the responsiveness
framework, included:


iwi based safer community councils;



community panel pilot diversion projects, such as Te Whānau Āwhina, that focused
on offending by urban Māori offenders;



Māori focus units in prisons;



habilitation centres specifically focusing on Māori;



a cultural perspectives unit within the Department focused on developing Māori
policy; and



a bicultural therapy programme.

Through the responsiveness strategy developed during the 1990s, government officials
drew a clear distinction between the Māori justice system advocated by Jackson and his
participants, and the preferred strategy of integrating ‘acceptable’ elements of Māori
culture into the state-dominated system. The strategy further sought to enhance the
goals and status of the formal system through recruitment of more Māori into the
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justice sector.

Officials also strove to achieve the goals of the strategy through

enhancing officials’ awareness of Māori culture, while purposefully avoiding significant
alterations in either the structure or power dynamics of the formal system (Tauri,
1999). The New Zealand Police, for example, actively recruited more Māori officers and
developed cultural awareness programmes as part of its responsiveness policy (Te Puni
Kōkiri, 2002a). The Department of Corrections responsiveness policy was dominated
throughout the 1990s (and early 2000s), by the introduction of supposed Māori
therapeutic programmes, the development of a Treaty of Waitangi Strategy and the
signing of a small number of Memorandum of Understandings (MOU’s) with specific Iwi
designed to enhance relationships with Māori communities (see Lomax, 1994;
Department of Corrections, 2001a, 2002).

The 1990s and onwards
The 1990s onwards witnessed the development of more sophisticated, supposedly
scientific approaches to the Māori problem, at least from a Eurocentric theoretical and
practice-based position.

For example, in 1998 the Department of Corrections

Psychological Services introduced a rehabilitation initiative for Māori called the Bi-cultural
Therapy Model. This model aimed to deliver psychological treatments to Māori offenders
through incorporating elements of tikanga into (or more accurately, onto) therapeutic
interventions. In describing the initiative, the Department of Corrections (2001: 10) noted
that:

Māori therapeutic programmes have been developed as ‘blended’ programmes
that incorporate tikanga Māori concepts alongside Western psychological
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concepts. These programmes provide a more focused analysis of how Māori
tikanga and concepts relate to specific offending behaviour.

This development, however, does not alter the basic premise of attributing offending to
individualistic pathologies. In reality, the treatment response has been adapted through
the utilisation of Māori culture and tikanga within the rehabilitation process
(McFarlane-Nathan, 1994, 1999; Nathan, Wilson and Hillman, 2003).

The development of Māori Focus Units can be attributed to this blended approach, with
the first being in place by 1997 (Department of Corrections, 2001a). These units offer
Māori inmates cultural instruction and te reo (Māori language) courses. The rationale
from the Department of Corrections (2002, p. 21) for developing these units was described
as “… use Māori language and culture to create a change in the understanding, attitude
and behaviour of Māori offenders” with a related “... commitment from participants to
address the discrepancies between Māori tikanga and their current offending and
lifestyle”. Within Māori focus units, Māori therapeutic programmes have also developed
into a cognitive group therapy intervention with Māori cultural components added on
(Webb, 2012). In evaluating the programmes, the Department of Corrections (2009a: 67) states that:

The Māori Therapeutic Programme (MTP) is a group-based offender rehabilitation
programme. The main purpose is to both encourage and enable the avoidance of
new offending amongst participants. Currently, MTPs are delivered only within
the MFUs. Led by experienced group facilitators, the MTP group meets several
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times each week over ten weeks to work through prescribed programme content.
This content is similar to that used in existing mainstream rehabilitative
programmes, centering on understanding the patterns of behaviour, emotion and
interaction that lead up to “relapse” into new offending. Participants are taught
social, cognitive and practical skills necessary to avoid such relapses. In exploring
such issues, the MTP uses Māori cultural language, values and narratives to assist
participants’ learning and change22.

It is observable that through the 1990s, psychological-based therapeutic treatments
became ever more entrenched in New Zealand’s policy response. The apex of this policy
approach came with the development of the Integrated Offender Management (IOM)
framework by the Department of Corrections in the second half of the 1990s. Based on
correctional policies imported from Canada and implemented in the early 2000s, the
IOM process sought to identify the particular criminogenic needs of all offenders,
including Māori, through applying diagnostic tools like the criminogenic needs index
(CNI) (Newbold, 2007). The importance of the risk and criminogenic needs paradigm to
understanding and framing responses to individuals’ offending behaviour is
demonstrated in the Department’s (2001a) report About Time - Turning People Away
from a Life of Crime and Reducing Reoffending, where it is argued Māori offenders are
more likely to be at risk of offending from criminogenic needs.

22

There are new developments for Māori offenders in prison, with Whare Oranga Ake Units, or Kaupapa
Māori Rehabilitation Units being opened in 2011 and piloted on a limited basis. Designed for inmates in
the final stages of sentences as targeted pre-release rehabilitation initiatives, it will be interesting in the
future to consider the effectiveness of these initiatives for Māori inmates.
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Despite the fact that Corrections’ documentation made it clear that criminogenic needs
are observable in a range of offenders regardless of ethnicity (and regardless of social,
familial or historical context), officials went about designing features to enhance service
delivery specific to Māori. The most notable examples forged under IOM were the
Framework for Reducing Māori Offending (FReMO) and Māori Culture Related Needs
(MaCRNs). In Maynard, Coebergh, Anstiss, Bakker and Huriwai’s (1999) discussion of
the MaCRNs assessment tool for Māori offenders, several cultural-related needs are
identified, including cultural tension, whānau and whakawhānaunga (kinship relations).
Maynard et al (1999: 50) suggest that:

Contemporary

New

Zealand

society

has

developed

primarily

from

Western/European- based norms, despite the fact that Māori are recognised as the
tangata whenua [First peoples] of this country. Māori culture has been generally
compromised and discouraged in the process of colonisation and it is likely that a
number of stressors and/or tensions have developed in connection with
differences in cultural values and beliefs both between Māori and non-Māori, and
amongst Māori. Further, the lack of positive coping skills for dealing with such
tension is likely to promote maladaptive responses which could include cognitions
and behavioural patterns that increase the individual's risk of re-offending.

Although these officials argue that specific Māori needs exist, Māori offending is framed
within a theoretical focus on individual thinking as explanatory of maladaptive
behaviour. Thus, in the IOM policy context we see components of Māori cultural
practice grafted on to a process based on individualistic theories of human behaviour,
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which has already explained offending as generated in negative emotions and antisocial thoughts (Webb, 2003). It is clear from the description of the MaCRNs they were
primarily developed to increase Māori responsiveness to psychological treatment
interventions, and this is evident when Maynard et al. (1999: 44) write that, “[t]he
responsivity principle states that offenders will be most affected by interventions that are
matched to their particular learning style…”.

A 2005 Waitangi Tribunal23 report into Māori cultural assessments provides insights
into the development and limitations of the MaCRNs model. The Tribunal report
identified that only a limited pilot study occurred prior to MaCRNs assessment being
implemented nationally. That the assessment tool for Māori ‘needs’ was developed
from a small sample before implementation, illustrates the limitations inherent in the
policy sectors strategy of integrating Māori knowledge frameworks in an ostensibly
individualistic approach like the CNI: in this instance the lack of wider engagement with
Māori as stipulated in the Treaty contract, and through a breach of the ‘rules’ of
positivistic social science in relation to validity and reporting of findings. Three years
after implementation, the Department of Corrections could “neither verify their
soundness nor point to any quantifiable benefits that flow to Māori offenders who are
assessed with MaCRNS” (Waitangi Tribunal, 2005: 151). Morrison (2009: 82) notes that
following the release of the Tribunal report, the Department of Corrections carried out

23

The Waitangi Tribunal was established by the third Labour Government (1972-1975) with the passing
of the Treaty of Waitangi Act in 1975. The initial purpose of the Tribunal was to inquire into and make
recommendations to the Crown (represented by the Government of the day) relating to Māori claims
against government actions that they believed contravened their rights under the Treaty of Waitangi
from the date of the forum’s inception (Catalinac, 2004; Gibbs, 2006). Later, in the mid-1980s, the
Tribunal jurisdiction was extended to receiving Māori claims going back to the signing of the Treaty of
Waitangi in 1840.
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an evaluation of the MaCRN’s. The evaluation found that the MaCRNs assessment tool
was underused by Correction’s staff. Furthermore, even when used, less than 20% of
offenders assessed with MaCRNs then took up a culture-related activity as part of their
offender management plan. Morrison observes that soon after this evaluation, the
MaCRNs assessment process was discontinued. Similarly, in a (2002b) review of the
criminal justice sectors responsiveness to Māori, Te Puni Kōkiri officials identified that
the much publicised FReMO process was rarely used by policy workers in the
Department of Corrections as designed. More often than not, FReMO was utilised after
policy and interventions had been designed by policy workers. Taking both case studies
into consideration, it is difficult to comprehend how some commentators have recently
argued that these

little used risk and needs assessment processes, and

‘Māori/Indigenous theories of, and response to, criminality’, have come to dominate
criminal justice policy making in the New Zealand context. It is to particular this issue
that we now turn.

Critiquing Responses to the ‘Māori Problem’
So far this paper has charted the explanations of and responses to Māori offending from
two related phases in the development of crime control policy in New Zealand. The
distinctly Māori perspectives from the 1980s, culminating in the production of Jackson’s
1988 report identified a framework for addressing Māori offending through Māori centred
and controlled responses. The idea of rebuilding and instituting Māori social control over
offenders goes far beyond the implementation of rehabilitation programmes for Māori
within the system. The period covered by the 1990s-2000s, however, demonstrate that
the state was much more comfortable with a strategy of incorporating elements of Māori
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cultural belief and practice into the existing system; a process that Tauri (1999) describes
as the symbolic and physical indigenisation of New Zealand’s criminal justice system. The
responsiveness policy saw the recruitment of more Māori into the criminal justice system,
and the development of blended (psychology-based) interventions. This response clearly
represented a rejection of Jackson’s notion of a parallel Māori criminal justice system, and
the furtherance of the co-ordinated strategy of indigenisation through increasing the
integration of Māori concepts into existing state processes.

Despite clear evidence to the contrary, some contemporary authors from the
administrative criminological perspective argue that the period from the 1980s to the
2000s marked the transition in the Department of Corrections, and other crime control
agencies, to adopting Jackson’s ideas and those of other Māori practitioners and academics
(for example see Marie, 2010 in New Zealand; and for similar arguments in Australia,
Weatherburn, 2010; Weatherburn and Fitzgerald, 2006). Given the available literature,
these commentators make the surprising assertion that the rehabilitation programmes
received by Māori offenders are predominantly informed by this supposed new orthodoxy
and focus mainly upon the concept of cultural identity deficit. Furthermore, it is argued
that the dominance of so-called ‘Māori theory and interventions’ presents a forceful
explanation for the New Zealand states’ failure to arrest Māori over-representation in the
criminal justice system. In this last section we wish to refute these claims and focus the
critical gaze firmly on the dominance of Western theories and interventions in state
responses to Māori over-representation.
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Does Tikanga Māori dominate the development of crime control policy in New Zealand?
The argument that tikanga dominates the development of crime control policy greatly
exaggerates the authority given to Māori approaches to offending within the system,
whether measured by legislative empowerment or the amount of resource targeted to socalled Māori initiatives. The purpose of this mythical construct appears to be to convince
us that the development of effective solutions to the Indigenous problem has been
hampered in neo-colonial jurisdictions by a) the rise of Indigenous cultural theory, b)
the biculturalisation of state policy, which led to c) the policy sector in New Zealand
‘turning away from science’ and embracing cultural perspectives to develop crime
control policies for First Nations (see Marie, 2010, and also Weatherburn, 2010 in
relation to the Australian context).

For some practitioners of administrative

criminology, this explains the predominance of policies and interventions geared to
conferencing processes, circle sentencing, enhancing the cultural awareness of agents
and agencies and a focus on bias and institutional practice. Amongst these, Marie
(2010: 283) makes the specious claim that Māori theory dominates correctional policy
development in the New Zealand context. To bolster this position, administrative
criminologists offer misleading summations of Māori theories of social harm, by arguing
that cultural loss is presented in such theoretical frameworks as the key determinant of
Māori overrepresentation in the justice system:

A major assumption of this theory is that the contemporary overrepresentation of
Māori in offending, incarceration, and recidivism rates is best understood as the
outcome of Māori experiencing impairments to cultural identity resulting from
colonisation. Central to this theory, therefore, is also the assumption that ethnicity
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is a reliable construct by which distinctions can be made between offenders
regarding what factors precipitated their offending, as well as best practices for
their rehabilitation. Considering a thwarted cultural identity is seen to have given
rise to a higher proportion of offenders who are Māori, rehabilitation efforts
largely pivot on the idea that restoring cultural identity will lead to a subsequent
reduction of the number of Māori in prison.

To support the argument Newbold’s (2007) summary of the types of programmes
currently en vogue in corrections is cited. Yet inexplicably overlooked are the preceding
chapters of Newbold’s book which reveal that within the Department’s theoretical
paradigm, culture and cultural identity are not given causal power: in other words
culture neither causes crime nor factors significantly in its reduction. In fact, culture
(specifically Māori culture) is confined to the responsivity tranche of the Department’s
theoretical and intervention framework. In this tranche ‘restoring cultural awareness’
is considered helpful for preparing individual Māori offenders to receive therapeutic
treatment (see Coebergh, Bakker, Anstiss, Maynard and Percy, 2001, especially p. 15-16;
Webb, 2012). Administrative criminological practitioners who take this view appear be
to unaware that the so-called Māori/Indigenous theory they are critiquing, is in fact an
invention of government officials and contractors (Tauri, 2013c). In other words the
‘Indigenous theory’ that informs policy making is best described as a governmental
interpretation of Indigenous knowledge and cultural practice employed by institutions to
enhance the indigenisation of their strategies and interventions (see Tauri, 2011a;
Webb, 2003, 2012).
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It is difficult to comprehend how commentators could depict the current policy
situation in New Zealand this way, given that the available documentation is almost
entirely constructed by crime control agencies, including external ‘experts’ contracted
to deliver a proscribed project on behalf of government officials. The majority of
sources utilised by crime control policy makers are not generated by external,
independent Māori (or indeed critical, non-Māori) commentators (Tauri, 2009). We are
not, as administrative criminological practitioners argue in relation to the Australasian
context, experiencing the dominance of Indigenous theory in the design of policy and
interventions. What are presented as culturally derived items are more accurately
described as neo-colonial artefacts developed by policy makers and member of the
academy ‘jobbing’ on behalf of the state, which are then utilised primarily to satisfy the
policy requirements of Ministers’ and their agencies (see Tauri, 2011a regarding
government institutions purposeful use of Māori symbols and Tikanga to indigenise
policies and interventions). The dominance of positivistic theory in Corrections policy
programme, and the subjugation of Indigenous perspectives are evident in all relevant
departmental documents, as demonstrated in the following text from a Department of
Corrections (2009b: 42) review of the effectiveness of rehabilitation programmes:

It is now generally accepted that treatment programmes should be adapted to
cater for the cultural needs of offenders who participate.

As such, culture

represents an important responsivity issue within offender rehabilitation.
Incorporating culturally-based concepts, imagery and activities into programme
content is regarded as a way of both attracting minority-group participants into
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programmes, and ensuring that the programme engages and retains them
(emphasis added).

This imagery is ignored in administrative accounts that accentuate the myth of the
dominance of Indigenous perspectives and a focus on structure (i.e., bias in policing or
the courts) in policy responses. For example, one account from that perspective argues
that:

... debate about how to respond to Indigenous violence have focussed less on the
question of how to reduce it than how to reduce the effect of Indigenous violence
on Indigenous contact with the criminal justice system. The general consensus on
this issue seems to be that the best way to reduce Indigenous contact with the
criminal justice system is to create some tribunal or process that gives Indigenous
community members a voice in how to respond to crime by Indigenous
defendants (Weatherburn 2010: 198).

In promoting the view that Indigenous theories dominate the development of crime
control policy, administrative criminological exponents appear to resist engaging with
the extensive material Indigenous and non-Indigenous scholars have produced in
examining Indigenous peoples and over-representation in New Zealand and other
settler societies. If they did they would find that Indigenous and critical scholars in New
Zealand (Jackson, 1988; Tauri, 2009; Webb, 2003), Australia (Blagg 2000b, Cunneen,
2009; Dodson, 1994) and Canada (Gosse, Henderson and Carter (eds), 1994; Monture,
1999; Turpel, 1994; Victor, 2007) provide sophisticated explanations of the causes of
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Indigenous social harm and victimisation. This material also reveals the wide range of
interventions, such as habilitation centres, and culturally and socially specific
therapeutic approaches to a wide range of risk factors, to use the preferred terminology
of administrative criminology that Indigenous scholars and practitioners have designed
(see Tauri, 2013c).

Undoubtedly, issues like colonialism, institutional bias and militaristic policing
strategies are all key foci of Indigenous criminological analysis.

However, it is

duplicitous to argue that they are the only or the most predominant factors that
Indigenous (and critical, non-Indigenous) scholars utilise to theorise the overrepresentation issue. The key issue that administrative criminology in New Zealand and
other neo-colonial societies neglect is that it is the settler state that has demonstrated a
preference for culturally sensitive processing of Indigenous offenders, exemplified by
agency designed and controlled programmes such as group conferences, sentencing
circles, Indigenous sentencing courts, Indigenous liaison officers, Aboriginal justice
strategies and such like (Tauri, 2011a).

These types of state-centred responses

invariably lack jurisdictional autonomy, legislative weight and receive significantly less
funding compared to mainstream policies and interventions. A considerable proportion
of settler state responses to the Indigenous problem can be described as orientalised
artefacts that enable the state to be seen to do something while attempting to silence
independent (Indigenous) commentary on the failure of its crime control processes to
provide meaningful justice outcomes for Indigenes (see Palys and Victor, 2005; Tauri,
2011b).

Policies to increase Māori participation within corrections through

communications, community relations, employment, service delivery, and community
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partnerships, should not be confused with control over correctional philosophy and
policy development.

Indeed, there have only been recent developments of two

standalone pre-release units for Māori prisoners in 2011, the Whare Oranga Ake units.
With thousands of Māori incarcerated on a yearly basis, the size of these 16 beds units,
confirm that Māori-informed correctional programmes are limited within the current
system.

The dominant orthodoxies that inform penal practice and wider criminal justice processes
are ignored by administrative criminologists, who instead present the erroneous
assumption that rehabilitation programmes for Māori are based solely upon cultural
identity deficits and dominate programme delivery to this group24. Critical scrutiny of
processes should involve an objective and systematic evaluation of the broader IOM and
the criminogenic suite of programmes, and the failure of these to achieve stated aims,
namely the significant reduction of recidivism amongst the prison population. This has
been thoroughly documented by Greg Newbold in his 2009 publication Another One Bites
the Dust: Recent Initiatives in Correctional Reform in New Zealand. In summary, contrary
to the mythic claims of some administrative criminology accounts in the Australasian
context, a thorough review of available research and government texts demonstrates
that:
1.

Māori theory does not dominate policy making in any of New Zealand’s crime
control agencies;

24

See for example, Marie’s (2010) assertion that the greater majority of Māori offenders receive tikanga-based
treatment, while the extant literature clearly shows this not to be the case. Unfortunately, Marie presents
the MaCRNs process as having a meaningful impact on policy design and the delivery of correctional
interventions to Māori offenders, when in fact it was only ever intended to supplement the much broader,
psychology-dominated IOM approach (Webb, 2012).
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2.

the vast majority of policy, legislation, intervention design and funding decisions
are informed by imported ‘theories’ and interventions (for example, see the
Ministry of Justice generated material on the recent Drivers of Crime project in
New Zealand (2009a, 2009b); and

3.

the vast majority of government spend in New Zealand’s criminal justice system
goes to fund the orthodox ‘Western’ derived crime control programmes.

Conclusion
We wish to conclude our critique of the mythological constructs of administrative
criminology by acknowledging the lack of evidence for the efficacy of Indigenous
theories and interventions. However, while making these claims commentators appear
unaware of the politics of Māori crime control policy in the New Zealand context. It our
contention that ignorance of the politics surrounding Māori policy construction, leads to
exaggerated claims regarding the amount of influence Māori theory and practices
actually have on the development of crime control policy.

Even a rudimentary

awareness of the politics involved, as evidenced by a vast array of policy documents,
would undoubtedly curb exaggerated claims about the supposed failure of Māori theory
and programmes. This is because such knowledge would invariably lead commentators
to acknowledge a fundamental truth about the criminal justice sector in New Zealand,
namely that it has a poor history of undertaking scientific, outcome-focused
research/evaluation on its policies and interventions (Tauri, 2011a).

The lack of

empirical analysis of the crime control in New Zealand pertains to the entire suite of
policies and interventions whether they are informed by tikanga, or Crime Prevention
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through Environmental Design (CPTED) or some other theory (see Tauri, 2013c; Te
Puni Kōkiri, 2002b).

The mythological construction of Māori approaches offered by administrative
criminologists is further weakened by a sustained, critical analysis of the efficacy of
their preferred scientifically-derived interventions. In particular, commentators fail to
provide significant evidence that the preferred programmes of the state and
administrative criminologists are reducing Māori rates of offending and reoffending in
any empirically verifiably way. Further to this is the fact that offenders in the New
Zealand context are much more likely to experience the individual-focused therapeutic
programmes that many administrative criminologists prefer, than they are to
participate in tikanga-inspired interventions that are supposedly having such a negative
effect on Indigenous recidivism rates (see offenders’ comments in Department of
Corrections 2009b and Te Puni Kōkiri, 2007). On this basis, any claim that Māori theory
and/or culture dominates crime control policy construction in New Zealand, or that we
are to blame for the contemporary failure of the overall crime control policy response to
the Māori problem, should be considered little more than a mythological artefact that
lacks empirical validity.

Over the past thirty years, Indigenous commentators have produced a significant
amount of critical material on the response of crime control agents to the ‘Indigenous
problem’. Less prominent has been critical analysis of the role played by the Academy
in supporting the state’s historical and contemporary marginalisation of First Nations
through crime control policy. Evidence for the need for Indigenous scholars to turn our
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critical gaze to the symbiotic relationship between the discipline of criminology and
policy-makers is indisputable. As Biko Agozino (2003) has demonstrated, the social
sciences born of the 19th century (in particular criminology), played a significant role in
the colonial project, with the First Nations of Africa and North American serving as
guinea pig populations for the development and refinement of Western crime-control
strategies.

In more recent times we have observed the resurrection and re-

empowerment of administrative forms of criminology in the policy making process, and
with it a governmental preference for individualised, therapeutic interventions and
policy development strategies largely devoid of direct engagement with First Nation
peoples. On these issues alone, the need for a sustained critique is justified. But this
critique must serve a greater purpose, namely the empowerment of First Nations in the
realm of justice, resulting in meaningful reductions in contacts with ‘the system’. In the
area of crime control, this necessitates a multi-dimensional, strategic approach
involving (amongst other things) a critical focus on the policy and legislation-making
functions of the state, the continued resurrection of First Nation responses to social
harm as alternatives to the formal system, and the development of an Indigenous,
counter-colonial criminology dedicated to contesting the hegemony of administrative
criminological approaches in the development of crime control policy.
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Paper 4

An Indigenous, Critical Commentary on the
Globalisation of Restorative Justice

Juan Marcellus Tauri

(2014) British Journal of Community Justice, 12(2), pp 35-55.

Introduction
This paper is intended as a small offering in response to the challenge posed by Muncie
(2005), O’Malley (2002) and Stenson (2005) for criminological analysis of the
globalisation of crime control to move from obsessive macro-theorising about ‘its’ shape
and depth, and instead begin analysing the micro-level impact of all this globalised,
criminological activity. The manuscript also serves as a response to Aas’ call for our
discipline to:

… take up an old debt of omission and explore more systematically connections
between globalisation and colonisation [which is] essential if we are to address the
imbalances of power and the dynamics of othering and social exclusion in the
present world order (2009: 413).
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A further motivation for this paper is my wish to privilege the experiences Indigenous
peoples of contemporary manifestations of globalised European Justice25, for as Fenelon
and Muguia (2008: 1657) rightly argue:

In the telling of man’s [sic] global project, the story of indigenous peoples has been
woven into the fabric of globality, yet the leading experts on globalisation have
either ignored the role of indigenous peoples or reduced their existence to prepackaged terms such as the ‘fourth world’ or as ethnics in ‘developing nations’ or
even hidden in the broader ‘periphery’.

It is the modest intention of the author that through this paper Indigenous peoples’ ‘real
world’ experiences of the globalisation of restorative justice will draw the discipline’s
attention to the meso and micro-level impacts of the inter-jurisdictional travels of their
theories, crime control products, and legislation.

Arguably, privileging Indigenous

peoples’ experiences of the globalisation of crime control is important for the
development of criminological analysis of the phenomenon. After all, the Indigenous
peoples of Africa, the Americas and the South Pacific have experienced an almost
continuous process of cross-border transfer of crime control products throughout the last
200 years or more. Furthermore, imported criminal justice systems were a significant

25

Further rationale for privileging the experience(s) of Indigenous peoples residing in settler-colonial
societies include the significant, over-representation of Indigenous peoples in all Settler Society
criminal justice systems (Cunneen; 2006; Tauri, 2004); the vast amount of evidence of bias, racism
perpetrated against Indigenous peoples by the agents of crime control, not to mention the part played
by them in the genocidal phases of colonisation that Indigenes refers to as the ‘killing times’; the
historical lack of focus by Eurocentric criminology on research with Indigenous peoples, that enables
their experiences to be reflected through the research generated by the discipline; and finally the right
of Indigenous peoples to speak for themselves about issues that concern them, a right recently
confirmed through the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (United
Nations, 2008).
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tool in the colonialists’ attempts to eradicate Indigenous life-worlds, strategies that
manifest in the contemporary moment in the form of violent policing strategies, and our
significant over-representation in criminal justice statistics. And yet despite all this, the
Indigenous voice is often silenced in the vast lexicon produced by the Western Academy
(Tauri, 2013c). Therefore, the time has come for us to speak for ourselves; to challenge
the often negative impact of the products generated by the Academy and the restorative
justice industry, upon our communities, and dispersed amongst us as though they are
offerings from the criminological gods for the benefit of the less fortunate (Agozino, 2003;
Tauri and Webb, 2012).

The paper begins with a brief overview of the globalisation of crime control products;
followed by a critical discussion of the processes through which the Indigenous life-world
has come to play a significant part in the developing globalised RJ Industry, elements of
which rely heavily on Indigenous culture for the marketing of their products. I argue that
the increasing inter-jurisdictional transfer of specific crime control products is having a
profound impact on Indigenous peoples residing in settler-colonial societies, firstly,
through the purposeful, and often exaggerated and inappropriate use of elements of
Indigenous life-worlds in the construction and subsequent marketing of crime control
products; and secondly, through the impact this activity is having on the ongoing struggle
of First Nation peoples to resurrect our traditional justice processes and/or achieve some
measure of jurisdictional autonomy (Tauri, 2011c).
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A Brief Comment on the Globalisation of Crime Control Products

Criminologists are, together with other criminal justice professionals, becoming
increasingly eager exporters of knowledge.
Aas (2009: 409).

During the past twenty years globalisation has become established as a legitimate area of
criminological inquiry, albeit one that is responded to in equal measures of admiration
and suspicion (Hopkins, 2002; Newburn and Sparks, 2004; Robertson, 1990; Scholte,
2005). For some, the prevalent image of globalisation as ever-increasing flows of capital,
people, data and cultural artefacts is a welcome development that presents new
opportunities for breaking down perceived barriers related to ethnicity, class, language
and culture (see Watson, 2004), overcoming poverty and inequality, and for the
development of effective responses to universal issues such as crime and (in)security
(Jones and Newburn, 2002a; Newburn, 2010) For others, globalisation represents an
unfolding tyrannical rule of peoples by a global economic regime that works exclusively
for the benefit of Capital, reflected in an ever-increasing exploitation of cultural context
for the benefit of policy entrepreneurs and the state (Hay and Watson, 1999; Held and
McGrew, 2000, Odora Hoppers, 2000; Teeple, 1995).

According to authors such as Friman (2009: 1-2) and Nelken (2004: 373), crime has ‘gone
global’. This statement signals that the scale and scope of the contemporary epoch of
globalisation is unprecedented and unmatched in its degree of globality. The evidence of
this phenomena is apparently everywhere, including the transfer of a range of
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criminological strategies, technologies, policies and interventions including Zero
Tolerance (Newburn 2010; Wacquant, 2009), and Broken Windows (Shichor, 2004)
policing strategies, and Mandatory Sentencing (Lynch and Sabol, 1997), and related ‘3stikes and you are out’-style legislation (Jones, 2003; Schiraldi, Colburn and Lotke, 2004).
All of these artefacts are accompanied by sophisticated marketing rhetoric and media
friendly sound-bites that betray (or perhaps more accurately, reflect) their conservative
birth-right: ‘tough on crime’, ‘sensible sentencing’, ‘life means life’, ‘holding offenders
accountable’, and so on. However, it is important to note that the growing international
market in crime control artefacts is not solely dominated by ‘tough on crime’
conservatives and their (supposedly) punitive policies and interventions. Arguably one of
the most significant players on the international market – to use perhaps a rather
inaccurate collective term for what is a broad, often disparate movement – is the
Restorative Justice Industry (Cunneen and Hoyle, 2010; Daley and Immarigeon, 1998).

The Globalisation of Restorative Justice
According to popular origin myths, the antecedents of contemporary RJ began in Canada
in the late 1970s when a parole officer from Kitchener, Ontario introduced a process that
enabled victims and offenders to meet face-to-face (Peachey, 1989).

From there it

steadily grew, with the development of community boards in San Francisco in the 1980s;
the proliferation of justice boards throughout North America through the 1980s/1990s;
Family Group Conferencing (FGC) in New Zealand in the early 1990s, and Sentencing
Circles in Canada. All this activity has since been followed by an explosion of RJ-related
activity across North America, Western Europe, and of late throughout parts of Asia and
South America. That RJ is now a full-blown industry that plays an increasingly important
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role in the globalised crime control market is undisputable. For example, Miers (2007:
447) writes that “viewed globally, informed observers estimate that, by 2000, there were
some 1,300 (RJ) programmes across 20 countries directed at young offenders”.

The contemporary development of the RJ Industry has played a significant part in both
the Academy’s commodification of Indigenous life-worlds and the global spread of RJ
products. For example, Deukmedjian (2008: 122-123) recounts the introduction by the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police of RJ into its practices via community justice forums that
were based heavily on the police-centred, Australian formulated ‘Wagga Wagga’ model.
The global trajectory of this model of RJ, based on the so-called ‘Māori’ approach to
justice, can be traced from its successful insertion into the U.S in 1994 in Anoka,
Minnesota (McDonald, Moore, O’Connell and Thorsborne, 1995). As Deukmedjian (2008:
122) recounts, this successful foray into the U.S “inspired McDonald and O’Connell [two of
the architects of the Wagga Wagga model] to form the Transformative Justice Australian
advocacy and consultancy group” that subsequently travelled throughout North America
in the mid-1990s marketing a standardised form of FGC to both practitioners and policy
makers. Their travels included meetings with Indigenous elder’s councils in Ottawa and
other Canadian jurisdictions (Rudin, 2013, personal communication). Eventually the
Wagga Wagga model became the standard for RJ-related service delivery by the RCMP
throughout Canada (Chatterjee, 2000). Further highlighting the rapid globalisation of the
FGC as part of the developing market in RJ products, both Chatterjee (1999) and Richards
(2000) recounting that RCMP officials visiting New Zealand and Australia in 1996 to see
first-hand the FGC model in action, after which they negotiated a cost-sharing agreement
with the Department of Justice (Canada) for 3.75 million each, for roll-out in 1997 of the
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RJ initiative known as Community Justice Forums (Deukmedjian, 2008). Subsequently, the
RCMP contracted Transformative Justice Australia to train members to run the new RJ
programme, which was very much a derivative of the New Zealand FGC and Australian
Wagga Wagga conferencing models.

Restorative Justice and the Commodification of Indigenous Life-Worlds

Family group conferencing was a gift from the Aboriginal people of New Zealand,
the Māori ….
Ross (2009: 5).

The appropriation of components of Indigenous life-worlds by state functionaries and
criminologists for the purpose of indigenising crime control products and culturally
sensitising systems and products, is well documented in the extant literature (see
Havemann, 1988; Tauri, 1998; Victor, 2007). Arguably, the most influential colonising
project of this kind in contemporary times came with the passing of the Children, Young
Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 (the Act) by the New Zealand Government, and with
it the introduction to the world of the FGC forum. Advocates of the FGC process make a
number of claims about the relationship between the format of the process, traditional
Māori justice practices, and the role the forum has played in responding to Māori
concerns with the formal criminal justice system (see Jackson, 1988). For example, it is
often claimed in Australasian-focused literature that:
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1.

the Act was influenced by Māori concerns for the prevalence of institutionally racist
and culturally inappropriate practices within the New Zealand criminal justice
system (Fulcher, 1999; Goodyer, 2003; Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1988);

2.

because the conferencing process and Māori justice practice have ‘restorative
elements’, it provides the state with a culturally appropriate forum for addressing
the justice needs of Māori (Hassell, 1996; McElrea, 1994; Olsen, Maxwell and Morris,
1995); and

3.

the conferencing process provides evidence of the system’s ability to culturally
sensitise itself, and also empower Māori to deal with their youth offenders in
culturally appropriate ways (Doolan, 2005; Morris and Maxwell, 1993).

Over the past two decades the oft-made claims of the Māori/Indigenous origin of the FGC
forum and its ability to culturally sensitive New Zealand (and other settler-colonial
society) youth justice systems, has largely been uncritically replicated in the international
restorative justice and wider criminological literature (see Braithwaite, 1995; Carey,
2000; Griffiths and Bazemore, 1999; Leung, 1999; Lupton and Nixon, 1999; McCold, 1997;
Roach, 2000; Strang, 2000; Umbreit, 2001; Weitekamp, 1999; Zehr, 1990).

Specific

examples of the way in which, to use Daly’s (2002) expression, the ‘origin myth’ of this
particular RJ forum, especially the constant refrain to its supposed ‘Māoriness’, are
reflected in the following statements from well-known advocates of the FGC forum, and of
the RJ movement:

The river [of ‘restorative justice’] is also being fed by a variety of indigenous
traditions and current adaptations which draw upon those traditions: family group
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conferences adapted from Māori traditions in New Zealand, for example… (Zehr,
2002: 62).

And

[T]he principles of restorative justice are particularly consistent with those of many
indigenous traditions… including… Māori people in Australia and New Zealand and
the practice of]… family group conferencing by Māori people in Australia… (Umbreit,
reported in Richards, 2007: 385).

Perhaps the most startling elements of the origin myth of the New Zealand FGC, from a
critical Indigenous perspective, is the claim that the forum was designed in part to enable
Māori families to manage the offending of Māori juveniles (see, in particular, Morris and
Maxwell , 1993 and Serventy, 1996).

The constant reiteration of the origin myth within the restorative justice literature of
(mostly) Western European criminologists and practitioners, has resulted in it acquiring
the status of a seemingly uncontestable, taken-for-granted ‘truth’ (see Pavlich, 2005), one
that RJ advocates refer to constantly in their accounts of the emergence of restorative
justice practice in the contemporary moment. And yet somehow, while focusing on the
‘Māoriness’ and the ‘restorativeness’ of the FGC forum, these same authors consistently
overlook readily available evidence that problematises almost all aspects of the origin
myth (see discussion below), including, for example, the following ‘confession’ by Doolan
(2005: 1), one of the primary architects of the 1989 legislation, that “those of us who were
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involved in the policy development process leading up to the new law had never heard of
restorative justice”. He further states that empowering Māori families to have any form of
‘control’ over responses to the offending of their youth was not a major consideration of
policy makers. Instead, Doolan goes on to affirm that the primary goal of the new forum
was making young people responsible for their offending behaviour and decreasing the
use of the Youth Court.

In comparison to the grand mythologising of many RJ exponents, there is the growing
literature from critical Indigenous and non-Indigenous commentators that directly
contests the monolithic origin myths of restorative processes such as the FGC. These
commentators provide evidence of high levels of dissatisfaction amongst indigenous
communities with the introduction of restorative justice interventions more broadly, and
of the FGC forum in particular (see Blagg, 1998; Cunneen, 1997, 2002; Moyle, 2013; Tauri,
1998; 2004; Zellerer and Cunneen, 2001). These critics also take advocates of RJ to task
for making “selective and ahistorical claims… about indigenous social control conforming
with the principles of restorative justice, while conveniently ignoring others” (Cunneen,
2002: 43; see also Pratt, 2006 for discussion of the tendency in RJ literature to
romanticise Indigenous justice by ignoring evidence of the use of non-RJ type punishment
practices by Indigenous communities).

In her ground breaking critique of the philosophical foundations of the modern RJ
Industry, Richards (2007) provides a succinct analysis of the ways in which the Industry
formulates and sustains origin myths of forums like the FGC. Richards achieves this by
demonstrating the extent to which the Daybreak Report, authored by the Ministerial
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Advisory Committee for the New Zealand Department of Social Welfare (Ministerial
Advisory Committee, 1988) is continuously, and erroneously portrayed by members of
the RJ movement as both the impetus for the introduction of restorative justice in New
Zealand, and as providing evidence of extensive Māori input into the development of the
FGC (for examples of this perspective, see Braithwaite, 1995; Doolan, 2002; Fulcher, 1999
and Lupton and Nixon, 1999). Richards analysis of the Daybreak report shows that the
oft-repeated notion that Māori communities ‘mobilised against Pakeha’, were successful
in pressuring the New Zealand government into adopting a more culturally suitable
criminal justice system, in the form of a ‘Māori inspired’ FGC, is a significantly
romanticised and exaggerated version of what took place. In summary, Richards’ (2007)
demonstrates that:


the initial working party appointed to consider what changes were necessary in
New Zealand’s youth justice/child welfare system was formed without Māori
representation; and



no specific recommendation was ever made by the Ministerial Advisory Committee
that the Department implement family group conferencing.

Undoubtedly, suggestions made by the Committee for reconfiguration of New Zealand’s
youth justice system clearly resonate with the core philosophies and practices associated
with RJ.

It is also true that we are able to make broad comparisons between the

governmental forum (FGC), and certain aspects of Māori customary justice practice. The
Committee recommended, for example, that the Children and Young Persons Act (1974) be
amended to include greater consideration of the role of the family when dealing with
Māori children, and the increased participation of Māori families in matters relating to
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child welfare and juvenile justice (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1988). Later in the
report, the Committee (1988: 29) returns to these issues, claiming that a “substantial
ideological change” would be necessary in order to amend the Children’s and Young
Persons Act (1974) to cater to Māori needs. However, as Richards demonstrates, the
Committee did not make any specific recommendations, preferring instead to present a
range of principles that they believed should shape changes to the legislation.
Furthermore, the original Children and Young Persons Bill, precursor to the CYPF Act 1989
made no reference the Committee’s proposals. Finally, Richards relates that Annex 2 of
the report focuses specifically on what the Committee believe should be done in regards
to child welfare and youth justice practices. In this section, the Committee (1988: 54),
rather than advocating significant empowerment of Māori to practice their own justice, or
‘control’ responses to their families and youth offenders, clearly stated that “[f]urther, we
believe that the establishment of new Courts and special Judges would be unnecessary”.
By rejecting any significant changes to status quo, and advocating for ‘cultural sensitivity
training’ for court officials, and the construction of a state-centred forum, the Committee
was following a strategy with a long history in the colonial context; namely the utilisation
of components of Māori cultural practice through a process of indigenisation to provide
the appearance of cultural sensitivity (see discussion below and Havemann, 1988; Tauri,
1998).

When considering all the above, it is evident that both the focus of the Committee and the
contents of the Daybreak report is thus “less romantically - and more prosaically-oriented
than ‘restorative justice’ advocates often imply” (Richards, 2007: 109). Furthermore, the
notion that the FGC forum emerged in New Zealand in response to an uprising of
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indigenous communities keen to implement traditional justice processes,” is not endorsed
by the very report that is often cited within the RJ literature to support this contention. It
is, therefore, an exaggeration to declare that the Daybreak report is responsible for the
implementation of the FGC forum in New Zealand as supporters of restorative justice
often claim. And with this realisation, comes the collapse of the origin myth of one of the
most significant forums behind the contemporary globalisation of crime control,
especially of restorative policies and interventions.

Indigenous Response to the Grand Mythologising of Restorative Justice
Over the past 15 years the origin myth of the FGC forum has been heavily critiqued by
critical Indigenous and non-Indigenous scholars alike, including Blagg (1997) and
Cunneen (1997) in the Australian context; Lee (1997), Rudin (2005) and Victor (2007)
presenting Indigenous Canadian perspectives26, and Love (2002) and Tauri (1998; 2004)
from a critical Māori perspective. These authors expose a number of significant issues
including much of the empirical research on Indigenous satisfaction is exaggerated, and
that Indigenous experiences of this type of forum do not match the glowing reports of
their cultural appropriateness and ability to meet Indigenous aspirations for
jurisdictional empowerment reported in the academic literature and through the
pronouncement or RJ advocates (for example, see Love, 2002; Tauri, 1998; 2004 and
Walker, 1996 for detailed discussion of the exaggerated claims of ‘cultural sensitivity’ in
26

In relation to Canada, Rudin (2005: 97) demonstrates that much the same myth-making is happening
in relation to Eurocentrically-derived ‘indigenised’ programmes developed there, as is happening with
the FGC forum, when he argues that:
The belief that sentencing circles are a form of Aboriginal justice displays a serious
misunderstanding of the hallmarks of an Aboriginal justice programme… the use of circles was
pioneered by judges in the Yukon, particularly Judge Barry Stuart”, and “… it must always be kept
in mind that sentencing circles are not an Aboriginal justice initiative or programme; they are
judge-made and judge-led initiatives.
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the Māori context). Schmidt and Pollak (2004: 133) underline Māori criticisms of both
the origin myth and the ‘myth of empowerment’ so prevalent in RJ literature on the FGC
forum, when they write that:

Māori writers such as Love (2002), Tauri (1999) and Walker (1996) have
challenged the popular notion that the adoption of conferencing was a victory.
Rather, they argue that FGC has co-opted and incorporated Māori perspectives,
leaving intact the structural power relationships within child welfare.

Much of the government-sponsored research underscores the co-optive nature of the FGC
process and the marginalisation of whanau (family) members and ‘cultural experts’ (for
example, in the New Zealand context re: FGC practice, compare Morris and Maxwell, 1993
and Tauri, 1998 and Maxwell et al, 2004 and Tauri, 2004). Alternatively, it has been
argued that both the 1989 Act and the FGC process were influenced by Governments’
need to be seen to be ‘doing something constructive’ in the face of a perceived rise in
juvenile offending, particularly amongst Māori youth, and continued criticism of the
operations of the formal system (Richard, 2007; Tauri, 1998; 1999).

Despite the contested nature of the findings of research on the FGC process and its
empowerment (or not) of Māori, what is evident is that over the past decade the FGC has
become an increasingly popular commodity on the international crime control market.
This is particularly evident in the settler-colonial jurisdictions of Canada, Australia and
the United States of America.

It should be noted that all these jurisdictions have

significant over-representation of Indigenous peoples in their criminal justice systems. As
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related earlier, evidence exists that New Zealand’s FGC forum and its Australian
derivative were purposely and at times aggressively marketed in other settler-colonial
jurisdictions. The marketing of these products was aided significantly by the fact that
much of the academic literature uncritically promoting the origin myth discussed
previously (see Consedine, 1995; LaPrairie, 1996; Morris and Maxwell, 1993; Olsen et al,
1995 and Umbreit and Stacey, 1996. For more contemporary manifestations of the
reiteration of the myths see Maxwell, 2008; Ross, 2009 and Waites, MacGowan, Pennell,
Carlton-LaNey and Weil, 2004). The Indigenous origin myth has recently featured in
commentaries on the spread of RJ forums across Great Britain and Western Europe
(Barnsdale and Walker, 2007), and central and South America (Scuro, 2013). The transfer
process appears to be taking place in an organised manner, involving a range of policy
workers, franchise companies and RJ advocates. These ‘activists’ are heavily involved in
creating viable markets for crime control products through the commodification of
‘culture’, in particular Indigenous cultural practices (see Lee, 1997; Takagi and Shank,
2004; Tauri, 2004; 2013b for analysis of these practices).

Undoubtedly, the exportation of the FGC forum to various Western jurisdictions has been
heavily influenced by the arguments discussed earlier. Particularly important is the
fiction that the FGC product provides a forum that empowers Māori /the Indigenous
Other, and signals the ability of the imposed criminal justice ordering to culturally
sensitise itself. This process is driven by the co-option (intentional of otherwise) of
Indigenous/Māori cultural practices and the purposeful utilisation of these selected
cultural elements (such as ‘circles’) as a key marketing tool for marketing this type of
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product across Western European crime control markets, and more recently across Asia
and Latin America (Tauri, 2013b).

Indigenous Justice and the Fictions of the Restorative Justice Industry

The final belief is to believe in a fiction, which you know to be a fiction, there being
nothing else, the exquisite truth is to know that it is a fiction and that you believe it
willingly.
Shanley (1997: 685).

Given the previous discussion, what are we to make of the following comment from
Gabrielle Maxwell, one of New Zealand’s staunchest advocates, both nationally and
internationally, of the FGC forum?

In New Zealand there has been criticism that family group conferences have not
been managed in ways that conform to traditional practice of Māori or those from
other cultural backgrounds. It has been suggested that the high proportion of Māori
staff managing the process and the inclusion of Māori greetings and blessing is little
more than tokenism and can rarely be described as a truly Māori process. This is
despite the undisputed origins of many aspects of the conference process in
traditional Māori procedures (Consedine, 1995). On the other hand, on occasion,
the management of the conference process is sometimes passed over to a Māori
social service group (Maxwell, 2008: 87).
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In this quote we observe many of the issues Māori and other critical Indigenous/nonIndigenous commentators have identified with much of the Academy and RJ advocates’
writing on the FGC forum. Firstly, the most obvious issue is the claim that the FGC’s Māori
foundations are undisputable. The previous discussion, especially the work of Richards
exposes that this claim is an exaggeration. In reiterating the origin myth and presenting it
as ‘undisputable’, Maxwell ignores a significant amount of literature exposing this fallacy
that has been published since Consedine’s book was released. This fact highlights another
of the criticisms levelled by Indigenous scholars at some members of the RJ Industry,
namely the lack of engagement with the critical Indigenous/non-Indigenous literature
(see Tauri, 2013c; Tauri and Webb, 2011). Secondly, Maxwell’s own published research
on the FGC process contained criticisms by Māori FGC participants with the tokenistic
way in which Māori culture was afforded space in the process by state officials, usually
confined to allowing elders to recite karakia (prayer) at the beginning and end of the
process (see Morris and Maxwell, 1993; Maxwell et al, 2004). This situation is far
removed from the claims by advocates that the process provides a meaningful forum for
the empowerment of Māori (for example, see Maxwell, 2008). Thirdly, in the above quote
Maxwell is replicating a fundamental weakness in the FGC/Māori justice scholarship;
namely ignoring the lack of direct Māori input into the design of the Act and the FGC
forum. Also overlooked is the fact that officials involved in the developing the process,
most notably the chief policy architect, Doolan, have acknowledged that the focus of work
on the 1989 Act was never on developing a Māori justice process, or indeed a restorative
one.
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Restorative justice advocates are constantly, and erroneously equating Māori requests for
a ‘traditional forum’ (more especially in Moana Jackson’s 1988 report He Whaipaanga
Hou than in Daybreak), with Māori justice philosophies being foundational to the
formulation of the forum itself. To do so is to ignore the reality of policy making in the
New Zealand context, in particular the historical tendency for the criminal justice sector
to Indigenise Eurocentric crime control processes (see Jackson, 1995; Tauri, 1998; 2009;
Tauri and Webb, 2011; Williams, 2000). It also ignores the fact that the supposed Māori
and restorative elements were identified long after the formulation and implementation
of both the Act and the forum (Tauri, 2004). As Daly (2002: 63) effectively argues “the
devising of a (white, bureaucratic) justice practice that is flexible and accommodating
towards cultural differences does not mean that conferencing is an indigenous justice
practice”. Daly (2002: 4) then goes further, revealing that Maxwell herself is aware of this
distinction when she includes the following quote from Maxwell and Morris’ original 1993
study:

A distinction must be drawn between a system, which attempts to re-establish the
indigenous model of pre-European times, and a system of justice, which is culturally
appropriate. The New Zealand system is an attempt to establish the latter, not to
replicate the former. As such, it seeks to incorporate many of the features apparent
in whanau [extended family] decision-making processes and seen in meetings on
marae today, but it also contains elements quite alien to indigenous models.

The Canadian scholar Stephanie Vieille (2012: 174) highlights a fundamental flaw in this
perspective when she writes that:
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Even though both FGCs and tikanga appear to adopt similar approaches to doing
justice, for instance, by putting emphasis on active participation of victims,
offenders, and the community, their underlying values differ significantly. This is
illustrative of a wider and problematic tendency to equate Indigenous approaches
and mechanisms of justice with the all-encompassing restorative justice approach.

How do we begin to explain the ongoing recitation of the origin myth by RJ proponents,
when significant evidence that contradicts it is ignored? In part, understanding the
situation requires recognition of how important the origin myth is to the marketability of
RJ products like the FGC.

Marketing the Indigenous
In much the same way as Kathryn Shanley in her 1997 (p. 676; emphasis included) article
The Indians America Loves to Love and Read, I argue that:

… we can identify neo-colonial cultural appropriations, thefts of ‘cultural property’
[and that] such cultural appropriations inextricably belong to overall totalisation
efforts – the political and ideological domination of indigenous… peoples…

The appropriation of Indigenous life-worlds is carried out in many different ways,
sometimes in a blatant, unapologetic ‘stealing’ of Indigenous artefacts, such as when
sports teams utilise Indigenous names and symbols (see recent debates regarding the
Washington Redskins, especially in The Huffington Post, 2013), and at other times
through sleight of hand, as in the case of the New Zealand state, non-Indigenous
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academics and, eventually, restorative justice corporations marketing of the FGC process.
The sleight of hand terminology is purposeful as it denotes the magic that often forms the
basis of criminological musings, and the constructions of crime control policy.

As an Indigenous person I find it easy to understand why Western criminologists, policy
makers, academics and private RJ companies seek to appropriate elements of the
Indigenous culture context to bolster the marketability of their products. After all, one of
the fundamental rules of modern marketing is 'sex sells', and indeed the Indigenous lifeworld can be very sexy and erotic. This process - the Western criminological enterprise
utilising Indigenous motifs, phrases, practices to Indigenise and market their products,
should be presented for what it really is, the eroticisation of Western crime control (see
Acorn (2004) for discussion of the eroticisation of justice, specifically in relation to RJ).

It is evident that many RJ practitioners and advocates are driven by a desire to do good,
but what is also driving this process is the desire to strengthen the marketing potential of
products on the competitive international crime control market. But let's be clear what it
is not about, at least in the first instance, the empowerment of Indigenous peoples. Nor is
all this activity about returning to Indigenous peoples the ‘gift’ of once again being able to
practice our traditional responses to social harm (Tauri, 2013a).

It is within this

understanding of the development of products that are marketable in settler-colonial
crime control markets that enables us to begin to answer the criminological question, so
what? Why is this issue important both for Indigenous peoples and critical criminological
inquiry?
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So What?

[G]lobalisation’ in Indigenous eyes reflects a deepening, hastening and stretching of
an already-existing empire.
Alfred and Corntassel (2005: 601).

There is growing anecdotal evidence that the global transfer of crime control policy is
negatively impacting Indigenous peoples (see Tauri, 2004 on New Zealand and Victor,
2007 on Canada).

This is particularly evident in the restorative and youth justice

contexts. From a distance it appears that the process is impacting Indigenous peoples in a
number of ways, including:


containment of Indigenous critique of neo-colonial state formal justice systems
through the production of state-centred indigenised policies and programmes
(Tauri, 2013b); and



blocking Indigenous activities aimed at enhancing their jurisdictional autonomy and
ability to develop their own responses to social harm, via the importation of
‘culturally appropriate’ crime control products (Victor, 2007).

In 1997 Gloria Lee, a member of the Cree First Nation in Canada, published an article
titled The Newest Old Gem: Family Group Conferencing. Lee expressed concerns about the
recently imported family group conferencing forum being forced upon Canadian
Indigenous peoples at the expense of their own justice mechanisms and practices. In
particular she argued that “First Nation communities are vigorously encouraged to adopt
and implement the Māori process and to make alterations to fit the specific community
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needs, customs and traditions of people who will make use of the new process” (Lee,
1997: 1). Lee’s concerns with the nature of the importation of the FGC/conferencing
process into the Canadian jurisdiction, and the impact it might have on Indigenous
peoples justice aspirations in that country have been shown to be valid.

The importation of the FGC forum into the North American context provides a neat case
study on the impact of the globalising activities of policy entrepreneurs and RJ advocates.
Almost twelve years since the publication of Lee’s article many Canadian Indigenous
peoples are still struggling to gain state support for the implementation of their own
justice processes. The increasing employment of Indigenous life-worlds in the marketing
of RJ products should be considered a significant component of the neo-colonisation of
Indigenous peoples: having faced a sustained period of colonisation, during which their
systems of justice were all but destroyed, Indigenes now have to deal with a new
colonising project.

This particular project involves the purposeful exportation of

restorative products from Australasia to the North American continent. The marketing of
this product and others like it, such as sentencing circles, is heavily reliant on
exaggerating the indigenous foundations of the products themselves.

We can demonstrate the potential negative impact of this process by citing just one case
study, that of the Stó:lo First Nation of British Columbia and their experience of the
importation of the ‘Māori justice process, FGC’ by the RCMP in the mid 1990’s. Katz and
Bonham (2006: 190) relate that in 1997, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police adopted a
policy which gave the police the discretion to utilise restorative justice. Based on family
group conferences used in Australia and New Zealand, as presented around Canada by
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‘Real Justice’ advocates such as Moore and O’Connell (Rudin, private communication,
2012), the RCMP subsequently developed guidelines for community justice forums
(Chatterjee & Elliott, 2003). The forum that was marketed around North America at the
time was based on the police-oriented ‘Wagga Wagga model’ developed by Terry
O’Connell (see O’Connell, 1993).

Dr Wenona Victor, a criminologist and activist from the Stó:lo Nation of the Fraser Valley
in British Columbia, underlines the impact the transfer of FGC’s to Canada had on First
Nation justice aspirations in that jurisdiction, thus demonstrating not only the
effectiveness of the marketing process, but also the concerns Lee expressed in the late
1990s.

Dr Victor describes receiving training on implementing FGC within Stó:lo

territory, a process that had been sold to them as “developed by the Māori, the indigenous
people of New Zealand”:

On the first day [of FGC-related training] we all eagerly awaited her [the trainer’s]
arrival. We were somewhat surprised to see an extremely “White” looking lady
enter the room; however, we have blonde blue-eyed, even red-headed Stó:lo among
us, and so, too, we presumed, must the Māori. However, it did not take us long to
come to realise this lady was not Māori and was in fact Xwelitem [European]. Ah,
the Māori had sent a Xwelitem; okay, we do that too, on occasion. It is one of the
many ironies of colonisation whereby Xwelitem often become our teachers…..
[t]here are times when it is an Xwelitem who is recognised as the Stó:lo ‘expert’ and
therefore, is the one talking even when there are Elders present. But by the end of
the three day training course I was convinced the Māori had lost their minds! There
181

was absolutely nothing Indigenous about this [FGC] model of justice whatsoever! (in
Palys and Victor, 2007: 6)

Through the experiences of Māori and the Stó:lo, we might view restorative justice
products such as these in terms of Tsing’s (2005) “packages of political subjectivity”,
meaning that they are:

[C]reated in a process of unmooring in which powerful carriers reformulate the
stories they spread transnationally… These packages carry the inequalities of global
geo-politics even as they promote the rhetoric of equality. Those who adopt and
adapt them do not escape the colonial heritage, even as they explore its possibilities.

The exports in question, including the FGC, are seen by some Indigenous peoples, as a
welcome and overdue extension of formal state justice processes beyond the Eurocentric
bias of its response to social harm, and of enabling ‘other’ ways of doing justice (Hakiaha,
1999; Māori Council, 1999; Quince, 2007). However, we must be careful not to oversell
the homogenising impact of these supposedly Indigenous-derived products. We must
always be mindful of what Aas (2009: 412) refers to as the “geo-political imbalances of
power between ‘exporters’ and ‘importers’ of penal policies and interventions”. We need
to be wary of the parasitic relationship between some importers (government/thinktank/administrative criminologist/private security company, etc.), exporters (another
nation state/government agency) and the ‘customer’, who is all too often a community or
an individual who has been given little choice in receiving these cultural appropriated
‘gifts’. As Tsing (2005: 76) argues, we should always keep in mind “the particularity of
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globalist projects”; critically analysing who constructs them, and for whose (primary)
benefit they are subsequently exported and implanted on the globalised crime control
market.

Final Comments
This paper was intended to contribute to ongoing Indigenous resistance to the
homogenising impact of much of the Western crime control industry’s activity. Hopefully
it will also serve as a wake-up call to criminologists and RJ advocates to ‘get real’ about
the often negative impact of their marketing of their products is having on Indigenous
peoples residing in settler-colonial contexts (Tauri, 2014c).

The business of crime control is complex, multi-dimensional, global and profitable. Like
any business enterprise, participants seek to market their products in ways that
distinguish them from those of their competitors, be they franchise companies or policy
entrepreneurs from other jurisdictions. As exposed in this paper, one key selling point for
the RJ Industry is the supposed Indigenous foundations of key products such as FGC, and
sentencing circles. As the saying goes, “sex sells” and the Indigenous world is ‘different’
and erotic, and therefore considered extremely effective for marketing policies and
initiatives in jurisdictions dealing with an Indigenous over-representation problem. The
techniques utilised by the Industry has been well identified in the extant literature; be it
the appropriation of Indigenous terms and language, or specific, boutique cultural
practices.

Or, as often happens, providing restricted space for Indigenous cultural

practice within Eurocentric, standardised programmes. From an Indigenous standpoint,
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all this activity amounts to the continued subjugation of our life-worlds, in this case, for
the benefit of policy makers, and RJ entrepreneurs.

The impact the globalised crime control market on Indigenous peoples is very real, and at
times negative and subjugating.

Those making money selling their biculturalised

products to state and Federal governments should consider the consequences of the
continued appropriation of the Indigenous life-world for the benefit of themselves and the
Industry they participate in. Perhaps it is time for all these non-Indigenous profiteers to
begin looking to their own cultural contexts for the next ‘big thing’ in restorative practice.
After all, we are often told by the demi-God’s of RJ about the lost restorative practices of
Western European culture (Weitekamp, 1999), so why the need to plunder our cultural
context? Given the contents of this paper, and the growing critical Indigenous literature,
they can be sure that the critical Indigenous gaze is now firmly turned towards them.
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Paper 5

Resisting Condescending Research Ethics in
Aotearoa New Zealand

Juan Marcellus Tauri

(2014) AlterNative, 10(2), online.

Introduction
Indigenous peoples residing in Settler Societies have long expressed concern at the
impact on their communities, of social research activity carried out by government
agencies and academic institutions (see Battiste, 2000; Smith, 1999a). More recently,
Indigenous commentators have focused their critique of the research context on the
ways in which Research Ethics Boards (REBs) impinge on the autonomy of Indigenous
researchers and participants to pursue knowledge construction in ways that suit their
social and cultural context. It should be noted that the title by which institutional ethics
review boards are known can vary depending on geographic location, for example in the
United States they are often referred to as Research Ethics Committees (RECs) and
Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), while in Canada they are designated Research
Ethics Boards (REB)s or General Research Ethics Boards (GREBs). The term REB is
used here to refer to all committees of this kind. Informed by the personal experiences
of the author and Indigenous Canadian and New Zealand research participants, as well
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as the extant literature, this paper critiques the processes employed by New Zealand
REBs to assess Indigenous-focused or Indigenous-led research.

In response to a

contested decision made by an REB, the author included questions in his study
specifically related to issues related to REBs, ethics’ processes and Indigenous research
so he could enquire of First Nation academics, researchers and service providers their
thoughts on the issues that arose from a debate that occurred between the author and
the REB. In all, seven individual interviews and two focus groups (with a total of 12
participants) were completed in both jurisdictions between November 2010 and
January 2012. The views of some of the participants are included in this paper, and
referenced via a ‘code’ designed to protect their identity. For example, focus groups are
coded as CFG1 or CFG2 (Canadian focus group 1 and/or 2) with participants given a
random number as an identifier known only to the researcher and the participant (such
as CFG14). Similarly, individual interviewees were randomly allocated a code based on
the jurisdiction the interview took place in, plus ethnicity (for example, a Māori
interviewee might be delegated the ‘code’ MII3 - Māori, individual interview 3).

One key issue identified is the general lack of experience of REB members in researching
with Indigenous peoples and a lack of knowledge of their social context, complex
histories and preferred research processes. As a result of this situation, REBs too often
privilege the ‘liberal’, Eurocentric conceptualisation of the autonomous research subject
as the focus of their deliberations on ‘right research’, which leads in turn to an overreliance on formulaic main-streamed (white-streamed) assessment processes that
sideline the importance of the social context within which ‘real world’ research takes
place. Furthermore, these practices potentially marginalise Indigenous researchers’ and
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their participants by placing them at risk of violating the ‘ethics’ of both the institution to
which they have applied for ethical consent, or the Indigenous communities where their
research takes place. The institutionalised ethics’ procedures may even be read as a
politics of containment that at once renders invisible the importance of relationships in
Indigenous research while asserting the right of the institution to determine the ‘correct’
way that research should be played out.

The paper begins with an overview of the author’s experience of the condescending
ethics of a New Zealand REB involved in assessing the ethics protocol for his doctoral
research. This discussion informs the following section which highlights Indigenous
issues with REBs identified in the literature and empirical research carried out by the
author. From there, the focus moves to an analysis of reasons for the poor quality of
REB processes and decisions regarding Indigenous research, drawing on Butz’s concept
of condescending ethics.

The paper ends with a call for Māori scholars (and

communities) to resist the ‘condescending ethics’ of REBs and their related institutions,
and develop a Māori-led, national-level ethics review process(es), that supports and
protects Māori and non-Māori researchers who want to research with Māori, but are
compelled by institutional edict to engage with the ethics protocols of the academy.
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The Research Ethics Board Experience

To assume that the Aboriginal past or knowledge can be adequately explained
from a totally foreign worldview is the essence of cognitive imperialism and
academic colonisation.
Henderson (1997: 23, emphasis added).

In late October 2009, the author and his then supervisor submitted the requisite ethics
forms to the REB at the institution where he was enrolled to carry out doctoral research.
The research focused on Indigenous experiences of the global transfer of crime control
policies and interventions, specifically restorative processes like Family Group
Conferencing, and the impact this kind of state activity was having, if any, on the
development of their own justice processes. The data gathering for the thesis was to be
carried out via a combination of individual interviews and focus groups with Indigenous
justice practitioners, researchers and academics in New Zealand and Canada (as well as
a small group of non-Indigenous policy workers in Canada).

Given the author’s previous experience with this and other REBs in the New Zealand,
and as an occasional advisor to Māori post-graduates who had experienced issues with
REB decisions, resistance was anticipated due to the authors’ decision to privilege the
ethics protocols favoured by Māori and Canadian Indigenous participants. As directed
by Indigenous advisors, the protocols were constructed through direct collaboration
with participants, elders’ councils and experienced Indigenous researchers in both
jurisdictions.

As a result of this collaborative process, a research protocol was
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developed that privileged collective strategies for eliciting informed consent and
gathering data.

The strategies devised related to the wish of some participating

communities (especially in the Canadian context), for privileging ‘communal’
expressions of consent, such as a) the fact that the research or meeting is agreed upon by
an Elders’ council, b) individuals participating at a focus group or hui give their consent
through the act of attending, or verbally at the beginning of the meeting, or c) an Elder or
designated person provides verbal consent at the beginning of a focus group/hui on
behalf of to the group and after discussing the background materials provided by the
researcher.

These strategies were included in the research framework as appropriate for eliciting
informed consent if the participants rejected the standard, form-based process that is
generally employed by social researchers. The author carried out thorough, communitylevel negotiations to ensure the development of protocols deemed ‘ethical’ and ‘tika’ by
Māori and Canadian Indigenous participants. The negotiations took place over a sixteen
month period via phone, email and during two visits to the region of Canada where part
of the research project was to take place. For the New Zealand context, the author was
advised on appropriate research ethics by three prominent Māori researchers, and
relied in part on extensive research and engagement with Māori communities over the
previous 15 years working in the academy and as a government official working directly
with Māori communities.

In contrast to the collaboratively constructed, community-centred and contextualised
research protocols developed by the authors and his potential participants, the REB in
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question followed a heavily standardised, Eurocentric process for assessing the
ethicality of both a researcher and specific project. It was evident from even a cursory
glance at the relevant background documents issued by the REB, supplemented by
communications between the author, his supervisor and members of the committee,
that the focus of their ethics deliberations centred on institutionally-defined risk
avoidance to researcher and research participant in a way that masked the power
differentials at the same time that they were seen as protecting what they perceived as
vulnerable research subject.

This Western liberal gaze may be seen as the

empowerment and privileging of the institutional research norms and values in a
universalising framework.

The REB in question had already rejected a previous version of the proposal submitted
in August 2009, in which the author had critiqued the REB’s privileging of individualfocused protocols for eliciting informed consent. Subsequently, the author and his
supervisor carried out further discussions with research advisors and participants
before resubmitting the application in late October of that year. The revised submission
included a thorough critique of the REB rationale for rejecting the previous submission,
while offering a dual-consent process that ensured the researcher would avoid behaving
‘unethically’, as that term is defined by Indigenous participants. The author and his
supervisor also sought to placate the REB by offering to use their preferred,
individualised process; as set out in this extract from the second submission:

Discussions between the primary researcher and Indigenous advisors for this
project indicate that the consent-related processes preferred by… University are
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unethical and culturally inappropriate for research engagement with these First
Nations. It would appear then that a compromise is required, and so the following
process will be used to satisfy the requirements of… [the ethics board in question]
with regards to confirmation of informed consent: All individual participants in the
research will be informed of the purpose of the research either verbally, or through
receipt of a written copy of the PIS, which will be offered to them prior to primary
researcher reading out the document... The process required by… University will
be explained to all participants, who will be informed that the requirements of the
institution privileges informed consent evidenced through written, signed
documents... research participants will be provided an opportunity at this stage of
the process to respond to the request for written confirmation. If they assent [sic]
to signing the informed consent forms (see appendix 4), then these will be
distributed to them for their analysis and signing. If they do not assent [sic] to the
[REB] process then the primary researcher will acknowledge this fact in their
research notes from that particular session. Individuals who decide not to sign the
document will be asked permission by the primary researcher to agree to be
contacted at a later date if any queries are made by… University officials because of
the lack of signed consent forms. A similar process will be followed during focus
groups, during which a request will be made for one person to act as a
representative for all participants and who can speak on behalf of that group.

This extract illustrates the way that the ethics proposal submission drew on the
consultation and collaboration of Indigenous participants. For example, the strategy of
identifying one person to confirm group consent to participation in the research, if the
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REB needed to seek confirmation, was suggested by two of the Canadian advisors for
the research after consultation with Elders Council members. How this selection would
be made was to be determined by the members of the group participating in a hui/focus
group, or determined by Elders’ prior to engagement. Unsurprisingly, the REB rejected
the compromise offered of a dual-consent process to guide engagement with Indigenous
participants, and continued to attempt to force its preferred individualised consent and
engagement process upon the researcher and his research participants. Many more
months were lost attempting to alter the approach taken by the REB, before his
supervisor finally received formal sign off for the research to proceed in April 2010. As
indicated earlier before embarking on the research the author added questions to the
research schedule for individual interviews and focus groups in order to elicit
participants views on the REB’s ethics review process. The responses of Canadian and
Māori research participants to these questions form an important part of the critical
analysis offered in this paper. However, before we present this analysis, we must first
background the growing Indigenous critique of the institutionalised ethics process.

The Indigenous Critique of Research Ethics Boards
Recently, a number of Indigenous researchers have criticised the role REB’s play in
stifling Indigenous-led, community-centred research. A common theme of Indigenous
critique has been the contribution made by REBs in the colonising project of Western
research (Absolon, 2008; Berg, Evans and Fuller, 2007; Bishop, 1998; Denzin, 2008; Ellis
and Earley, 2006; Glass and Kaufert, 2007; Marker, 2004; Schnarch, 2004; Smith, 1999a;
Tuck and Fine, 2007; Wax, 1991). Indigenous and non-Indigenous academic critique of
REB’s covers a broad range of issues, including (but by no means exclusively):
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Individualism – marked by the privileging of the autonomous research participant,
and informed consent processes that force individualised protocols upon
collectives (see Ellis and Earley, 2006; Glass and Kaufert, 2007: 32-33; Manson et
al, 2004; Piquemal, 2000; Wax, 1991).



Lack of expertise – members of REBs often lack adequate disciplinary,
epistemological and methodological expertise in Indigenous research/issues,
resulting in a, over-reliance on tick-the-box approaches that ensure the hegemony
of institutionally-acceptable protocols (see A. Smith, 1997).



Universalism – the propensity for REBs to utilise processes derived from
Eurocentric notions of ‘right’ (research) conduct, and essentialist notions of what
does/does not constitute an ethical researcher, all of which eulogise the
‘individual’ research participant and marginalise social groups which prefer
collectivist constructs to guide the research process (see Battiste and Henderson,
2000; Bradley, 2007; Ermine, 2000; Menzies, 2004; Wax, 1991; Wilson, 2004).



Formulism – an over-reliance on standardised, formulaic approaches that mask the
complexity of the social context within which research takes place (see
Hammersley, 2006; Smith, 1999b).

In essence, the author’s recent personal experience of REB conduct and that relayed to
him by other Indigenous researchers, strongly aligns with the issues identified in the
extant literature, especially issues relating to consent and REB preference for
individualistic research protocols. For the sake of brevity, this paper will focus on issue
of the dominance and impact of universalism on the Indigenous research context.
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Universalism

[T]he white man takes his own mythology, Indo-European mythology, his own
logos, that is, the mythos of his idiom, for the universal form that he must still wish
to call Reason.
Derrida (1982: 213).

Universalism refers in the research context to ideological presentations that portray
Western ‘social scientific’ research methods and methodologies as applicable to any
and/in all social and cultural contexts.

The philosophical principles underpinning

research-related universalism are presented by Battiste and Henderson (2000: 134) as
follows:

Eurocentric thought would like to categorise Indigenous knowledge and heritage
as being peculiarly local, merely a subset of Eurocentric universal categories… It
suggests one main stream and diversity as a mere tributary... [t]ogether
mainstreaming and universality create cognitive imperialism, which establishes a
dominant group’s knowledge, experience, culture, and language as the universal
norm.

Minnich (1990: 53) brings Battiste and Henderson’s evocation of the culture destroying
potentiality of universalism into stark relief when he contends that “one category/kind
comes to function almost as it is, were the only kind, because it occupies the defining
centre of power... casting all others outside the circle of the ‘real’”. In this schema,
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Eurocentric notions of ‘proper research’ are represented as the acceptable ways to
engage in knowledge construction. In comparison, the philosophies and practices of the
‘Indigenous Other’ are situated outside the institutionally-contrived ethics framework,
to be allowed in when necessary to brush the institutional framework in the cloak of
‘cultural responsiveness’.

It is argued here that the research-related universalism described above, forms a key
operating principle for New Zealand REB’s, an argument exemplified in the case study
that forms the basis of this paper. Universalism works as a dominant operational
principle throughout the country, despite the fact that all REB-related guidelines include
text exhorting researchers (and, one presumes, REB’s) to ‘respect difference’ (see
guidelines developed by the National Ethics Advisory Committee, 2012 and the Ministry
of Social Development, 2002). A number of Māori practitioners and post-graduate
students the author discussed these issues with, reported persistent failure on the part
of committees to match their actions with the ethics guidelines that appear in
institutional documents and websites. This is evident in the REBs response to the
author’s second ethics proposal and especially the authors’ decision to privilege the
ethics protocols that were developed in collaboration with Indigenous peoples. The REB
responded by stating that "[the REB] has concerns about the researcher's ability to
interact ethically with other communities under the auspices of… and about the
commitment to obtaining voluntary and informed consent from each participant" (REB
written decision, 24 February 2010). Despite a request under the Privacy Act the author
received no evidence from the REB members that supported how it came to this
determination.

In fact, the request raised an issue that further demonstrates the
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problematic nature of decision making by some REBs: despite being told the application
evinced significant and lengthy debate amongst its members, the committee could not
provide thorough notes of the discussion. The only material furnished as evidence by
the REB was the final, written decision emailed to his supervisor. This lack of reporting
meant it was difficult to rationalise how the REB came to its determinations. Therefore,
it proved extremely difficult to contest the REBs formal decision to reject the
application, and especially the contention made by the committee that the author was
unfit to engage in research with First Nation peoples. In response to this type of closed,
non-transparent deliberation by REBs, Katz (2007: 798) argues that:

As they review and adjudicate individual cases, administrators should make
themselves reviewable. Minimally, they should make records of what they have
considered and decided so that they can take distance from themselves in reviews
conducted at a later date. Maximally, they should articulate reasons that can be
reviewed publically. The decision, and in particular the determination that the
researcher was potentially ‘unethical’, ignored the fact that significant effort was
made to include the standardised informed consent and engagement process
preferred by the institutional body.

When presented with the author’s ethics submission and the REBs written responses
and email correspondence, key Indigenous respondents were overwhelmingly critical of
the universalistic tendencies inherent in the bodies ethics review, for example:
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The email from the guy, the one who said you had to follow Canadian law – does he
know what he means? Does he know we have our ways; that the ‘law’ of research is
set by us? I think he means his law, the one government’s make, or the college, the
one we have to put right whenever they turn up to research us. (CFG24)

So, you develop ethics after talking with us; to say you are unethical is like saying we
are unethical about how we want to be researched! It’s like saying we don’t know
how best to talk to each other. Where does this arrogance come from? Surely it
doesn’t come from talking to us? (CII5) And

... you talk to us, develop what we want, they ignore it and say you are unethical.
We’ve already begun the process of informed consent that ensures ethical conduct in
our communities. The fact they don’t recognise that shows they have no idea about
research with different Māori and Māori communities. (MII2)

The universalism that appears inherent in institutionalised ethics process is based on a
foundational myth of contemporary Western scholarship: that ‘White knowledge’ is the
only knowledge worthy of consideration and only ‘white approaches’ to gathering
knowledge can be considered ‘ethical’. It appears to be, as Best describes it (cited in
Ermine, 2000: 62) “... a dictatorship of the fragment, the privileging of Eurocentricallyderived protocols, leading to the potential marginalisation of the ‘Other’. Furthermore, it
appears to be founded on an assumption that ethics (as the morals inherent in respectful
human engagement) are best met through institutionally-derived, formalised processes.
Arguably, this situation exists because of the mistaken assumption that the morals
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necessary for governing ‘ethical’ research activity can be separated from ‘real life’ and
reduced to a standardised list of rules. Similarly, Christians (2007: 438) takes the view
that “[e]thics is located in the sociocultural first of all, instead of in rational prescriptions
and impartial reflection”.

From this perspective, ethics occurs at both the site of

engagement between researchers and participants; it is organic and socio-culturally
centred. In contrast, the ethics process confronted by the author with respect to his
doctoral research “assumes that one model of research fits all forms of inquiry… The
model also presumes a static, monolithic view of the human subject; that is someone
upon whom research is done” (Denzin, 2008: 104).

The author’s REB experience demonstrates that the institutionalised process employed
in New Zealand, is often beset with contradiction. For example, the REB in question
states in its web-based ethics documents that its protocols and practices are based on
those developed by New Zealand’s Health Research Council (HRC). If this is the case
then the REBs inability to recognise the authority of an ethics process developed with
Indigenous people can be interpreted as a violation of its own guiding principles, as set
down by the HRC, in particular:


Partnership: working together with iwi (tribes), hapu (sub-tribes), whanau
(families) and Māori communities to ensure Māori individual and collective rights
are respected and protected in order to achieve health gain.



Participation: involving Māori

in

the design,

governance, management,

implementation and analysis of research, particularly research involving Māori.
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Protection: actively protecting Māori individual and collective rights, and Māori
data, cultural concepts, norms, practices and language in the research process
(National Ethics Advisory Committee, 2012; emphasis added).

Furthermore, due consideration needs to be given to the instruction that when
conducting observational studies, investigators should understand, respect and make due
allowance for diversity among participants and their communities. (See also the Code of
Rights, Right 1(3): ‘Every consumer has the right to be provided with services that take
into account the needs, values, and beliefs of different cultural, religious, social, and
ethnic groups, including the needs, values, and beliefs of Māori’).

The process of Universalism and the risk it poses for the Indigenous researcher and
participants were repeatedly identified by participants in both individual interviews and
focus groups. For example:

The issue seems to me to be about their (the REBs) authority, and not about the best
way of going about this business. As Māori we have the right to determine how both
insiders and outsiders research with us... reading that document [the REB’s written
determination re: the second EA1 application], reads like they didn’t want to
understand because it was easier to stick with what they know. That is not a system
based on everyone being the same [Universalism], but on everyone being like them. It
is condescending to the extreme to tell us our ways are unethical (MII2)
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The Condescending Ethics of Research Ethics Boards

‘Condescending ethics’ – positions participants as the ‘Other’, reinforces
powerlessness, and further marginalises them with knowledge production
processes.
Reid and Brief (2009: 83).

We might begin to explain the current situation by analysing institutionalised ethics
processes in New Zealand and other Settler Societies, as a contemporary manifestation
of the condescending ethos that formed the basis of the role played by the academy and
its research activities in the colonisation of Indigenous (Battiste, 2000; Smith, 1999b).
The condescension of institutionalised REBs and their processes relates directly to their
preference for individualised research ethics, and the categorisation of the ‘subject’ as an
autonomous entity to be engaged in meaningful ways after the institutionally-focused
review process. And it is in this subjugation of the research subject that we find the
basis of the institutional form, which according to Eikeland (2006: 42) is coloured by “...
a condescending attitude following almost logically from its own point of view, that is,
position, and implied in its research techniques, be they observation, experimentation,
interviews, or surveys”.

Butzs’ invocation of Habermas’ concept of communicative action in relation to his own
experiences of REB’s, provides a helpful schema for understanding the condescending
ethos of the institutionalised ethics processes discussed here.

According to Butz,

Habermas distinguishes between two principle forms of ‘action’ in late modernity,
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Instrumental and Communicative.

Instrumental action is “oriented to technical

manipulation and control, and communicative action to the ideal of intersubjective
understanding and consensus among individuals” (Butz, 2008: 250). As Butz states
(ibid, p. 250, emphasis his)

The former is outcome oriented, the latter process oriented.

For Habermas,

communicative action is ethically prior to instrumental action, in that the justice of
an outcome is contingent on the justice of the process that yielded it.

In

contemporary modernity, he argues, the communicative effort to reach consensus
is frequently sacrificed to the imperative of bureaucratic efficiency.

It is easy to view the author’s experience of REB’s in New Zealand (and, according to the
extant literature, other Settler societies), in this vein, especially:

[w]hen it is assumed that the problem of voluntary informed consent is solved by
asking participants individually to sign written consent agreements regardless of
the research context, then a fully communicative appreciation of the adjectives
voluntary and informed are subordinated to the instrumental purposes of the
monitoring and controlling attached to the noun consent (Butz, 2008: 251 –
emphasis his).

Central to our understanding of the condescending nature of REB process and
Indigenous research, is the concept of power. In the mythology of the development of
contemporary research ethics, REBs arose from concerns of power imbalances between
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the researcher - all powerful, and therefore ‘potentially dangerous’, and the research
subject – powerless and in need of protection, provided, of course, by REBs as the
independent arbiter of ‘righteous research conduct’ (Juritzen, Grimen and Heggen,
2011). Juritzen et al argue in favour of expanding the conceptualisation of power in the
researcher-research subject relationship to critically encompass “ethics committees as
one among several actors that exert power and that act in a relational interplay with
researchers and participants” (ibid, p. 640). Given the considerable power REBs wield,
they cannot be exempt from critical commentary.

In fact their central role in

determining what is/is not ‘ethical’, who can research which communities and on what
issues, plus the fact their deliberations occur prior to research taking place, makes
McIntosh’s (2011: 62) statement that “trust and power relations must be examined from
the outset of any research endeavour” all the more authoritative.

Undoubtedly power relations and differentials are central to the activities of REB and
their individuals members, for let us not forget that all members (except perhaps for
those committees that include ‘non-accredited’ community members) are quite often far
removed socially, economically and politically from many of the individuals involved in
the research proposals they are assessing, for as Keith-Spiegel and Koocher (1985: 389)
write “[r]esearchers usually turn their gaze downwards in the societal power hierarchy,
studying people who are poorer, more discriminated against, and in a variety of ways
less socially powerful then themselves”. Given the ways in which research was used to
‘know’ Indigenes and its relation to the power of defining what is/is relevant knowledge
throughout settler-colonial jurisdictions (Smith, 1999), makes Juritzen et al’s call for
critically analysis of the power wielded of REBs in the New Zealand context. Let us now
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turn to explaining how and why condescending ethics processes manifest themselves
through institutionally-derived REBs.

Lack of Expertise, REBs and Condescending Ethics
The reported experiences of Indigenous commentators and researchers points
consistently to one key source of discontent with REBs, namely that their members
generally lack experience of Indigenous communities, and the core principles and
practices related to knowledge construction and dissemination (Smith, 1999a). This
brings forth the spectre of committees dominated by non-Indigenous academics and
external advisors making decisions about appropriate ethics protocols, without the
requisite socio-cultural experience and authority. In the New Zealand context most, if
not all, REB’s include a Māori member, part of who’s role is to advise on the
appropriateness of research that involves Māori participants, or touches on ‘Māori
issues’. However, it should also be noted that they are often the only Māori member of
such committees which can result in the added burden of being the lone voice on
significant issues that may arise with applications, as well as being expected to be the
expert.

van den Hoonaard (2006: 269) contends that the issue for many researchers are not
ethics codes developed by REB’s, as much as way these codes are interpreted and
employed by committee members; especially where members clearly have little
experience of the context within which research takes place. This position is supported
by significant literature (e.g., Anthony, 2004; Bradley, 2007; Haggerty, 2003) and
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comments to the author during his recent engagement with Indigenous researchers,
including one participant who stated that:

In my dealings with IRBs, I find they will have a standard ethics guidelines; go to the
bibliography and all the usual experts are there, Henderson, Smith... they [REBs] say
the right things, consult, engage, privilege [the Indigenous], but the practice is
different. Mainly white committees, no experience of us, who revert to their ways, to
what they understand to be right. (CII3)

Reid and Brief (2009: 83) highlight this failing with respect to their own experience of
REB interference in their ethnographic project: “... they did not have the capacity or
resources to fully support ethical decision-making in the project, nor did they have the
mechanisms in place to hear from the community researchers themselves”.

Arguably, in the case of Indigenous-focused research, the lack of knowledge and
experience of the research context is of greater risk to both researcher and participants
than lack of disciplinary expertise. Hammersley (2006: 4) describes the dangers thus:
“Researchers’ decisions about how to pursue their inquiries involve weighting ethical
and other considerations against one another, and this requires detailed knowledge of
the contexts concerned”. By drawing conclusions on the ethics of research situations
they have little expertise in or knowledge of, and ignoring advice from those with the
relevant experience, REBs place Indigenous researchers and their research participants
in danger of experiencing ‘unethical institutionalised research’. Hammersley (2006: 6)
further states that:
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What is involved here, to a large extent, is a great pretence: ethics committees are
to operate as if making research decisions were a matter of applying a coherent
[standardised] set of ethical rules that do not conflict with any other
considerations, or that override them, and that good decisions can be made
without having much contextual knowledge.

While following and conforming to an institutionalised bureaucratised ethics process
means you have ‘acted’ as ethical researcher in that particular context, the experience of
the author, his research participants and the published (critical Indigenous) record,
demonstrates that simply following REB processes does not guarantee ethical research
‘on the ground’ (see Butz, 2008; van den Hoonaard, 2001). It is argued here that
conformity to the Academy’s bureaucratised processes comes with significant,
potentially ‘unethical’ baggage because, as Knight et al (2004: 397) argue,
institutionalised ethics protocols are a set of “cultural norms that [serve] the interests
and reflects the values of the IRB and the academy”. Arguably, these cultural norms
replicated through mandatory engagement with institutional ethics processes, reflects
the ‘knowledge by mass production’ that permeates so much of the Academy today; the
dangers of which are pointedly summarised by Lorenz (2012: 606) who states that:

We should not be surprised therefore that universities have been changing in the
direction of academic capitalism in the form of entrepreneurial McUniversities.
This development boils down to ‘a move from elite specialisation with strong
professional controls towards a ‘Fordist’ mass production arrangement’.
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The McDonaldisation of the Academy is perhaps most evident when the formalisation of
research becomes married with academic institutions reliance on universalistic
processes of knowledge construction. This situation, combined with the general lack of
expertise of REB members of the Indigenous social context, generates an environment
for the Indigenous pursuit of knowledge characterised by contradiction and
condescension.

Having set out the condescending nature of the Academy’s ethics

processes, we now turn to our focus to identifying responses that will enable the
Indigenous Academy to counter the often disempowering practices of REB’s and their
tendency to employ universalising, standardised processes.

‘Researching Ourselves Back to Life’: Resisting Condescending Ethics

If it is true that we been researched to death, maybe it’s time we started researching
ourselves back to life (Comment by Indigenous elder in Brant-Castellano and
Reading, 2010: 3, emphasis added).

In a powerful call for decolonising the academic, research edifice, Arthur Smith (1997:
25/26) asserts that:

It is self-evident that Indigenous people now want their voice in research, and they
want it to be heard and understood... [t]he right to establish and control the terms
and conditions of cultural research is an inalienable right for all peoples of the
Earth. The colonial era is dead, if not yet buried.
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Given the reported experiences of Indigenous commentators and researchers, of the
condescending nature of REB activities, one might argue that colonialism is very much
alive in the present, especially in the realm of institutionalised ethics; and thus
arguments for the death of the colonial era are perhaps slightly premature: the fight
against the imperialistic tendencies of academic research continues.

A strong argument in favour of the need to overhaul institutionalised ethics is the impact
it has on us as ethical, respectful Indigenous researchers. In the end, the repeated
requests for assurances from the author that he would adhere to the Institutions
individualised ethics protocols (particularly relating to informed consent) were given
(albeit by his supervisor) in order to gain sign-off from the REB, thus enabling the
doctoral research to proceed. This was done with full knowledge that in all instances the
ethics protocols of Indigenous participants (whether as individuals, groups or
communities) would take precedence over the REB’s standardised process. Schwandt
(2007: 92) refers to this strategy as ‘playing the game’ in order to receive the gift of
authorisation. Schwandt reports using this strategy from time-to-time to keep her own
students safe (albeit from REBs), as related thus:

We publicly and privately complain about the onerous review process, but when it
comes time to file the papers, we simply figure out what it is in terms of language
and procedure that IRB’s are looking for and then find ways to say it just so... a
major problem with such a strategy is that it encourages confusing technical
compliance with IRB regulations with careful and sound substantive ethical review
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of one’s research. Moreover, it creates the impression that ethical matters are
dealt with once IRB approval has been granted (ibid: 92).

These sentiments were shared by a number of participants’ in the Canadian focus
groups, including one who stated that:

Sadly, we play the game, giving ethics committee’s what they want, knowing it isn’t
right... playing the game means they don’t learn a thing, change the process, we do
ourselves no favour [sic] and certainly not the participants: but what do you do? Go
up against them and they’ll do everything to crush resistance... (CFG16)

According to the author’s focus group participants, personal communications with
Indigenous researchers, and the extant literature, ‘playing the game’ appears to be
widespread; indeed it is considered by some as necessary to protect themselves as
Indigenous researchers and especially their research participants. While it is easy to
understand or validate resistance strategies like ‘playing the game’, I wish to propose a
different strategy, one that requires us to stop playing the ‘ethics game’ as dictated by
institutional REBs. I am advocating that we develop our own REB(s), modelled on our
specific socio-cultural and ethical principles and practices (see Brant-Castellano, 2004;
Maddocks, 1992; Manson, Garroutte, Goins and Henderson, 2004: 60S for similar
arguments in other colonial jurisdictions).

What is being proposed here is neither novel, nor unrealistic: Precedents have already
been set by other Indigenous including the Cherokee (Manson et al, 2004: 65S-70S), Nuu
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Chah Nulth Indigenous (Wiwchar, 2004) and the Mi’kmaq Grand Council of Mi’kma’ki
(also known as Sante Maio’mi within the seven districts of the Mi’kmaq nation, Nova
Scotia). Let us consider in detail, the example provided by the eminent leaders of the
Mi’kmaq Indigenous who authorised the development of the Mi’kmaw Ethics Watch
(Ethics’ Eskinuapink) “to oversee research processes that involve Mi’kmaw knowledge
sought among Mi’Kmaw people, ensuring that researchers conduct research ethically
and appropriately within Mi’Kma’ki” (Battiste, 2007: 114). Battiste (2007: 114-115)
relates that developing the process was “... a significant step toward ensuring Mi’kmaw
peoples’ self-determination and the protection of our cultural and intellectual property”.
The said Ethics Committee oversees the research protocol and ethical research
throughout the seven traditional districts of the Grand Council, which includes the
provinces of Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and
Quebec. Members of the original Mi’kmaw Ethics Watch included community elders,
leaders and researchers. Indeed, referring to Canada Menzies (2001: 21) writes that:

Many Indigenous communities have now instituted research protocols that researchers
must abide by when researching in an Indigenous community. Such protocols, whether
community – or researcher initiated, ultimately contribute to the establishment and
maintenance of respectful research relations.

This body works in similar ways to institutional REBs: members receive and consider
research proposals and assess them against ethics norms and protocols generated by
Indigenous themselves. The purpose is similar to that of institutionally-focused REBs’,
except that the primary goal is to protect Mi’Kmaw peoples and Mi’Kmaw knowledge
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(Battiste, 2007: 126-127). The Mi’kmaw Ethics Watch was instigated by the Grand
Council of Mi’Kmaq to “assert the responsibility and authority of Mi’kmaw People as
guardians and interpreters of their culture and knowledge systems” (Brant-Castellano,
2004, p. 108). Further, the protocol applies to “any research... or inquiry into collective
Mi’Kmaw knowledge, culture, arts, or spirituality” (Mi’kmaq College Institute, 1999).
While the protocols centralise the review of research applications, primary
responsibility for monitoring is allocated to communities that fall under the auspices of
the Grand Council (Brant-Castellano, 2004).

Doing Things for Ourselves
The suggestion that we develop a pan-Māori ethics process to support Māori research
endeavours is likely to cause discomfort for some REBs and non-Indigenous researchers,
for as Glass and Kaufert (2007: 27) write REBs “are accustomed to being the sole
arbiters of the ethical acceptability of a project. However, it is worth remembering that
“[m]ost conventional boards are not yet well prepared to meet the demand of
communities for a more interactive partnership” (ibid). No doubt some, including Māori
and other Indigenous researchers, will advocate that we continue to participate in REBs
as we have done for the past two decades, so we might impact practice ‘from within’.
There is some validity to this position because most, if not all New Zealand REBs include
Māori academics as members or external advisors.

Furthermore, as previously

mentioned the guidelines employed by most REBs include a sub-section dedicated to
research practice involving Māori and/or Pacifica peoples. And yet, despite all this
attention far too many Māori academics and post-graduate researchers continue to
report dissatisfaction the REB processes (see Hudson, 2004 and Walsh-Tapiata, 2003).
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So, by all means we should continue to engage with the Academy’s REBs, if for no other
reason than to provide guidance on Indigenous ethics, as well as ‘polite censure’ and
gentle chastisement for unethical, disempowering conduct and decisions when
necessary. However, it is also evident that we must be more forceful in our attempts to
effect change in the Academy’s attitudes and practices. One way of doing so is to
develop a Māori- dominated ethics process that is dedicated to supporting Māori postgraduates, established researchers and non-Indigenous scholars wanting our guidance
on conducting ethical research with Māori. A process of this kind will focus in part on
holding REBs, government agencies and private researchers accountable if their conduct
negatively impacts Māori researchers and Māori research participants.

In anticipation of resistance from REBs, especially non-Māori academics and
researchers, I offer the following rationale for the proposed Māori-led ethics process:
1.

to provide a body that works to operationalise Māori self-determination in the
realm of knowledge production;

2.

to provide emerging and experienced Māori/non-Māori researchers and the
Academy’s REBs with an experienced body of experts with whom they can engage
with to enhance their ability to carry out ethical research with Māori;

3.

to provide a Māori-dominated body to which Māori individuals, organisations,
hapu, iwi and communities can turn to for support when issues arise with the
conduct of researchers, REBs and academic institutions; and

4.

to empower us to send a strong message to the non-Indigenous academy and the
institutions they serve, that their perspective on ‘how to research’ the Indigenous
Other is no longer hegemonic.
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Any one arguing against this suggestion should consider the recent United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted by the General Assembly in
2007 that recognises member states poor treatment of Indigenous peoples and calls for
“control by Indigenous peoples over development effecting them and their land”, and the
need for Indigenous peoples to give their “[f]ree, prior and informed consent” to any
decisions or actions that affect their well-being. Inarguably, the actions of researchers
and research bodies, including REBs, fall within the range of institutions, to which this
principle of Indigenous empowerment applies, for as Brant-Castellano (2004: 102)
rightly reminds us:

[f]undamental to the exercise of self-determination is the right of peoples to
construct knowledge in accordance with self-determined definitions of what is real
and what is valuable. Just as colonial policies have denied Aboriginal Peoples
access to their traditional lands, so also colonial definitions of truth and value have
denied Aboriginal Peoples the tools to assert and implement their knowledge.
Research under the control of outsiders to the Aboriginal community has been
instrumental in rationalising colonialist perceptions of Aboriginal incapacity and
the need for paternalistic control.

Furthermore, the development of an indigenous-dominated ethics process will enhance
the prospects of the ‘decolonisation of the research project’ (Smith, 1999a) which:

… proffers a (re)centering of indigenous worldviews into research methodologies
based on subjectivity (perspective or voice), insider knowledge (authenticity),
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reciprocity (giving back) and the non-exploitative design of research that ‘benefits’
the community and not the researcher (Coram, 2011: 41).

The Academy, especially members of REBs, and the general population of researchers,
might hesitate at the idea of an Indigenous-led ethics process. No doubt some will view
it as just another level of ‘red-tape’. Schnarch (2004: 93) pre-empts such concerns when
he writes that:

Some researchers may balk at the idea of an Indigenous review/approval process,
construing it as political interference contrary to academic freedom. They do,
however, readily accept the constraints of peer review for funding proposals,
journal articles, and so on. As with academic review, an Indigenous review process
is generally intended to ensure quality of the work, its relevance, and the
appropriateness of interpretation.

Having prompted various counter-arguments, I see no reason why we cannot proceed to
develop a Māori-specific ethics body in the social sciences. A vehicle already exists upon
which to build the process, namely the Māori Association of Social Sciences, which I
believe can easily be turned from a representative/relational body, into one that actively
works to support and protect researchers and research communities.

Concluding Remarks
A key motivation for the Indigenous focus on Western modes of knowledge construction
was the role this activity played in the colonisation process and its ongoing role in
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Indigenous marginalisation in the neo-colonial context (Tauri, 2009). As Battiste and
Henderson (2000: 132-133) write “[m]ost existing research on Indigenous peoples is
contaminated by Eurocentric prejudice... [thus the development of] ethical research
must begin by replacing Eurocentric prejudice with new premises that value diversity
over universality”. If we are to achieve self-determination over our own knowledge
construction processes, then it is imperative that we challenge the power and authority
the academy has over the production process; a power that is centralised in
institutionally-centred bodies such as REBs. This call to action should not be interpreted
as an attempt to marginalise institutionally-based REBs, but to provide a Māoridominated processes for protecting our researchers and research participants from the
well documented problems Indigenous peoples have been having with institutionalised
ethics processes across all Settler Societies. Whether the Māori-focused REB works
separately from existing institutional REBs, or as an adjunct body that advises and
guides them, are issues that would need to be addressed by Māori scholars (in the first
instance), during the development phase.

While we must acknowledge that the stated intentions of REBs and their members are
‘to do good’ and protect the vulnerable, we must always acknowledge that in the first
instance they will always be wedded to the institutions from which they derive; for as
Bradley (2007: 341) relates:

By controlling the models of research, who gets to speak and how subjects get to
represent themselves, IRBs are in a powerful position as part of the institutional
structure.

In this position they can, and often do, silence the voices of the
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marginalised and perpetuate an academic political economy and a traditional topdown research and professional model that quantify and objectify human lives by
keeping them nameless, faceless and voiceless.

215

Paper 6

Ritual and the Social Dynamics of Policy Making in
New Zealand

Juan Marcellus Tauri

(2015) P. Howland (Ed.), Ritual Aotearoa New Zealand: An Effusive Introduction.
Wellington: CANZ (in print).

Introduction
I wish to begin this paper by positioning myself within the context of the rituals of
policy making in New Zealand: I went to University at the age of 26, where I studied
Criminology and Sociology and eventually lectured Criminology for three years. In 1999
I left the Academy and spent ten years working in various government agencies
including the Ministry of Māori Development (Te Puni Kokiri), Ministry of Social
Development and Department of Corrections. The majority of my time was spent
working on criminal justice and social sector policy, and interacting with a range of
agencies, including the Ministries of Justice, Police, Corrections, Internal Affairs,
Housing, and Department for Prime Minister and Cabinet. I participated in a number of
inter-agency committees and projects, most notably the Youth Offending Strategy
(2002), Crime Reduction Strategy (2002), Effective Interventions (2006) and Drivers of
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Crime (2009/10). I use this experience to provide a critical discussion of the rituals that
underpin policy-making activity in the crime control sector New Zealand government.

I have chosen to focus on the activities of the Policy Industry for the following reasons;
firstly, the industry has the ability to significantly impact our lives through its close
relationship with Cabinet, the development of legislation and access to extensive
budgets for policy development and implementation; and secondly to demystify the
mythological and ritualistic world policy makers are encapsulated within.

This

construct assists in protecting the policy sector from external scrutiny and maintaining
hegemony over the way social problems are defined and responded to. I evidence my
critique by referring to a specific case study I observed while working in New Zealand’s
policy sector, namely the Organised Crime Strategy.

Policy Development in New Zealand

State? What is that? Well then, open your ears to me, for now I shall speak to you
about the death of peoples. State is the name of the coldest of all cold monsters.
Coldly it tells lies too: and this lie crawls out of its mouth: “I, the state, am the
people”. That is a lie!
Nietzsche

Broadly speaking policy development can be understood as an institutionally-derived
practice that is contextualised and codified in various written forms. It is the process
through which government identifies and puts into play actions they believe will
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improve key social and economic indicators (e.g. lift overall youth educational
attainment or reduce unemployment) (Althaus, Bridgman and Davis, 2007).

The

process of policy making is facilitated through various bureaucratic actions including
Cabinet papers, budgets, legislation, regulations and other administrative practices that
have formed the basis of policy making in Western democracies for most of the last sixty
years (Schick, 1996). However, over the past decade the Policy Industry has been
significantly impacted by the rise of two inter-related movements, managerialism and
evidence-based policy (EBP) (Reid, 2003).

The (re)construction of contemporary policy development processes
In the mid-1990s, New Zealand’s Policy Industry began building on developments in the
United Kingdom to conduct a co-ordinated process of modernisation. This involved
implementing of a range of techniques that proponents believed would enhance the
efficiency of the public service.

These ranged from alterations in performance

measurement, such as moving from reporting on outputs (i.e. the number of clients
serviced) to outcomes (i.e. quantifiable evidence of the impact of policies, spending and
interventions), and enhanced inter-agency co-operation across intersecting portfolios
(e.g. criminal justice, welfare and health) (Shick, 1996; see also Cheyne and Belgrave,
2005). In short, New Zealand’s public service underwent a process of modernisation
that brought its operations into line with the theories and practices of managerialism;
an approach to policy development that had been gaining popularity in other western,
neo-liberal jurisdictions.

Trinder (2000: 18) states that the managerialist ethos

emphases value for money and focuses on “effectiveness and efficiency [as] a central
driving force behind… policy”.

Through the managerialist movement government
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agencies and providers contracted to deliver services on their behalf, were expected to
quantify what they were doing, why they did ‘it’, and whether or not ‘it’ was working.

The influence of the managerialist movement on New Zealand’s public service was
boosted by the attendant development of the evidence-based policy or EBP movement
immediately after the Blair government came to power in the United Kingdom in the
mid-1990s (Bullock, Mountford and Stanley, 2001). Evidence-based policy has been
described as a technical approach to policy making that places empirically-generated
evidence at the heart of policy development. The types of evidence privileged in the EBP
environment are quantitative, scientific methods, such as randomised clinical trials,
statistical meta-analysis and systematic, large-scale reviews. The power of EBP to
influence the modern Policy Industry derives from the part it plays in combating one of
the key concerns of the modernisers, namely the perception that policy-making until the
mid-1990s was dominated by the “untested views of individuals or groups, often
inspired by ideological standpoints, prejudices, or speculative conjecture” (Davies,
2004: 3).

In contrast, policy modernisers argued for a policy industry based on

evidence of what works to produce positive social outcomes, and the only valid
knowledge for informing policy is that derived from scientific, objective observations of
the social context (Schick, 1996). Thus 21st century New Zealand is supposedly blessed
with a ‘scientific policy endeavour’ that ensures that the tax payer is receiving value for
the hundreds of millions allocated every year to the policy industry.
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Ritual and Myth-Building and Maintenance in New Zealand
In a chapter on the public service in New Zealand, Shaw (2006) begins by describing a
scene from the popular 1980s television series Yes Minister in which Sir Humphrey
Appleby, a senior public servant, is leading his hapless Minister in circles by obfuscating
on a question of whether or not a certain investigation had in fact taken place. Those
who remember the series might recall that two of the core premises were that the
public service was the real power behind government, and public servants purposely
employed a range of (devious) techniques to ensure this situation continued. Upon
reflection, Shaw (2006: 273) states that:

At one level Yes Minister and its sequel, Yes Prime Minister, make for witty, wellcrafted viewing. But at another they promoted a jaundiced view of public servants
that is not, and perhaps never has been, a fair or accurate depiction of the role of
public servants.

I disagree with the substance of Shaw’s argument: Yes, while it is inaccurate to present
the public service in New Zealand as an entity that is at all times manipulative,
nevertheless, in my experience the behaviour depicted in the British television series
was more common, and at times far more manipulative, than displayed by Sir
Humphrey and his fictional colleagues.

The manipulation of Cabinet Ministers,

competing agencies and the public, is common practice across New Zealand’s public
service.

Furthermore, the degree and nature of the obfuscation and deceit often

correlates to the potential for political damage of a particular issue, or the ability (or
more usually the lack thereof) of specific agencies and officials.
220

The motivation,

perhaps even the necessity for manipulation and obfuscation, can be easily understood if
we recognise that what is at stake is something more important to senior public
servants than their significant salaries, power. And what is more important to the
attainment and maintenance of power, than the intertwined processes of ritual, mythbuilding and maintenance?

Ritual(s) in organisational culture
Alvesson and Billing (1997: 125; see also Kertzer, 1989) describe three basic
formulations through which corporate culture is expressed and reproduced, i) through
artefacts - physical objects like furniture, logos, and dress that convey meaning within
an organisation; and ii) through metaphors –“culturally rich verbal expressions”, or
verbal symbols, creating” vocabularies to facilitate and guide interpretations” of
organisational activity, and lastly, through rituals. In Alvessen and Billing’s schema
rituals are activities that occur within and between corporate operators, corporations
or institutions and ‘outsiders’ (such as the general public as consumers of corporate
products) that include certain repetitive patterns which contain symbolic and
expressive elements that confirm existing (or newly constituted) power relations,
institutional values and attitudes. This type of functionalist analysis of ritual considers
institutionalised ritual(s) as activities used to communicate organisational norms and
mark those who are part of the institution itself (Jones and Sergot, 1995). However,
institutionalised rituals are often as much about who or what is excluded from the ‘club’
and therefore from power (Meyer and Scott, 2009). This argument brings a much
needed multi-dimensionality to the analysis of the place and purpose of ritual in
bureaucratic institutions.
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Suk-Young (2009: 3) contends that ritual(s) is an important feature of organisational
culture and corporate activity because of the part it plays in overcoming “coordination
problems” and ensuring individuals and agencies agree on the core ethics, principles
and goals that drive organisational activity. Further, Suk-Young (ibid: 26) makes the
pertinent observation that:

If one calls [a] meeting a “ritual”, then according to our argument, the purpose of a
ritual is to form the common knowledge necessary for solving a coordination
problem [see also Islam and Zyphur, 2009 and Smircich and Stubbart, 1985].

I do not entirely agree that a meeting per se is ‘ritual’. There may be rituals involved in
getting ready to attend the meeting, for example, pre-meeting discussions where
officials go over a pre-set plan for marketing their policy position or identifying
problems, including particular agencies or individuals, and creating strategies for
nullifying these impacts. For example, I recall being told by a friend working at the
Ministry of Justice, an agency that the Ministry I worked for, Ministry of Māori
Development, was in conflict with on a regular basis, that during the development of the
Crime Reduction Strategy (Ministry of Justice, 2002) officials would hold pre-meeting
meetings to strategise about how best to deal with the anticipated conflict. In a ritual
reminiscent of war movies, Ministry officials would gather to discuss their ‘intelligence’,
to ruminate on our relative strength and weaknesses, determine their likely plan of
attack and create strategies designed to protect their perceived policy ‘high ground’.
Various officials would be designated to lead specific attacks (or defences) and would be
invited to participate in the conflict by the ‘General’ (in this case the highest ranking
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Ministry official) at pre-conceived points during hostilities. The war metaphors are
quite apt in this case; I and my colleagues from the Ministry of Māori Development
would sit, often bemused as we observed the heavily scripted, ritualised defensive
strategies of crime control policy officials, As such, it might be more accurate therefore
to think of formal, public service interagency meetings as a platform or theatrical
vehicle that enables the performance of ritual between policy makers (Lea, 2009). It is an
often heavily prescribed, coordinated site of interaction that compels performers to
forestall or overcome potential coordination problems, collectivise normally disparate
policy and decision-making processes, and to construct supporting myths specific to
their industry.

Ritual, myth and power
Building on the previous discussion, in the policy context ritual is enacted in part
through

micro-political

ceremonies

involving

established/agreed

vocabularies,

symbolic gestures and codified texts, usually produced in writing in the form of
ministerial briefing papers, meeting minutes and cabinet papers. This body of work,
borne from ritual, enables policy workers and their disparate institutions to formulate
common knowledge of, and approaches to, social problems, and to anticipate ‘right
conduct’ in working together to respond to them. Furthermore, it can be argued that
ritual also serves to support the myth of a political neutral public service, mask the
power and authority that lies in the hands of a large, unelected body of policy
technocrats, and lastly, to assist in insulating the policy industry from the gaze of critical
commentators, such as the media and independent members of the academy. In the
following section I utilise a case study to demonstrate the role of ritual in developing
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and maintaining two of the core myths of the Policy Industry within the New Zealand
context, the myth of political neutrality, and the myth of the primacy of evidence.

Myth and policy development
What have myths to do with policy making? My experience tells me that the Policy
Industry is, overall, genuinely committed to the aims of evidence-based, politically
neutral, policy-making. Unfortunately, those aims are difficult to achieve and maintain
in what is in reality a highly ideological and politically-focused industry, one that is
dependent on an “alternative dimension of myth” to mask the reality of its politicised
activities (Herzog and Abel, 2009: 4). I argue that myth-making in policy making is
reflective of the gap and tension between the ‘ought’ and ‘is’ of institutional,
bureaucratic practice. Accordingly, it is a duplicitous activity where “... the ought
provides a fantasised or glamorised ideal that the is of practices should be achieving”
(ibid: 4).

The creation and maintenance of myth can be said to be foundational to the ‘art’ of
policy-making because of the important part it plays in “mediating opposition” and
“justifying decisions regarding major issues” (ibid: 5). Therefore, myth-maintenance
(supported by ritual) is particularly helpful in policy-making for taming internal
coordination problems (i.e., competition within and between agencies for finite
resources) and external one’s (i.e., nullifying the potentially politically damaging impact
of independent, public scrutiny) “because myths, by their very nature, disguise and
manage the emotional impact of the stories they tell” (ibid: 5), and often play a useful
role in hiding the ‘real story’ behind the intent and likely impact of specific policies.
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Ritual and the Myths of Political Neutrality and the Primacy of Evidence

Formally, officialdom is at the service of the political executive, its obedient
instrument (although we must allow for the odd, rare occasion of the outbreak of
juvenile-type resistance) the tool of its will. In actual fact, it is nothing of the kind.
Everywhere and inevitably the administration process is also part of the political
process, administration is always political as well as executive, at least at the levels
where policy-making is relevant, that is to say in the upper layers of administrative
life.
Miliband (1969)

One of my all-time favourite movies is Usual Suspects, released in 1995. The film
contains a number of memorable scenes and splices of dialogue, but the one that has
stuck in my mind is probably the most often quoted: “the greatest trick the devil ever
played was convincing the world he didn’t exist”. This quote refers to the deceptive
practices employed by the ‘Evil One’ to divert attention away from the role he/she plays
in the madness and pain of everyday life. A similar deceit on the part of New Zealand’s
Policy Industry is its on-going attempts to convince both the public and its political
masters that it is politically neutral. In my experience the Policy Industry is much more
successful in this endeavour with the public, while most politicians are well aware of the
politicised nature of the public service.

I qualify my comments, however, by acknowledging that many members of the public
service, in particular those doing the technical work (the ‘policy proletariat’), try their
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best to adhere to the public service code of conduct and the theoretical and practice
bases of EBP. However, in my experience - apart from the odd exception – policymaking is a fraught process which requires practitioners to continuously compromise
these core values. Why? Because in reality, contemporary policy making in New
Zealand is not much different from the supposed bad old days of opinion-based policy
that existed before the rise of EBP: It is no less ideological than it ever was, and it
certainly is far from the objective, politically neutral beast its exponents claim.

There are a number of ways we can evidence the argument that the Policy Industry is
political: firstly, it is a given that a number of the public service are members of
registered political parties. Some keep their political affiliations to themselves; while
others openly declare them as is encouraged under the Public Service Code of Conduct
(PSCC) (State Services Commission, 2007). The PCSS stipulates that while it is the right
of all policy workers to affiliate politically they must be circumspect when carrying out
duties on behalf of any political entity. More significantly it is possible to also argue that
the public service is wedded to the political system through the fact that officials and
institutions are compelled to support the implementation of the policies of the
Government of the day. The myth of the political neutrality of the public service is built
in part on the fact that the PSCC directs officials to give full and frank advice to
government ministers. What this should mean in practice is that if existing evidence
does not support the policy directives from Cabinet and indeed may cause harm to the
public, then it is the duty of public servants to advise Ministers of this fact. However, in
reality this rarely happens, especially in the crime control sector, and when it does it is
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often more about protecting the reputation and resources of the agency and their
Ministers, than the public27.

The political nature of the Policy Industry is, however, much more insidious and far
reaching than these benign examples demonstrate. The Industry can be charged with
being political and partisan (as opposed to neutral) via the fact that while directed by
Cabinet and beholden to it; it holds extensive power over the development and
implementation of policy itself. If you live in Wellington, New Zealand and work in the
Industry long enough, you will hear politicians and media (and sometimes, but rarely,
policy workers) state that policy is not made or dictated by Cabinet, but is controlled by
the policy mandarins in the small geographical triangle that takes in the parliamentary
precinct, the Terrace and much of Lambton Quay. This point is often made tongue-incheek, but my experience is that it holds true in many cases. The myth of political
neutrality masks two sub-surface truisms that are not easily observed by external
audiences, but are well known within agencies. These are that i) part of the ‘art of
politics’ and therefore of policy-making (which is the textual articulation of political
theory/ideology) is a theoretical or conceptual framework for explaining the world and
how it works; ii) while individual members of agencies will have their own ‘theory of
the world’. Agencies utilise specific theoretical paradigms that match their institutional
view of how the world works, and form the ideological bases for policy development.
27

One recent exception, whereby criminal justice officials did provide conflicting advice, occurred
recently when Ministry of Justice officials provided a written brief to their Minister on proposed
‘Three Strikes’ legislation. Officials pointed out that the proposed changes to sentencing policy could
lead to significant violations of individual rights under both the Bill of Rights and human rightsfocused legislation. The Minister acknowledged receiving the briefing but not having reading it. This
scenario is highly likely, although in all likelihood the Minister would have been advised on the
contents of the briefing by one of his advisors. Technically, this enables the Minister the ability to
state that he had not read the paper, while all the time knowing of its contents (see Dominion-Post
(2010) Three Strikes Papers Seen but not Signed by Justice Minister, article published on 3 March.
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For example, neo-liberal economics has been the dominant political and economic
theory/philosophy for the development of economic policy by New Zealand’s Treasury
agency since the mid-1980s (Treasury, 2001); the Psychology of Criminal Conduct is the
dominant theoretical paradigm in the development of prison policy by the Department
of Corrections from the mid-1990s (Department of Corrections, 2013); and a form of
neo-tribal orthodoxy underpins policy making in the Ministry of Māori Development
(2013); and iii) agencies employ various rituals and associated activities that either
mask the theoretical underpinnings of their processes or validate them over others.

Case study: the Organised Crime Strategy
To demonstrate the political nature of policy making and the myth of the primacy of
evidence, we need look no further than the highly inflammatory issue of gangs and
crime. On 7 May 2007, a two year old girl was murdered in Wanganui, the victim of a
gang-related drive-by-shooting. Understandably the incident caused outrage amongst
the wider public and politicians. Through the media, public figures, such as the Mayor
of Wanganui, Michael Laws, called for ‘something to be done’ about the perceived
violence and general lawlessness of ethnic gangs in the region (Wanganui District
Council, 2007). The Government’s response was swift: just a few days after the incident,
public service officials were called upon by Ministers to brief them on the issues and
potentially effective policy options. Up to that point the only meaningful, albeit largely
ineffective, policy initiatives in place were the Ministry of Social Development-led interagency project called the Plan of Action: Improving Outcomes for Young People in
Counties Manukau (Ministry of Social Development, 2006) and a joint Ministry of Māori
Development/New Zealand Police project which utilised established (adult gang)
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leaders to mediate directly with so-called youth gangs in an attempt to dampen down
tensions and reduce the potential for further violent confrontation between these
groups. The reality was that over the preceding decade or more, the crime control and
social policy sectors had an unwritten rule of not working with gangs, meaning no
funding for gang members to develop social programmes or support for activities that
involved gang members or their associates28.

Officials’ response to requests from Ministers about how best to respond to the
Wanganui incident, was to revive the then grossly overdue Organised Crime Strategy
(OCS) (Ministry of Justice, 2002) that was initially part of the larger Crime Reduction
Strategy signed off by the Labour government in May 2001. The Strategy identified
seven priority areas for the wider criminal justice sector, of which organised crime was
designated Priority Area 5 (family violence and community violence and sexual violence
were priority areas one and two). By the time of the Wanganui gang shooting, priority
area five was the least developed, and certainly any formal strategy was by then almost
six years overdue.

28

There are a few exceptions to this rule, for example some District Health Boards in New Zealand have
funded patched gang members to deliver services, such as information on immunisation programmes,
in recognition of the difficulties government agencies often have in accessing ‘hard to reach’
communities. However, in my experience such enlightened thinking in the Policy Industry is rare, and
more often the response is puerile. Take for example the recent situation of Eugene Ryder: Eugene is a
former member of the Black Power and is now acknowledged, even by some police officers in
Wellington, as an effective youth worker. Eugene works with the hard to reach youth, those either
involved in, or moving towards involvement with, gangs. In 2008 Eugene was invited to give a talk at
a youth conference scheduled to be held in Wellington. Unfortunately one of the main sponsors of the
conference, the Ministry of Social Development, made it known that any future involvement or funding
by them would possibly cease if Eugene spoke at the conference. The Ministry made the demand
despite the fact that it had, at that time, lead responsibility for developing effective, informed youth
gang-related policy.
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Work began in earnest on resurrecting the OCS in mid-2007. It involved some of the
usual strategies, tactics and rituals officials utilise in order to be seen to be busy when
potentially nasty coordination problems arise in the public sector: firstly, lead agencies
were empowered (in this case, Ministry of Justice, followed closely by the New Zealand
Police); other important players were identified (for example, DPMC, Ministry of Social
Development, and to a lesser extent the Ministries of Māori Development and Pacific
Island Affairs); an inter-agency group established; a schedule of meetings agreed, along
with priority work items (background papers, briefings to Ministers, Cabinet papers,
etc) and tasks identified and allocated. Given the political capital inherent in the gangrelated incident in Wanganui, work on developing the OCS was given priority by
Government, and therefore by participating agencies. The fact that the lead agencies
had failed to deliver on the promised organised crime strategy for some two to three
years was never discussed at formal meetings and overlooked in official documentation.
Regardless, this overdue strategic item provided agencies with a ready vehicle to be
seen to respond meaningfully to what Cabinet clearly considered to be a politicallycharged, perhaps even electorally damaging issue.

So where does ritual fit into this particular case study? All of the above strategies and
activities can be viewed, individually or collectively, as rituals of (in)activity. In the
event of a highly charged, political issue arising, agencies (individually or collectively)
swing into ‘action’, utilising the well-established rituals of activity outlined above to
serve as markers of responsiveness, concern for public safety and expertise. The long
overdue OCS became a ready vehicle through which officials and agencies could
demonstrate their ability to respond quickly and efficiently. Having no doubt briefed
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Minister(s) on the situation, including claiming that the Strategy was an appropriate
and effective mechanism for responding to the Wanganui incident, officials then moved
to deploy another set of rituals, referred to here as the rituals of deception. This set of
rituals is commonly used by criminal justice officials who need to retrofit policy to a
social issue for which it is unsuited.

Retrofitting in the case of the OCS, refers to the fact that other policy mechanisms and
strategies already existed through which to create meaningful policy; the original intent
and focus of the proposed OCS did not correlate to the type of social issue that
developed in Wanganui, and the lack of evidence that an OCS-style approach would
demonstrably alter the social conditions which led to the Wanganui incident. Rituals of
deception are common in situations of policy retrofitting: they enable officials and
agencies to mask the fact that their activities are more about managing potential
coordination problems than about constructing meaningful ‘real world’ solutions. The
coordination problems that were the target of the OCS-related rituals of deception were
masking a long-overdue piece of supposedly important strategic work, the historical
lack of meaningful policy response to gang-related violence and gangs per se, and the
complete failure of the preferred suppression and surveillance policies since the mid1980s to solve the so-called gang problem. All of these coordination problems carry the
potential to negatively impact institutional credibility with Cabinet and the public, and
inter-agency relationships.
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Why the deceit?
There are a number ways to explain and understand why supposedly neutral policy
mandarins become involved in the politics of policy and utilise rituals of (in)activity and
deception.

At base level it has to do with affinity and access: the higher up the

managerial decision-making structure one gets, the closer you are to the political
decision-making process and the politicians who ultimately make those decisions.
Accordingly, the more one has ready access to political authority the more one pays
attention to the political consequences of policy design and implementation. In other
words, the higher up the management food chain you move, the less concerned with the
technical development of policy you become, and the more you focus on what is
referred to in Wellington as the ‘front page of the Dominion-Post test’: namely, how will
a particular policy or policy issue look in the news media when it is released? A further
issue for consideration is what is the risk of negative media publicity to Cabinet and the
policy sector? In other words, senior managers can be viewed as political commissars
who carry out the dual roles of educating the technocrats on the political expectations of
Cabinet and the Ministry, and providing political risk assessment and protection
services for Chief Executives, their agencies and Cabinet Ministers.

Of course it can be countered that the argument I present here robs policy workers of
their ‘agency’. However this position presupposes that policy workers are empowered
to carry out independent articulation of ‘free thought’ in the politically charged
environment of a policy shop to begin with. My experience was that this was rare and
most definitely discouraged. The reality of the policy environment and the position of
the policy proletariat is effectively summarised by legal theorist Stanley Fish (1989:
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141) who describes professional analysts not as free agents, but as "embedded
practitioners" whose values, canons of evidence, normative measures and theoretical
schema are proscribed by his or her professional community. As a result, the potential
for professional objectivity or political neutrality are, by definition, curtailed
significantly by their personal, and their agencies proximity to, political power.

The policy commissars and their direct line managers, who may be referred to
collectively as the Policy Elite, also have the unenviable task of adhering to and
implementing the policy platforms of incoming (newly elected) governments, along
with new policy initiatives dreamt up by the current government. This can be a
nightmare at times, especially if the government’s policy goes against the majority or all
of the available research evidence, as often occurs in the criminal justice sector (see
below). The case study of the OCS and policy response to the Wanganui incident,
highlights the myth of the political neutrality of the public service. This example
underlines the role of ritual in masking the way(s) in which officials and agencies will
bow to political and media pressure and construct policy responses ill-suited to the
specific social issue that is dominating front page news at a particular time. When
observed from afar, this type of ritualised response to the potential for ‘bad publicity’
may appear crude, but it can be supported by more sophisticated rituals. In the case
study discussed here, it included a set of pre-conceived activities that provided the
policy response with a ‘veil of scienticism’, that effectively maintains the myth of the
primacy of evidence in the policy-making context.

233

The OCS and the myth of the primacy of evidence in New Zealand policy making
According to the myth of the primacy of evidence, policy-making in New Zealand is
founded on the use of empirical evidence to develop effective solutions to real world
problems. There are times when this appears to be an accurate description of the link
between research-generated knowledge and policy development, particularly in policy
sectors such as education and health. My experience of the EBP process within the
crime control context is that while from time-to-time relevant evidence plays a part in
policy construction, more often than not rituals of deception are favoured. There is also
a tendency towards utilising a preconceived strategy of importing and implementing
policies from other western jurisdictions, regardless of the lack of evidence that these
interventions would work in the New Zealand context (the recent introduction of boot
camps for youth offenders a recent example), a practice that clearly breaches core
principles of EBP, including that policies and interventions are clearly suited to the
social context to which they are been imported (Tauri, 2009).

Without doubt, empirically-derived evidence is important to the development of policy in
the New Zealand context. However, it is the point at which evidence is gathered and
pre-determined decisions made about what evidence to use, that problematises the
Industry’s claims to be working in a politically neutral, EBP environment. In terms of
the OCS, core agencies went to great pains to retrofit the urban/ethnic gang issues onto
a policy mechanism focussed (largely) on a fundamentally different gang-related issue
altogether, namely the interlinked issues of organised (international) crime cartels and
terrorism. Part of this process included a whole set of rituals of deception focused on
the use (non-use) of evidence.
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Generally, the policy development process in the crime control context is characterised
as following a fairly straightforward process: the policy problem identified or received
→ policy industry formulates ‘plan of action’ → background/policy papers developed
including (if necessary) identifying a range of responses/interventions → review of
existing research and evidence of the effectiveness of range of intervention options. The
last stage in this linear process, the review of evidence, can be considered one of the
primary sites for the practice of rituals of deceit. In reality the process often looks like
this: framing the policy (research) question → preconception of the acceptable
parameters of the research review based on predetermined factors, including agency
ideological/theoretical paradigm (the Department of Correction’s Psychology of
Criminal Conduct), policy commissars assessment of political climate and/or Ministers’
policy directives → predetermined decisions/findings → selection of, and privileging,
existing evidence in support of pre-determined policy solution.

As a Ministry of Māori Development official, my colleagues and I identified significant
weaknesses in background papers produced to resuscitate the OCS.

Firstly, the

retrofitting process had resulted in weak analysis by core agency officials in terms of
‘fitting’ the street gang issue within an organised crime strategy. The best example of
this was their attempt to create a continuum of organised crime that ended with the
usual transnational crime conglomerates (international drug cartels, etc), and began
with ‘youth street gangs’, or more accurately what Ministry officials referred to as a
‘small group of loosely affiliated youth who hang out in public together’ (a touch team
perhaps? Maybe youth choir members going home from church?).

Officials then

attempted to create some solidity around the continuum in order to rationalise the
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inclusion of the various organised crime groups. At the ‘high end’ (links between
national drug organisations and international drug cartels) the evidential base was
loose, yet the arguments for significant linkages was at least plausible. However, the
further down the hierarchy of gang structure we move the more the evidence becomes
vague and inconclusive. At this point in the policy process, evidence was replaced by
unsupported suppositions, rationalised as ‘best guesses’ to retrofit the current street
gang issue onto a strategy focused on ‘organised crime’.

This fact came as no surprise to Ministry of Māori Development officials like myself,
who had read the existing New Zealand and international literature on gangs and
criminality, and found no firm evidence in New Zealand of major links between ‘street
gatherings of youth’ and organised national/international drug cartels Furthermore a
significant number of studies demonstrated that most ‘youth street gatherings’ did not
fit the poorly constructed definition of a gang that dominated this policy (Ministry of
Social Development, 2007). In fact, the greater majority of so-called Māori, Pacifica and
Pakeha (European) youth gang members were unlikely to become involved in organised
crime or to graduate to adult ethnic gangs (ibid). Through numerous interdepartmental
comments to core OCS agencies we repeatedly used the availing evidence to critique the
evolving policy position. Furthermore, we implored justice officials to base their policy
argument on the available evidence, or, if not, to provide evidence that supported the
position they were taking. Of course none was forthcoming as it either did not exist, or
what did exist (internationally) did not support their position. Instead, what occurred
was the use of selected parts of research, and definitions (of ‘gang’, ‘organised crime’,
etc) that excluded elements that contradicted their argument, something I and my
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colleagues encountered frequently in the Policy Industry and began to call the ‘cherrypicking ritual’.

At one stage we strongly challenged the definitional work on what did (and did not)
constitute organised crime, citing numerous international definitions that demonstrated
the fallacy they were creating by including youth, and even ethnic gangs, as key
components of the OCS. In response, officials countered by citing the United Nations
definition and argued that it allowed for such inclusions. In fact, it did no such thing, as
our commentary below demonstrates:

Paragraph 12: only part of the United Nations (UN) definition of organised crime is
used, what is missing is the second part, which stipulates the types of behaviours
and activities that would fall within the purview of ‘organised crime’ (such as illicit
traffic in narcotic drugs, traffic in persons, etc). In developing the draft convention
for the suppression of transnational organised crime, the United Nations purposely
undertook to develop a ‘specific’ definition, in order to avoid having such a broad
definition that violations of human rights would occur (e.g., enabling states to
utilise organised crime legislation/responses to target non-organised crime
‘organisations’ such as youth/ethnic ‘gangs’) (taken from Ministry of Māori
Development inter-agency comment on Ministry of Justice Cabinet paper).

The ritual of cherry-picking of evidence to suit a pre-conceived policy position is driven
largely by the policy commissars with one eye on the external political context
(meaning media scrutiny), and both ears bent to a Minister’s poll-driven directive. It is
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a ritualised process that is most evident when witnessed directly via input into policy
development, or indirectly as an external policy commentator who receives the
paper/briefing as part of the standard inter-agency or Cabinet consultation process –
otherwise it largely remains for the most part hidden from the public and the media. I
argue that while policy making is sometimes influenced by relevant evidence, much of
the evidence used is carefully (pre)selected to support the policy position of the current
government and/or the preferred theoretical paradigm of specific institutions. The
rituals of deception thus play a key role of allowing officials and agencies to present, to
themselves, to other policy workers, Cabinet and the public the illusion of ‘a ‘scientific’,
empirically-informed process informing the development of crime control policy in New
Zealand.

Evidence–based policy is perhaps best understood as simply a new technique that has
been added to the tool box utilised by the Policy Industry to define/control potentially
politically disruptive social issues in line with their understanding of the social context.
The rituals of deceit serve to ensure that any policy solutions are constructed in line
with that understanding and remain within the control of the policy sector to define
social problems and the solutions to them. Perhaps we might best understand this
deceit by taking a policy-as-discourse approach that “frames policy not as a response to
existing conditions and problems, but more as a discourse in which both problems and
solutions are created” (Bacchi, 2000: 48). In this schema, policy-making becomes a
process through which potentially damaging coordination issues (such as the gang
shooting in Wanganui) enable the Policy Industry to control the process of problem
definition and problem solving. However, the primary goal of the Policy Industry, at
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least in the criminal control sector, is not to solve social problems, but to reframe social
issues and policy in such a way that the power to define and respond remain in the
political sphere. By so doing, the Industry is able to mediate the degree to which crime
control agencies and present and former governments, do not become the focus of
critical analysis of the causes of significant social problems. If we understand the
actions of criminal justice officials in trying to retrofit the ethnic gang and youth
congregation issues onto the OCS in this light, then we might readily identify with
Edelman’s (1988: 16) definition of policy as “…. a set of shifting, diverse, and
contradictory responses to a spectrum of political interests”.

Conclusion
The Policy Industry and its activities are all about power and the power they have to
construct crime control policy can have a profound effect on our daily lives. When we
dovetail this fact with the notion that all this ‘power’ sits with a large group of unelected
individuals and the agencies they represent, then we have a duty to expose the
processes they use to develop policy, legislation and interventions.

Despite the

grandiose claims of the Industry regarding the Public Service Code of Conduct and their
adherence to the overarching principle of political neutrality, it is very much a
politically-motivated beast. This point may seem laboured, but it is an important one to
make when considering the connections between ritual and policy making. This is
because a large amount of the intellectual and rhetorical work that underpins the rituals
of the Industry is aimed at supporting the intertwined mythologies of political
neutrality, and the primacy of evidence-based policy; while all the time masking
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inherent power struggles between bureaucratic agencies over ever-decreasing
resources and its parasitic relationship to the political elite.

The case study used in this paper highlights the extent to which ritual forms a key
component of the policy-making process. It was selected to demonstrate the support
ritual provides to the key myths of New Zealand public service. I have also been
purposely critical (or ‘negative’, if you are a senior public servant), as this reflects my
experiences of the policy industry, and to counter the overly positive spin that
dominates agency publications, Cabinet papers and self-generated research.

Shaw

(2006) does have a point: the public service is not always the self-serving, manipulative
institution portrayed in Yes Minister. However, its use of ritual and myth-maintenance
to shore up its authority over policy-making problematises its oft-made claims of
political neutrality and the importance of evidence in creating meaningful policies and
interventions.
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The Waitangi Tribunal and the Regulation of Māori
Protest

Juan Marcellus Tauri
and
Robert Webb

(2012) New Zealand Sociology, 26, pp 21-41.

Introduction
Despite the political rhetoric of successive governments around partnership and a
commitment to the Treaty of Waitangi, Māori Treaty rights remain contested, as
represented in the contemporary moment in legislation such as the Foreshore and
Seabed Act 2004. In this context, it is useful to reflect on an important period of Crown
and Māori relations, a period that marked a shift in recognising longstanding Treaty
rights through the development of a specific forum for reviewing Māori Treaty
grievances - the Waitangi Tribunal. The paper examines the important formation
period of the Tribunal in the early 1970s to mid-1990s to illustrate two interrelated
points: firstly the Tribunal's formation poses a contradiction in that while it represented
the first meaningful examination of Crown breaches of Māori Treaty rights, it did so
utilising an ‘informal’ review process that initially lacked the authority to impose
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binding decisions; and secondly that during this period the Tribunal encouraged the
incorporation of Māori political and social activism into a government controlled forum.

The establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975
appeared to offer Māori a meaningful process for airing their Treaty grievances. Until
the Tribunal’s formation, Māori Treaty activism had been largely contained within the
formal court processes of the justice system and governmental processes which decade
upon decade denied recognition of Māori rights.

The paper focuses on two related questions: ‘why did the government develop the
Waitangi Tribunal at this juncture in State/Māori relations’, and ‘what function or
purpose did the Tribunal serve at this point in State/Māori relations’? We argue that
the processes and mechanisms of the Tribunal constituted a form of regulation resulting
from the shift from a Fordist to a Post-Fordist mode of capitalist accumulation in New
Zealand from the late 1970s. More precisely, the formation of the Waitangi Tribunal
and the first decade of its operation can be understood as a state-centred informal
justice forum that assisted the state in regulating the potential hegemonic impact of
Māori Treaty activism.

The authors set out to contest claims that the Tribunal and its processes are evidence
that the New Zealand state had sought to address Treaty grievances in a meaningful
way, by providing Māori with a forum where they could ‘tell their stories of
dispossession’ (Maaka and Fleras 2005; see later discussion on perspectives on the
development and role of the Tribunal).

In contrast, we argue that although the
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regulation of Māori protest and Treaty grievances from the inception of the Tribunal
may not have been as overt as those employed during the colonial context 29, regulation
existed nonetheless; albeit reconstituted to reflect the developing Post-Fordist
economic and regulatory environment. We use regulation theory as a theoretical and
conceptual framework to describe the underlying socio-political drivers behind the
development of the Tribunal at a particular point in State/Māori relations.

The decision to focus on the early period of the operations of the Tribunal (from 1975 to
the late 1980s) was influenced firstly, by the fact that the establishment of the Tribunal
signalled the first instance in which the state had organised a specific, institutionalised
response to Māori activism after a long period of disengagement from Māori and their
Treaty issues. Prior to the Tribunal the Government had considered the Treaty a
‘nullity’, and left it to the courts to mediate (and consistently) repudiate Māori claims.
And secondly, much of the material generated by academics and researchers on the
Tribunal has focused on claims-making and the way in which the Tribunal dealt with
claims and government responses to their deliberations. In comparison, our focus is on
the drivers behind the development of the Tribunal at a particular point in State-Māori
relations, which we believe is an under-theorised and researched area of the Tribunal’s
history and operations.

29

The colonial government legislated extensively in the nineteenth century to suppress Māori protests
against land sales. For example the Suppression of Rebellion Act 1863 allowed for the arrest of Māori
who were defined as rebels, generally defined as those who refused to sell, resulting in the
confiscation of their land (Ward, 1995).

243

The State’s Response to Māori Political Dissent
As the historical record shows, Māori have long contested the ways in which the Crown
and the New Zealand government have developed policies that directly impact on them
and their communities, particularly in relation to land confiscation and breaches of the
Treaty of Waitangi. As stated earlier, most of this activity had been dealt with through
the state-dominated justice system, as well as numerous petitions made by hapū and iwi
to government and the Crown. However, by the late 1960s, the form and nature of
Māori Treaty-related activity began to change (Morris, 2003; Ward, 1993). Spurred by
the ethnic reorganisation of other colonised indigenes and influenced by the Black civil
rights movement of the 1960s, Māori began to more actively express their discontent
with assimilationist state policies since the 1880s (Hill and Bonisch-Brednich, 2007:
166-167; Poata-Smith, 1996; 2004).

Thus, in 1970 the protest organisation, Ngā

Tamatoa (Young Warriors) began its career of confrontational politics against the New
Zealand state (Hazlehurst, 1993). In 1975 the then Labour Government was confronted
by the famous Hikoi (Great March) of numerous Māori from the far north to the steps of
Parliament in Wellington (Walker, 1987). And by the mid-1980s organised Māori
activist movements had emerged as a potent political force in challenging government’s
hegemony over State/Māori policy (Spoonley, 1989).

The impact of the rise of Māori protest activism on government policy, cannot be
overstated (see Poata-Smith, 1996; 2004). For example, Catalanic (2004) argues that
one of the key drivers behind the rise of Māori activism was the policy context that
predominated in New Zealand for much of the twentieth century, one based on
assimilating Māori into ‘mainstream society’.
244

To further this policy, government

actively denied Māori grievances by ignoring Treaty issues, while at the same time
upholding the Treaty of Waitangi as the founding document of the nation via the ‘joining
together as one, the Crown and Māori’. This continued, policy-driven denial of Treaty
justice was instrumental in the radicalisation of Māori Treaty politics. In relation to the
link between Māori activism and the development of the Tribunal, Catalanic (ibid: 11)
states that:

The policy assimilation that characterised New Zealand politics and society acted
as a constraint to the definition of Māori socio-economic problems as connected to
Crown injustices committed under the Treaty... [therefore]... the New Zealand
politico-institutional context... conditioned the way in which Māori sought to draw
attention to their problems – protest activism – that was eventually the most
successful factor in achieving the desired recognition.

The New Zealand state’s response to the hegemonic threat posed by the radicalisation
of Māori ethnic politics was swift.

From the mid-1970s the state’s policy and

administrative response moved from being openly assimilationist, to become imbued
with the rhetoric of Māori bicultural ideology (Tauri, 1998). Administrative responses
included attempts to increase public service responsiveness to Māori values, needs and
aspirations; a new distributive ideal based on the bicultural allocation of power and
resources; and acceptance of the Treaty of Waitangi as a policy blue print for reuniting
‘the founding partners of New Zealand’ (Sissons, 1990). However, arguably the most
substantive response to the counter-hegemonic activity of Māori was the Waitangi
Tribunal.
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The Waitangi Tribunal
The Waitangi Tribunal was established by the third Labour Government (1972-1975)
with the passing of the Treaty of Waitangi Act in 1975. At this point the Tribunal was
given the authority to inquire into and make recommendations to the Crown
(represented by the Government of the day) relating to Māori claims against
government actions that they believed contravened their rights under the Treaty of
Waitangi (Catalinac, 2004; Gibbs, 2006). The government’s intentions for the Tribunal
in terms of process and jurisdiction are summarised by Ward (1993: 185) who writes
that:

[I]n future, ‘any Māori’ or group of Māori who considered that they were
prejudicially affected by any act of the Crown or its agents, in breach of the
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, could bring a claim to a new tribunal, the
Waitangi Tribunal. The Tribunal would act as a commission of enquiry, with power
to summon witnesses, investigate widely and make recommendations (emphasis
ours).

However, despite the authority given to the Tribunal to investigate, initially the
jurisdiction of the new body was significantly constrained. According to Walker (2005),
in order to gain Government support for the Tribunal in the first instance, one of its
chief architects, the late Matiu Rata made a number of significant concessions at Cabinet
level relating to the powers of the proposed forum. For example, the legislation that
established the forum determined that after a hearing was held with Māori
complainants, the Tribunal was empowered to only make recommendations to
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Government on how it should respond. However, the Government was not bound by
the Tribunal’s recommendations and could ignore them at will (Sorrenson, 1995;
Stokes, 1993). The legislation also restricted the forum to considering claims emanating
from violations of the Treaty of Waitangi occurring after 1975 and purposely excluded
historical claims. These concessions meant that the vast majority of events considered
by Māori to represent significant breaches of the Treaty contract, sat outside the
jurisdiction developed for the new entity.

The restrictions in jurisdiction caused concern amongst some Māori commentators.
Ward (1993) relates that as a result few claims were brought before the Tribunal.
However, this situation changed with the advent of a ‘bi-cultural tribunal process’
instigated by Chief Justice Eddie Durie in the early 1980s, and the content of initial
reports that underlined the extensive scope and nature of Māori grievances, and Crown
breaches of Māori Treaty rights (see Waitangi Tribunal 1983; 1984). This, along with
what Ward (1993: 186) describes as New Zealand middle class desire to ‘confront the
historic sources of Māori grievance and to offer redress’, saw these jurisdictional
restrictions partially lifted with passing of the Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act 1985
by the then recently elected Labour Government.

The legislation extended the

Tribunal’s jurisdiction to enable it to consider Māori claims against violations that took
place after the signing of the Treaty in 1840 (Gibbs, 2006).

Despite significant constraints on the initial jurisdiction placed upon the Tribunal,
arguably little changed after the alterations provided for in the 1984 legislation, a range
of authors (e.g., Robinson, 2002; Ward, 1993) claim that the forum represented a
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significant change in the State’s response to Māori Treaty grievances. In summing up
this perspective, Catalanic (2004: 10) writes that ‘[i]t (the Tribunal) has been heralded
as marking the beginning of a post-colonial era in New Zealand, in which Māori-Pākehā
relations were being transformed from Pākehā dominance to negotiation towards
greater justice, equity and partnership’. While undoubtedly the Tribunal signalled a
change in formal Government process for dealing with Māori grievances, the
predominant perspective on the drivers behind its formation have a tendency to
overemphasise the notion that it represented a significant transformation in power
relations between the state and Māori (see for example, Maaka and Fleras, 2009). In
comparison, we argue that a critical analysis focused on the wider socio-political
context developing in New Zealand at the time, demonstrates that while the Tribunal
represented a unique response, the purpose and goals aligned with previous policy:
namely continued state control over Māori policy in light of changes in Māori grievance
politics (see Byrnes, 2004; Gibbs, 2006 for similar perspectives).

Key questions of the paper
As outlined earlier, this paper focuses on two inter-related questions: ‘why did the
government develop the Waitangi Tribunal at this juncture in State/Māori relations’,
and ‘what function or purpose did the Tribunal serve at this point in State/Māori
relations’? We argue that the answers lie in part in the wider changes in capitalist
development in New Zealand from a Fordist to a Post-Fordist regime of accumulation
that began in the mid-to-late 1970s and continued throughout the 1980s. In particular,
we contend that the formation of the Tribunal can be linked to the growing popularity
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of informal justice processes as one mechanism employed by the modern state to
regulate social discontent and political protest in Post-Fordist contexts.

Fordist to Post-Fordist Regimes of Accumulation and Regulation
Regulation theory is useful for anchoring our examination of the New Zealand state’s
response to the increasing radicalisation of Māori political dissent, as it provides a
framework to analyse the changes in the forms of regulation of populations and dissent
in capitalist economies (Tickell and Peck, 1995). Regulation theory attempts to explain,
through an analysis of capitalist development, the paradox between capitalism’s
inherent tendency towards instability and crisis and the constant drive to stabilise
around a set of institutions, norms and rules that support, or attempt to affect economic
and social stability (Amin, 1994).

Filion (2001: 86-87) identifies two concepts at the core of regulation theory. Regime of
accumulation describes the organisation of society that aid economic activity and
growth. Included in this domain of activity are the political institutions, culture and
systems of production. Mode of regulation refers to the nature of mechanisms that bring
society in line with the requirements of the sphere of production. Amin (1994: 8)
describes the mode of regulation as the ‘institutions and conventions which regulate
and reproduce a given accumulation regime through application across a wide range of
areas, including the law, state policy, political practices, industrial codes, governance
philosophies, rules of negotiation and bargaining, cultures of consumption and social
expectations’. These components of society can pattern behaviour in ways that support
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the prevailing regime of accumulation. They provide the social mores, beliefs and
behaviours that support capitalist accumulation (Painter and Goodwin, 1995).

Due to its contradictory and crisis-ridden tendencies, capital requires forms of
institutional regulation to supports its continued reproduction and legitimacy.
Successive phases of capitalist development can be characterised and analysed via the
combination of regimes of accumulation and regulation formed to support capital in
that particular epoch (Jessop, 1994). Each regime therefore has distinctive regulatory
characteristics and regulation theory attempts to explain transformations and
differences between phases, such as the movement from a Fordist regime to a PostFordist regime of accumulation that occurred in many western capitalist societies from
the immediate post-war period onwards30.

Fordism
The Fordist regime of accumulation is generally characterised by mass production and
mass consumption, based upon the assembly line production techniques introduced in
the United States at the turn of the twentieth century by Henry Ford (Lipietz, 1992). As
Wilkes (1993) notes, the concept of assembly line production brings with it notions of
universalism, uniformity, repetition and rationality. The regulatory forms commonly
ascribed to Fordism include the welfare state31; the role of trade unions in raising
consumption standards of working class and public servants; the media-inspired
30

See Amin (1994) and Jessop (1995) for discussions about different theoretical explanations on the
emergence of Post-Fordism.

31

Lipietz (1986a) writes that the Fordist mode of regulation in Western jurisdictions often included a
welfare system designed to ensure every wage earner a guaranteed income in times of economic
hardship, with social legislation covering minimum wage levels and collective agreements. This tends
to institutionalise the class struggle by meeting some of the needs of workers, whilst allowing
capitalist accumulation, including the cheap appropriation of labour, to continue.
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interest in mass consumption and the replacement of the extended family with the
nuclear model as the family formation of modern society (Falion, 2001). The Fordist
accumulatory epoch is generally considered to have lasted from the early 20th century
until the early 1980s depending on the particular jurisdiction, at which time the
supporting regulatory regimes began to lose their effectiveness.

Lipietz (1992)

contends that crisis developed within Fordism's supposed universal and rational
system as real wages continued to increase and the cost of fixed capital in relation to the
total work force also rose, resulting in the retraction of profit margins. This brought
forth a new accumulative and regulatory regime, Post-Fordism.

Post-Fordism
In contrast to the Fordist epoch, Post-Fordism is characterised by a reduced role in
society for trade unions; a sharper division in the working class between core and
peripheral workers; and a greater flexibility of work practices, characterised by
diversification, rather than universalism. The Post-Fordist mode of production has been
described as involving the commodification and privatisation of a range of collective
services that were previously organised by the Fordist state (Aglietta, 1979). The
market reforms of the 1980s to mid-1990s in New Zealand showed a decisive move
towards this type of capital organisation and accumulation, the privatisation of public
works a clear example of this process (Kelsey, 1993; 1997).

The move towards a Post-Fordist era of capital accumulation is accompanied by the
development of different modes of regulation.

As with modes of regulation

characteristic of previous forms of capital accumulation, they provide the means of
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institutionalising and confining class struggle and potential hegemonic crises within
state-controlled processes. These modes of regulation will be different from those
which characterise the containment and control of class and ethnic relations in the
Fordist era.

Despite the existence of the range of regulatory mechanisms listed above, crises of
capital within the Fordist era brought about the need for new and innovative forms of
regulation. The state’s response to the social disintegration inherent in the crises of
accumulation was to penetrate even more deeply into civil society in order to
restructure social relations into forms appropriate to the emergence of a new, PostFordist regime of accumulation. This statement is perhaps at odds with the common
portrayal of the Post-Fordist state as less regulatory and less involved in civil society
(see Bonefield and Hollaway, 1991). Arguably, this portrayal is overstated. The rise of
Post-Fordism did not see the state withdraw from its regulatory position, but instead
re-shape itself and seek to control the regulatory process in different, less obvious ways
than were constructed during the Fordist context. One less obvious form of state
regulatory control is the informal justice forum, of which the Waitangi Tribunal, during
its first decade or more of operation, greatly resembled.

Post-Fordist Regulation and the Rise of Informal Justice
Although the informal justice movement began initially during the latter part of the
Fordist epoch, it was during Post-Fordism that its products became key components of
the regulatory regime (Hofrichter, 1987).

This was due in part to the growing

obsolescence and ineffectiveness of Fordist state institutions and technologies of
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control that mediated class and social conflict during the earlier epoch (Santos, 1995).
These institutions, including the police, courts and child care and protection, while still
powerful and coercive, were no longer on their own successful in reproducing what
Spitzer (1982) calls politically docile populations.

Arguably, the rise of radical socio-political movements, such as feminism and
indigenous activism, represented forms of political expression that contested the
legitimacy of existing modes of justice, and therefore regulation, in the developing PostFordist context. These counter-hegemonic movements were not easily contained within
existing institutional processes designed to support a Fordist accumulatory regime, thus
prompting the development of alternative modes of regulation (Hofrichter, 1987). We
contend that informal justice became a key Post-Fordist regulatory response in the New
Zealand context, and that a primary example of this ‘new form’ of regulation was the
Waitangi Tribunal.

Informal justice forums operate within Post-Fordism as pacificatory mechanisms,
drawing potentially hegemonic activity into state-designed and dominated regimes.
The Tribunal, particularly the way it operated throughout much of the 1980s,
neutralised conflict that could threaten the state or capital accumulation by responding
to legitimate Māori grievances in ways that inhibited their transformation into serious
ideological or physical challenges to the authority of the state (Santos, 1982). Abel
(1982) notes that informal justice institutions of this kind are generally created and
controlled by the respondents, and rarely if ever by the grievant themselves.
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In order to neutralise conflict, informal mechanisms must be able to attract disputants
to their processes.

State-centred informal justice seeks to achieve this goal by

appearing to operate as a neutral arbiter between the claimants and the state. Inducing
complainants to submit voluntarily to an informal justice regime heightens the chances
of their accepting any decisions made and believing that ‘justice has been done’, despite
the fact that the process is often designed to limit the possibility of adverse decisions
being made against state interests. This has a neutralising effect on class conflict, by
denying class antagonisms and appealing to general standards of engagement that are
designed to promote capital affirming modes of social cohesion. As Selva and Bohm
(1987: 50) note:

[t]he residual is the legitimation of state intervention and the return to
uncontrolled political power, delegalising social relations by loosening power
from formal controls. Thus, under the banner of informalism and the rhetoric of
personal justice, state authority and political control has been partially obscured.

From this brief conceptual outline, it become possible to explain the emergence of the
Waitangi Tribunal during the rise of Post-Fordist phase of capital accumulation in the
New Zealand context and to illustrate how regulation of Māori grievances and claims
has changed in this transitional period. In the following section, the Waitangi Tribunal
is examined as a form of Post-Fordist regulation, to demonstrate how the informal
procedures it utilised throughout the 1980s, channelled, then neutralised, the
hegemonic potentialities of Māori Treaty activism.
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The Waitangi Tribunal as a Post-Fordist Regulatory Body

It could be argued that the Waitangi Tribunal is a belated attempt to extend the
hegemony of the rule of law over Māori, at a time when its legitimacy is most
directly under attack.
Jane Kelsey (1984)

Chris Wilkes (1993) suggests the Fordist period in New Zealand was broadly located in
the period 1935 to 1984, otherwise known as the ‘Long Boom’ (Nielson 1990: 81).
During the 1960s the long boom was also sustained by increasing productivity of labour
through mass production techniques and the rapid expansion of agricultural exports to
the world economy, while the local economy and the manufacturing sector were
protected through a range of state subsidies and tariffs (Roper, 1993). The Fordist
phase was brought into crises in the late 1960s and early 1970s due to a falling rate of
profit, rising foreign debt and the shifts in the global export markets away from New
Zealand produce (ibid).

In the move towards Post-Fordist accumulation and regulation in the 1980s, the Labour
government introduced free market policies, collectively referred to as ‘Rogernomics’,
which sought to restructure the New Zealand economy through privatisation of state
services and assets32. Ideologically driven by new right economic theory, the process
involved the reformation of government control over key assets into separate State
32

Rogernomics refers to the plethora of neo-liberal economic and social policies developed by Roger
Douglas and the Labour government from 1984-1990. Douglas, the Minister of Finance from 19841988, argued that social goals and political considerations should be excluded from economic policy.
Douglas and Labour sought to construct a highly deregulated economy in New Zealand, driven by
market forces (Kelsey, 1997).
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Owned Enterprises that were required to be profit focused. The enterprises could then
be privatised and subsequently offered for sale to the private sector. Resistance to
these policies came mainly from Māori, who saw the resources under the auspices of the
enterprises being further alienated to private control, leading to potential breaches of
their rights under the Treaty of Waitangi. Kelsey (1990: 1) offers an insight into this
effect on Māori articulation of Treaty grievances when she argues that:

The pace and scope of Rogernomics left a politically naive and economically
illiterate population stunned and apathetic. Significant resistance came from just
one quarter. Māori movements of the 1970s intensified throughout the 1980s as
Māori reasserted their rights under the Treaty of Waitangi to te tino
rangatiratanga, or complete authority over themselves and the country's key
resources of land, fisheries, waterways and minerals. With determination, and
sometimes desperation they challenged the government moves to vest in the
hands of private capital the resources guaranteed to te iwi Māori in the Treaty.

Māori concerns focused upon the fact that by privatising resources, the Government - as
the Crown’s representative - was potentially divesting itself of its Treaty responsibilities
and, as result, their Treaty rights. The interests of capital would be supported through
legislation, while Māori would remain economically and politically destitute, with little
or no resources to exercise sovereignty over (Kelsey, 1990). Rising Māori protests
challenged the legitimacy of the government’s activities in this sphere, and through
court action they were eventually able to curtail the Government’s ability to implement
the reforms (Kelsey, 1993). In order to allow capitalist accumulation to continue
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unimpeded, attempts were made to channel Māori activism into new forms of
regulation, the most obvious being the Tribunal.

In the Fordist period, regulation of Māori protests against Treaty breaches was
maintained firstly by a formal legal system that denied the validity of the Treaty, while
emphasising parliamentary sovereignty as the sole legitimate power in the country.
Secondly, a paternalistic welfare state provided rising living standards for both
European and Māori. While Māori did not have recognised Treaty rights, they had
access to education, health and housing support. However, by the mid-1970s, both the
legal and welfare systems were proving insufficient for regulating Māori Treaty
grievances and political activism. This situation necessitated the development of
alternative forms of regulation, which the state set about constructing throughout the
late 1970s and into the 1980s (Kelsey, 1990). It is possible to see that the decline of the
Fordist mode provided the conditions for the emergence of the Tribunal in 1975. The
Fordist state could not fully contain Māori concerns for Treaty rights through the formal
legal or parliamentary systems as it had done up to this point. As Wilkes (1993: 205)
argues ‘[d]emands for the revitalisation of the culture and language, and the return of
wrongly appropriated tribal land, now sought a real answer which the old settlements
could not produce’.

Kelsey (1993) contends that in the 1980s the state could respond to Māori Treaty
activism in two ways. It could use coercion, as had previous governments, with the
potential for increasing Māori sense of grievance and, therefore, conflict with the state.
Or it could choose the path of passive revolution, a term derived from Antonio Gramsci
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that denotes the ‘inclusion of new social groups under the hegemony of the political
order without the expansion of real political control by the mass of population over
politics’ (ibid: 234). The State chose the latter, inducing and encouraging aggrieved
Māori to seek the Tribunal as neutral arbiter between the conflicted parties. Through
the Tribunal the State temporarily brought the counter-hegemonic activities of Māori
within its ambit until the challenge was defused, through both real (in terms of limited
fiscal settlements), and rhetorical concessions (e.g., formal apologies) , and the promise
of meaningful ‘change’ in State-Māori relationships. By drawing Māori protests off the
street and national television and into the Waitangi Tribunal (see Gagne, 2009: 42), the
State was largely able to regulate actions that could have presented a barrier to the
developing Post-Fordist regime of accumulation.

We are not suggesting that the Tribunal was intentionally created as a regulatory body
from its inception. Earlier we argued that the Tribunal was created as a forum to hear
grievances, a necessary response by the state to the developing radicalisation of Māori
activism. Jessop (1991) contends that the emergence and subsequent dynamic of
structures of regulation might be endowed with a greater intentionality than is justified.
In the case of the Tribunal it would be an exaggeration to reduce its origin merely to the
formation of a mode of regulation in response to accumulation or ideological crises.
However, it is possible to view the emergence of the Tribunal as a Post-Fordist mode of
regulation as a non-intentional, but nonetheless focussed strategy, aimed at ensuring
state-controlled direction of an already emergent structure.

Regulation should be

viewed as a complex and provisional process mediated through institutions and
conducted by social forces. Given these points, the Waitangi Tribunal should be viewed
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as a state-formed regulatory body that assisted the state to institutionalise Māori dissent
and political activism as part of the Post-Fordist regulatory regime that began to emerge
and then expand in New Zealand throughout the 1980s.

For the Tribunal to institutionalise Māori protest and dissent, it had to be able to attract
Māori claimants to its processes. The Tribunal developed in ways that enabled it to
attract claimants by appearing to be more responsive to Māori grievances than the
formal court system. The ability of the Tribunal to attract claims enhanced as it
proactively moved from replicating the process of the formal justice system to the
‘informal’ formalism of marae protocol. The changes can be shown by contrasting the
reaction to the first hearing by the Tribunal and then subsequent hearings that were
altered to attract Māori claimants.

The first hearing of the Tribunal was in Auckland on the 30 May 1977. The claim was
made by a Mr Hawke relating to fishing rights of the Ngāti Whātua (Waitangi Tribunal,
1978). Williams (1989) writes that the Tribunal attempted to establish the atmosphere
of formal court proceedings, and also tried to narrow the claim to one of legal niceties.
Williams (1989) and Sharp (1997) also note the choice of location for the hearing, the
Ballroom of the Hotel Intercontinental, and the processes employed, were highly
inappropriate for the hearing. No attempt was made to use Māori customs and the
chairperson referred to it as a Magistrates Court (Catalinac, 2004). From this it is
possible to see that the Tribunal in the beginning had the formality and processes of the
formal justice system. However, as Sharp (1997: 77) writes ‘the Māori people for whose
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benefit it was primarily designed did not like its manner of proceeding according to
formal, legal, Pākehā practice’.

The response by claimants to the formality of Tribunal hearings and its restricted
jurisdiction was clearly shown by the small number of claims to go before the Tribunal
during the initial years of its operation. Just fourteen claims were lodged in the first
nine years of its existence to 1984. However, this changed as the processes and
operations of the Tribunal were altered, as shown in the Motonui claim. Lodged in
1982, the Te Atiawa tribe argued that the Motonui Synthetic Fuel project would pollute
their traditional fishing grounds (Waitangi Tribunal, 1989). Notably, the hearing was
held on a marae, without formal legal procedures, instead using marae protocol. Temm
(1990) notes that Pākehā legal formality did not seem appropriate on a marae, so it was
decided that marae kawa (protocols) would be adopted for each hearing. It was also
decided that legal formalities such as paper work would be kept to a minimum in order
to ensure the Tribunal worked in an orderly and efficient manner, but also, because it
was important that ‘the Waitangi Tribunal be in every sense a people’s court’ (Temm,
1990: 9). After this claim, hearings were held on home marae, replacing the appearance
of legal formalism.

In 1985, the amendment to the Treaty of Waitangi Act allowed retrospective claims
back to 1840, and increased the membership of the Tribunal to a Chairperson plus six
others, four of whom were to be Māori.

By using Māori custom, more fully

incorporating Māori in its processes, and eventually being able to examine historical
grievances, the Tribunal was able to present itself as a body able to address and resolve
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Māori claims in an ‘appropriate manner’. By the beginning of 1994, claims lodged with
the Tribunal had increased to 400 (Kneebone, 1994). Thus, in the period covering the
late 1970s to the late 1980s, the Tribunal arguably transformed itself from a formal
body of justice, to that of an informal justice forum that engaged with Māori on their
terms; at least as far as protocol was concerned.

The Tribunal was able to gain

acceptance from Māori by making decisions that not only recognised past injustices, but
also produced tangible, albeit unintended, results.

Abel (1982) writes that because the state presents itself as the only legitimate source of
legal authority, other processes, for example communitarian justice, require its support
to provide the necessary legitimacy for their survival. This was demonstrated in the
New Zealand context by the 1987 New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney General case.
The 1987 court decision gave the Tribunal’s interpretation in favour of Māori claimants
the orthodoxy of informed opinion.

Renwick (1993) argues that this had three

important effects upon Māori and the Tribunal. Firstly, the legitimacy of the Tribunal
for Māori was enhanced by the formal recognition of the validity of the forum’s
interpretations and deliberations. Secondly, it demonstrated that informalist processes
could find in favour of Māori interests, and that going to the Tribunal would not be a
waste of time or resources. Thirdly, arguably the decision was instrumental in changing
the character of Māori activism by moving protests from the street to the Tribunal
process, where many Māori began to believe that justice could now be achieved.
Renwick (1993: 11) underlines the counter-hegemonic potentialities of the Tribunal
when he contends that during this period in Tribunal history that “Māori advocacy…
moved beyond protest marches to hearings of the Waitangi Tribunal, the courts, the
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committee rooms of parliament and the offices of Ministers of the Crown... The process
has growing legitimacy in Māori minds”.

This development had a demonstrable effect on Māori protests during the late 1980s
and early 1990s. Protests that were previously loud and visible moved from being
confrontational to conciliatory (Sharp, 1997; see also Gagne, 2009: 42). As a result,
grievants (more commonly referred to by media and politicians as ‘radicals’) who did
not use the path offered by the Tribunal had their complaints labelled illegitimate.
Arguably then, a key outcome of the Tribunal process was State containment of Māori
radicalism and the incorporation of Māori political discourse. Kelsey (1992: 601)
underlines this argument when she wrote that:

…those who harbour grievances are persuaded to abandon radical measures, such
as boycotts or militant action, in favour of orderly and peaceful resolution under
the protection of informal state institutions.

The conflict is redefined, its

manifestation controlled within state-prescribed limits and the demands of the
grievants moderated... Continued resort to extra-legal tactics by other grievants
can be discredited by reference to those who have accepted the opportunity,
which the state has provided, to address their concerns responsibly [our
emphasis].

In effect, Māori were directed towards a state-sanctioned process which worked as an
informal justice body independent of the formal system. However, while the Tribunal
may have become the environment where the struggle over Māori claims was
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contained, ongoing regulation of socio-political discontent was never absolute. As
Jessop (1991: 73) writes ‘since there are no institutional guarantees that struggles will
always be contained within these forms and/or resolved in ways that reproduce these
forms, the stability of an accumulation regime or mode of regulation is always relative,
always partial, and always provisional’. So, while Māori gained from the Tribunal
process in terms of positive claims decisions and successful court actions to temporarily
halt government legislation, these successes were very much unintended consequences
of the Tribunals regulatory process and, more importantly for our argument, extremely
rare.

According to Merry (1992) state controlled informal justice institutions may provide
indigenous peoples such as Māori, an opportunity to push the boundaries of the
imposed regulatory ordering and mould them to better suit their needs. However,
despite the contestability of control over informal processes, in practice the state can
employ a number of tactics to maintain or regain control of the regulatory environment,
including reconstituted legislation; withdrawal of financial support and/or constructing
new processes and strategies that divert focus away from a domain that may threaten
state interests begin working in unintended ways. For example, in response to the
Tribunal recommending the return of 44 hectares of private land in the Te Roroa claim,
the Crown passed legislation in 1992 to prevent any further recommendations on the
return of private land, excepting only the 1988 State Enterprises Act in relation to State
Owned Enterprises.

One reason for this has been the pressure exerted by the

Government upon the Tribunal against employing their powers under this Act (Gibbs,
2006). This was demonstrated in March 1997, when the Tribunal touted the possibility
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of this section of the Act being used in relation to the Muriwhenua claim. The State’s
response was to threaten that such a mandatory ruling would result in the limited
settlement fund (set under the Fiscal Envelope, see discussion below) for all claims
collapsing, thereby leaving a significant number of claims unresolved. The Tribunal
quickly backed down, recommending only that the Crown should enter into direct
negotiations with the claimants (see, Barlow, 1997; Hubbard, 1997).

Given this example, it is possible to suggest that the Tribunal formed the initial basis of a
Post-Fordist regulation of Māori claims during the late 1970s, throughout most of
1980s. However, the lack of action by both the fourth Labour and the following National
Government in acting upon the Tribunal’s recommendations throughout this period,
resulted in rising dissatisfaction from Māori with the claims processes by the early
1990s (Kneebone, 1994). It is at this point that government policy was reformulated
into a claims resolution process based on direct negotiation with iwi. The first major
pan-tribal Treaty settlement extinguished Māori fishing rights in exchange for a limited
1989 settlement, and a share in fishing assets in the Sealords company in 1992, known
as the Sealords deal33. Iwi were then encouraged to compete for a limited land claims
settlement fund, labelled the Fiscal Envelope. Those iwi who chose to participate would
have their outstanding Treaty claims extinguished in exchange for a limited financial
settlement, while iwi that refused the envelope process were unlikely to receive
compensation.

The regulatory environment that had been initiated through the

Tribunal and dominated by it, was overtaken by the Fiscal Envelope process, and

33

Under the terms of this agreement, the government provided Māori with 150 million dollars towards
purchasing a half share in the Sealords company, with Brierley Investments as the joint venture
partner. By agreeing to this deal, Māori effectively signed away their commercial fishing rights as
guaranteed under the various articles of the Treaty of Waitangi (Webb, 1998).
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thereafter by the Government favouring the strategy of direct negotiation with iwi
claimants. This change in the regulatory environment signalled the beginning of the end
of the Tribunal as a significant process in the state’s regulation of Māori dissent, in
particular those associated with Treaty grievances34.

Conclusion
The emergence of the Waitangi Tribunal can be explained by the development of a PostFordist mode of regulation. The historical basis of Māori Treaty grievances emanated
largely from the alienation of land that occurred during the colonial context and
throughout the 20th century. Legislation supported this acquisition and throughout the
pre-Fordist and Fordist eras, the state was able to regulate Māori protests either by
ignoring them or channelling them towards formal, legal processes, where grievances
were less likely to interrupt the processes of capital accumulation.

The Tribunal emerged during a crumbling Fordist regime of accumulation and the rise
of Post-Fordism in the New Zealand context. The establishment of the Tribunal can be
understood as a consequence of the transition to the new mode of accumulation and the
concomitant need to ensure the continuation of a capital friendly social order. However,
the development of the Tribunal should not be viewed as the direct result of planning by
certain interest groups to regulate or control Māori claims. The analysis presented here
shows the non-intentional development of the Tribunal into a mode of informalist
34

Joseph (2000, p. 61) posits another possible explanation for the eventually sidelining of the Tribunal,
and for Government attempts to nullify its powers: ‘[t]he Tribunal’s work evolved in the midst of a
collision between two contradictory forces: on the one hand, a genuine political will to improve the
situation for Māori; on the other, a new commitment to neo-liberal economic policies that transformed
state structures and undermined the capacity to fulfil the promises generated by that political will’.
Arguably, the Tribunal’s willingness to even signal the possible use of its powers, thereby effecting
Crown control over resource allocation, was a potential stumbling block to the neo-liberal idea (see
also Kelsey, 1993).
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regulation, where strategic conduct by the State may have only been used to impose
coherence and direction on an already emergent structure.

The increased use of informal procedures by the Tribunal throughout the 1980s can
also be seen as a change in the mode of regulation from Fordist to Post-Fordist regimes,
where dissent is channelled into an institution that defines the limits of the justice that
can be dispensed. The less formal procedures developed by the Tribunal attracted
Māori claimants, which incorporated their activism within the state-controlled
apparatus. Thus, the Tribunal functioned as a Post-Fordist mode of regulation by
incorporating Māori grievances in ways that nullified their potential to threaten the
hegemonic legitimacy of the New Zealand state.

The final chapter in the role of the Waitangi Tribunal as a key component in the PostFordist regulation of Māori socio-political dissent is now playing out. Since the mid1990s, the position of the Tribunal in the regulatory hierarchy was supplanted by the
Fiscal Envelope (Robinson, 2002), with its cap on resourcing of Treaty claims, and more
contemporarily by the favour shown by all participants to the strategy of direct
negotiation. This is not to say the Tribunal is totally irrelevant, as it remains important
to some iwi and other Māori organisations for the role it plays in the preparation of
Treaty claims. However, its part in the process of regulation and control of Māori
activism has been usurped by the recognition by senior politicians of the ideological and
fiscal benefits to be had from taking direct control of State-iwi engagement.
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Introduction
This paper and the research it reports on, adds to the growing number of studies that
have explored various manifestations of Cohen’s (1972) conceptualisation of moral
panic as it relates to processes of marginalisation of specific populations and/or
communities (for example, Furedi, 1994; Goode and Nachman, 1994; Hall, Critcher,
Jefferson and Roberts, 1978; Hood, 2001; Marsh and Melville, 2011; Young, 2009). The
issue that prompted our involvement in research on this issue was a perceived spike in
youth gang violence in the Counties Manukau region (Great Auckland, New Zealand), a
community that subsequently became the focus of a moral panic related to its
supposedly ‘wayward youth’.
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The response to supposed youth gang crime in Counties Manukau can be framed as a
moral panic for three reasons. First, despite enormous media attention and claims to
the contrary, the research was unable to demonstrate the existence of an extensive
youth gang problem. This is an important consideration given the heightened panic that
ensued following media and politicians’ pronouncements of escalations in youth gangrelated crime. For instance, large public meetings were called by the Mayor of Counties
Manukau. In attendance were parents, church ministers, community stakeholders and
local and central government representatives. The highly emotive issue led to mothers
crying, fathers waving angry fists and church ministers proclaiming the need for stricter
parenting and an adherence to Biblical principles for child rearing. Next, despite the
inordinate amount of attention to the issue and dire predictions of ‘youth out of control’,
no additional government resources were set aside and directed at the issue. Rather,
the central government’s response occurred within existing budgets. Finally, the extent
of the issue was brought into question when the so-called youth gang crime wave in
Counties Manukau subsided as quickly as it appeared, as the following report by Police
attests:

During the period, Friday the 23 December 2005 to Monday the 9 January 2006
there were no incidents of youth gang violence or notable activity reported to or
dealt with by the Police in the Counties Manukau, Auckland City or North Shore
Waitakere Police Districts (New Zealand Police, 9 January 2006).
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Such a drastic decrease in visibility, crime and apprehension is contrary to the way in
which this type of ‘social issue’ evolves, at least from the view of those involved in
developing and enforcing crime control policy.

The paper is made of two parts in order to provide the authors’ with the opportunity to
discuss their personal involvement in the research and policy response to the youth
gang ‘issue’ that occurred in Counties Manukau.

The first voice (the researcher)

provides a contextual background to the study. Specifically, a variety of dynamics are
highlighted that added to the developing moral panic about youth gangs, silenced
community voices and participation in the development of policy responses while
furthering the authority of central government stakeholders. The second voice provides
a critique of the way in which policy officials responded to the primary researcher’s
work.

Voice of the researcher

Background
During Labour Weekend October 2005, Iulio Naea, a 38-year-old father of a reported
youth gang member was murdered in Otara, Counties Manukau35. Naea’s murder was

35

Manukau City is a local authority that consists of the Botany, Clevedon, Howick, Mangere, Otara,
Pakaranga, Papatoetoe and Manurewa Wards. Counties Manukau incorporates the three territorial
local authorities of Franklin, Manukau City and Papakura District Councils. Historically this area has
been known as South Auckland. Analysis of data has been complicated by how the areas within
Counties Manukau are configured by various agencies. For instance, the Counties Manukau Police
District includes the territorial authority areas of Manukau City, Papakura District, Franklin District
and the Auckland City suburban area of Otahuhu. Counties Manukau District Health Board area
provides health services to the people of Manukau City, Papakura and Franklin districts.
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thought to have been responsible for triggering a series of violence retaliations, and was
later categorised as the first youth gang-related homicides in the region (New Zealand
Forum, 2010).

Following the murder, the central government came under increasing pressure to
provide a solution to the burgeoning youth gang problem. Notably, substantial pressure
came from the Counties Manukau Mayor and the New Zealand Police. In response, the
Ministry of Social Development (MSD) was directed to undertake research into the issue
and coordinate an appropriate, inter-agency policy response. The research component
of the research resulted in one of the authors, Michael Roguski, being tasked to carry out
a four-month ethnographic study. The aims of the research project were to develop an
understanding of youth gangs in Counties Manukau, assess possible factors that have
contributed to the emergence of youth gangs, ascertain the extensiveness and impact of
youth gangs and identify elements and features of intervention models that could be
developed and successfully implemented in the region.

The research methodology was developed to ensure a strong adherence to community
participation and ownership of the data and subsequent research findings.

This

approach was thought necessary to secure community participation as respondents
were initially reluctant to engage with the research. A number of reasons were given,
but in the main participants felt their communities were over researched, especially by
the public service, and they were:
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Sick of sharing our experiences only for the government to ignore what we say and
do what they wanted to do all along.
Community participant

As the primary researcher I attempted to forge community participation through
promises of community hui (meetings) where residents and research participants
would be able to review the study’s findings and meet to discuss possible community
identified solutions.

Locating and defining youth gangs
The research evolved with an amorphous character. It proved exceedingly difficult to
marry the media, Cabinet Ministers’ and the New Zealand Police’s portrayal of an
apparent overriding presence of youth gangs in Counties Manukau with the situation as
it was reported by community-based participants. In this sense a discursive chasm was
evident. On one hand government representatives spoke of the existence of criminal
youth gangs while simultaneously stressing that all efforts would be made to quash the
problem. In contrast, community participants spoke of normalising the presenting
issues; stressing that these were young people and not gang members and pleading that
their community should not be judged and labelled as criminal:

Government people say we are socio-economically deprived. Do you realise how
insulting and frustrating that is when you live here and you know the community
and its beauty. All I see are rich social connections and a vibrant community that
is doing exceptionally well on very low incomes. Of course, what the government
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sees are a bunch of poor darkies. After all isn’t that what socio-economically
deprived really means?
Community participant

I attended a number of government meetings about the young gang issue and quickly
became aware that the research and the policy response resembled a particularly fast
moving locomotive that had lost the ability to apply its brakes. This was particularly
troublesome because Counties Manukau has long been marginalised by policy makers
and community members repeatedly stated their frustration at being misrepresented
by public servants, politicians and the media. Further, it was disturbing to note the
growing number of young people (referred to in the report as ‘wannabes’), who over a
three-week period proudly reported having formed some form of ‘gang’ membership
and adopted clothing styles and physical gestures in response to the elevated media
reporting. While I viewed wannabe gang membership as a reflection of normal and
expected adolescent grouping behaviour this development was concerning because
media attention appeared to elevate gang membership (with the possibility of criminal
activity) to an aspirational level. Given these concerns, it was extremely frustrating to
be confronted with governmental machinations that refused to divert attention from
the problem of youth gangs. A combination of media attention and the government’s
public commitment to action meant that the public service needed to be seen to address
the issue, even if the problem did not exist as it was framed by media and politicians.
The following extract from my fieldwork diary outlines some of my confusion with the
way the issues were being manipulated by officials:

272

Each of the Ministries met today to discuss the youth gang problem.

I gave a

presentation on emerging research findings that focused on how difficult it is to define
the problem and the shifting sands of prevalence and criminality. Specifically I raised
the issue it may be a misnomer to categorise the issue as youth gang and that there is a
risk that by using such terms we may exacerbate the issue. After the presentation I was
met with blank stares. No one commented. We then had a 15-minute break so X and Y
and I went outside for a smoke. It was over the cigarette that X and Y agreed that it is
obviously not a youth gang problem and they qualified this by outlining that they live
and work in each of the communities in question and therefore were sufficiently
informed. We then discussed the need to be careful of the terms we used and then went
back upstairs to continue with the meeting. Within five minutes both of my ‘informed’
smoking buddies had referred to ‘youth gangs’ and started talking about how terrible
the problem is (Researcher’s fieldwork diary, January 2006).

Maintaining the Status Quo of Marginalisation
At the heart of the amorphous nature of the moral panic was the divide between the
voices of government and those of the community, with the government perspective
eclipsing the experiences and needs of people living in the region. To understand why
government would marginalise the community in this way, we need to understand
more about the people who live there. We argue that the community’s historically
marginalised status provided a fertile ground for the government’s position on youth
gangs to hold centre stage while local voices and experiences were relegated to the
margins.
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The area’s marginalised status can be linked to the post World War II economy that
created a significant demand for unskilled labourers. This demand was met by Māori
who moved in increasing numbers to the cities in search of work where they were
generally employed in low-paid manual occupations36, and supplemented in the mid1950s onwards by substantial increases in migration of unskilled labourers from a
variety of Pacific nations37. The new migrants, both Māori and Pacifica, overwhelming
settled in a small number of Greater Auckland suburbs – initially Grey Lynn and
Ponsonby and then Counties Manukau38. The migrant districts were characterised by
substandard housing and crowded tenancy which contributed to negative social effects,
becoming visible by the early 1970s.

Key to the ability of policy workers and media to further the marginalisation of the
communities of Counties Manukau is a prevalent public perception that the area has
high rates of crime. In actuality, an analysis of crime data (aggregated by age) provided
no evidence of higher rates of criminal activity in Counties Manukau when compared
with national rates. For instance, Figure 1 below shows that in the year ending June
2005, Counties Manukau ranked fifth out of 12 Police districts with regard to recorded
36

The ratio of Māori living in cities and boroughs grew from 17% in 1945 to 44% in 1966, growing from
99,000 in 1945 to over 200,000 in 1966 (Thorns and Sedgwick, 1997) 36. Migration continued so that
by the 1990s almost 60% of Māori lived in urban areas.

37

As a result, whereas in 1945 fewer than 2,000 Pacifica lived in New Zealand, by 1956 the number had
grown to over 8,000 and by 1966 it was over 26,000 (Thorns and Sedgwick, 1997).

38

The two most striking demographic features of the Counties Manukau area are a young age structure
and a high proportion of Māori and Pacific people. The latter feature underlies the former as Māori
and Pacific ethnic groups have a younger age structure than European/Pākehā. Counties Manukau has
a young population with 39% of people under 23 years compared with 34% of the total New Zealand
population. In Counties Manukau 22.5% of the population were estimated to be aged 10-to-23 years
at June 2005. This compared with a national figure of 20.7%. Counties Manukau has a relatively high
proportion of children aged under 10 years (estimated to be 16.7%) compared with nationally
(14.3%).
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crime and had one of the lowest rates (along with Canterbury and North ShoreWaitakere) of Police apprehensions and resolved crime39 compared with other districts.

Figure 1: Crime Statistics for 12 Police Districts. Year Ended June 2005
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A second factor that advanced the moral panic over youth gang crime was a heightened
international awareness of youth violence and vandalism associated with French civil
unrest that occurred between October 27 2005 and January 4 2006. During that period
riots had spread through Paris and a number of other French cities, concentrated in
39

Recorded crime is defined as all reports of incidents, whether from victims, witnesses, third parties or
discovered by Police, and whether crime-related or not, will result in the registration of an incident
report by Police. The incident is recorded as an offence if a) the circumstances as reported amount to
a crime defined by law, b) there is no credible evidence to the contrary, c) an incident was not
reported as an offence, but upon investigation Police determine that an offence is likely to have been
committed. Resolved crime is defined as recorded crime for which an offender or offenders have been
identified and dealt with. Apprehensions are defined by a person having been identified by Police as
the offender and, where appropriate, dealt with in some manner, such as warned, prosecuted, referred
to youth justice family group conference and/or diverted.
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lower socio-economic areas with high percentage of immigrant and/or non-white
populations. So strong was concern arising from the riots and the possibility of unrest
spreading to New Zealand that media reported the Prime Minister as having:

. . . watched the television coverage of the riots spreading throughout the suburbs
of French cities and saw it as a result of “the frustration and despair of
marginalised communities with high levels of unemployment and deprivation”
(Toli, 2005).

Further evidence that gang-related issues were foremost in the public psyche is
reflected in reports that Wellington hospital’s neurosurgery ward was under lock-down
because of fear of inter-gang violence (Dominion Post, 2005a). Further, fear was raised
about the incidence of gang-constructed traps and cyanide poisoning surrounding
marijuana plots (Dominion Post, 2005b).

Associated with a growing fear of youth gangs was a fear of New Zealand’s cultural
decline as influenced by the United States-derived hip hop and gangster rap culture and
media associations of this form of music with criminality. These fears arose in media
reports and in the various public meetings called by the Mayor of Counties Manukau40
during which hip hop music, culture and artistic expression were considered highly
influential in youth gang membership and activity.

40

Concerns about linkages between music, youth culture and crime have arisen at various times in New
Zealand over the past sixty years. The concerns expressed by officials and media about the
‘immorality’ of rap and hip hop closely mirroring the cries of immorality associated with post-war
Bodgies and the Widgies (see Manning, 1958; Levett 1959 and Green, 1959).
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Finally, the construction of a growing youth gang problem in New Zealand was
reinforced by continuous media representations of gang criminality and growing
membership (with much of the reporting going uncontested or challenged). Within
these media portrayals gangs were associated with firearms (Radio New Zealand
Newswire, 2006b), drugs (Dominion Post, 2005b; Radio New Zealand Newswire, 2006d;
New Zealand Herald, 2006a), graffiti (New Zealand Herald, 2006b) and violence
(Cummings, 2005; New Zealand Herald, 2006b; Timaru Herald, 2006; Radio New
Zealand Newswire, 2006f). Further, within a three month period what was a problem in
one geographical location had grown to encompass other areas within New Zealand.
Suddenly gang problems had erupted in Whangarei (New Zealand Press Association,
2005), Whanganui (Radio New Zealand Newswire, 2006f), Timaru (The Timaru Herald,
2006a and 2006b) and Palmerston North (Cummings, 2005). So common were reports
about youth gang activity that it could be argued that public safety justified the
government’s response.

While these factors created an environment in which the youth gang moral panic
flourished it is noteworthy that government representatives actively silenced
alternative perspectives by accusing communities of apathy. For instance, in February
2006 a representative from the New Zealand Police criticised the Counties Manukau
community for its high levels of apathy about youth violent crime (Radio New Zealand
Newswire, 2006a). In this situation, because the community was not perceived to have
sufficiently rallied against youth gangs then the community needed to be chastised.
Similarly, blame was laid across a variety of local bodies who were accused on
minimising the youth gang problem. For instance, The Police Association’s President,
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Greg O’Connor stated that “. . . many local authorities don’t believe they have a gang
problem because they don’t see active violence on their streets (Radio New Zealand
Newswire, 2006c).

We argue that the communities needed to be silenced because of Police agitation for
increased resources and the public relations opportunities the youth gang crisis
presented to that particular agency, and also to ‘tough on crime’ politicians, members of
the public service and the media.

Throughout the youth gang research multiple

attempts to increase Police resources were made by representatives of the New Zealand
Police and local government (Radio New Zealand Newswire, 2006c) and to increase the
amount of Police discretionary power to be able to appropriately and expeditiously deal
with the burgeoning problem. Similarly, in his first public address on the issue the
Mayor of Counties Manukau, Sir Barry Curtis, stressed that there was a need for more
youth workers (New Zealand Herald, 2005). As such, multiple examples were offered
where youth gangs were used to underscore the need for increased resourcing of
various institutions.

Aside from accusations and blame directed at the various Counties Manukau
communities, government agencies made no effort to control the panic through the use
of appropriate terminology. Instead, emotive terms were employed and, despite the
research providing evidence to the contrary, government representatives continued to
use youth gang and gang/crime-related rhetoric when discussing the issue amongst
themselves and with media. In this sense, it can be argued that the potential for
material gain for government agencies was instrumental in the consistent use of
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inappropriate terminology to characterise the situation, and silence the community
perspective.

A final means of silencing occurred in the latter stages of the research. Earlier promises
of community meetings to address the research’s findings and provide an opportunity
for public participation in jointly arriving at solution(s) were retracted without apology.
As such, the community was once again treated in an unethical manner by public
servants (see Tauri, 2009).

Further, those who had decided to participate in the

research because of the promise of future participation in the policy response had their
distrust of government affirmed. Poor community engagement practice was so rife that
I was chastised for having distributed copies of the draft research for peer review as
“we can’t trust them [community representatives] not to give it to the media”
(Government official).

Sadly, the emergence of a youth gang problem in Counties Manukau provided central
and local government with resourcing and public relations opportunities. As such, the
depth or extent of the youth gang issue was irrelevant as pervasive media attention
provided government officials with an opportunity to agitate for more resources, or
affirm already existing work programmes and funding allocations. The opportunity
afforded the Police by this project, to potentially increase resources, and for central
agencies to protect current spend and projects and the potential for improved public
relations meant that strategies had to be employed to silence opposing voices and
perspectives. We argue that these factors, when combined, acted to maintain the
political and policy status quo to the detriment of a historically marginalised
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community; as maintaining the status quo required the communities in question to be
publically constructed as deprived, apathetic and fostering criminality.

Juan’s story

Reflections on the Politics of Gang Research in New Zealand

Sir Humphrey: The public doesn't know anything about wasting government
money. We are the experts.
Yes Minister - The Economy Drive.

The following section is written primarily from the perspective of the official given the
task of ‘minding’ the primary researcher, Dr Michael Roguski, as he proceeded with
analysing the data he gathered in the field.

Background on my role in Michael’s project
At the time Michael was carrying out field work on the ‘youth gang situation’ in South
Auckland, I was employed as a Regional Policy Advisor in the same agency, the Ministry
of Social Development (MSD).

It was not long after Michael had returned from

fieldwork that I was contacted by a senior advisor in the agency who expressed
concerns about the research (especially the analysis) and its implications; intimated
that the primary researcher had little idea of what they were doing and asked if I would
provide ‘quality assurance’ as the analysis and finding stage progressed. At this point
the official who sought my involvement hinted at ‘broad’ issues with the researcher’s
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work, without qualifying their concerns. I readily agreed to assist but made it clear I
would base my observations on a thorough reading of the research material and
engagement with the primary researcher.

After reviewing the documentation produced to this point I concluded that the
researcher’s work was methodologically sound and his analysis and representation of
data accurate. In fact, some of the analysis was highly innovative and, in the context of
previous research on the New Zealand context, ground breaking. For example, he
determined that the police, media and political representation of the ‘youth gang
problem’ in Counties Manukau was greatly exaggerated, and that the political elite and
policy industry had overreacted to wildly exaggerated and inaccurate media reports41.
This finding was made more auspicious (and worrying, at least from a community level)
by the fact that police had to acknowledge that their ‘data’ on youth gang membership
was highly inaccurate, and that violent crime could not be attributed to ‘gang members’
to the degree that they and media representatives were claiming. Other significant
findings included that community members believed that imported government
programmes/interventions were failing due to their unsuitability for those
communities; that communities preferred to be empowered to develop their own
solutions to social issues (such as youth crime and gangs); and that militaristic policing
‘styles’ had contributed to poor police/community relations. There are many other
significant findings from the research, too many to list here, but the ones mentioned

41

However, it should be noted the media is not entirely at fault in this regard as much of what they
reported on the youth gang and crime situation in South Auckland was fuelled in part by exaggerated
comments on youth gang crime by policy workers.
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here provide clues as to why Michael’s work meet with so much resistance at the local,
policy and interagency levels of government.

Policy workers’ issues with the research and subsequent analysis had little to do with
the quality of Michael’s work. Michael’s sin had been to subvert a number of unwritten
conventions that govern policy making in the social and crime control sectors of New
Zealand’s public service, including (but by no means exclusively):


try not to ask questions that enable community members to talk about their
experiences of government policy or interventions (unless the questions focus on
the positive or the answers can easily be presented as such);



never ask people of their experiences of other agencies policies or interventions,
as this may cause ‘relationship’ difficulties prior to or post-release of the findings
(although, if the findings are adverse they are likely to be a) altered, or b) not
released); and



all research and /or evaluation is to be about the institution and not the
community.

So what was the reaction to Roguski’s research, and more particularly his analysis and
findings? These can be grouped into the various levels of bureaucracy the work past
through on the way to becoming ‘policy’, namely the unit, policy and interagency levels:

The Unit level -‘strategies of resistance’ employed within the research unit of MSD
included asking me to provide ‘quality control’ over Michael’s researchers analysis and
reporting, frequent requests for drafts of various chapters, most of which went without
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comment. This resulted in the primary researcher having to continuously backtrack on
various chapters which significantly slowed his progress. This ‘strategy’ can be blamed
in part on the lack of sector knowledge and expertise of the senior managers involved,
but also the fact they were continuously measuring the likely impact of the analysis and
findings on internal, agency relationships, especially with policy workers.

The Policy and Interagency levels - if resistance at the unit level was motivated by a
concern for political relationships with internal units, then at the policy level it was
about maintaining control of the policy parameters and the political relationships of the
agency to other agencies and ultimately to Cabinet. At times the policy response to
Roguski’s research bordered on the farcical. For example, too often the researcher
would send material out as completed (based on the assumption that no response =
agreement to content), only for policy workers to insist their input had not been sought
and/or received, despite email evidence to the contrary.

Furthermore, part way

through the analysis and reporting phase, policy representatives had organised an
interagency committee that included most of the key social policy and crime control
players, including, Police, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education and the Ministry of
Youth Development. This group had been working on a ‘plan of action’ (the Plan) to
respond to the core issues, except the plan that was eventually released bore little
resemblance to a) the key issues identified by the research and b) the solutions
identified by the community itself, as well as ignoring participants’ criticisms of the
prevailing policy and intervention paradigm currently being employed by the Policy
Industry in their region (see further discussion below).

283

Our suspicions that a policy response was being developed without the support of
research evidence was confirmed after a senior policy manager enquired of me as to the
status of the research was going. On being told we were about half way through she
replied:

‘Oh we can’t wait for the research, we have already decided on the policy levers’.

This statement was confirmed when the Plan42 was finalised and released.

The Plan
The Plan provides an exemplar of a number of policy-making pitfalls in the New Zealand
context. First of all is the issue of retrofitting of research on to pre-determined policy
outcomes was a significant feature of the interagency development of The Plan (see
Tauri, 2009 for a discussion of this process in the crime control sector). To say that
Roguski’s research was retrofitted on to the final policy response is no exaggeration as
the evidence is overwhelming. In this instance Policy and the inter-agency process
simply took Michael’s research and glued the ‘acceptable’ elements of his work on to a
policy response that further marginalised the community. For example, the version of
the Plan released to the public is missing two important chapters written by Michael, 1)
analysis of the participants ‘issues’ with current policies and government initiatives and

42

Known as The Plan Action: Improving Outcomes For Young People In Counties Manukau, 2007: available
on the Ministry of Social Development website.

284

2) the issues the community believes are important and how best to respond to them,
namely through community empowerment43.

Explaining the Community-Research-Policy-Intervention Disconnect
To understand the disconnect between Michael’s research, the views of participants,
and the actions of policy workers, we have to recognise:


the political nature of policy development and research in the New Zealand public
service’s social policy sector (especially in relation to youth or adult gang-related
issues); and



that the public service in New Zealand uses ritual to ensure it maintains authority
over the policy process.

The Plan and the politics of youth gang policy
As Tauri has discussed elsewhere (2009), New Zealand’s policy industry considers itself
to be working in an ‘evidence-based [policy] environment’ (EBP) (see Bullock et al,
2001; Cook, 2001 and Davies, 1999). This belief is supported by a survey of a range of
documents produced by the industry including Statements of Intent, Briefings to
Incoming Ministers44, annual reports and high-level portfolio-specific strategies where
much is made of the evidence-based nature of policy and decision-making by that
particular agency. The purpose of these instruments is to enhance the impression that:
43

The extent to which senior policy officials in the Ministry were divorced from the social context has
driven home to the researcher when he was asked to explain a) what he meant by a ‘community
action’ approach and b) why he used it in his research, and after he had done so was informed by said
official that ‘government does not do that, it does government action’.

44

Known in Industry parlance as ‘BIM’s’, these documents are generally provide a high level overview of
an agency’s core business and provided to incoming Ministers immediately after a general election or
if a sitting Minister is replaced at any time during the electoral cycle.
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The advice and decisions of policy makers are based upon the best available
evidence from a wide range of sources; all key stakeholders are involved at an
early stage and throughout the policy’s development. All relevant evidence,
including that from specialists, is available in an accessible and meaningful form to
policy makers (Great Britain’s Centre for Management and Policy Studies, cited in
Reid, 2003: 6).

The response to Michael’s research and my observations of the research/policy
intersection demonstrate that the policy industry in New Zealand’s adherence to the
principles of EBP is often driven more by political considerations than with ensuring
quality outcomes in the ‘real world’ (see Packwood, 2002; Parsons, 2002 and Perri 6,
2002 for a discussion of this issue in other jurisdictions). That policy making concerns
itself with ‘politics’ should come as no surprise if we view the process less as an
‘objective, scientific, rationale endeavour’, and more in line with Edelman’s (1988: 16)
description of it as “…. a set of shifting, diverse, and contradictory responses to a
spectrum of political interests” that take place in a social context Schon (1979; 1983)
describes as ‘messy and unpredictable’. To understand the policy response to Michael’s
work we first need to suspend belief in the dominance of a ‘rational EBP environment’
and acknowledge policy development for what it is: an ideologically driven, political
process that serves the interests and concerns of policy-making institutions, the
political elite and the careers of individual policy workers (see Tauri, 2009), and not, as
the senior policy manager mentioned earlier told Michael, to enhance community
empowerment.
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The policy process as an exercise in ritual and myth-maintenance
Understanding the policy response to Michael’s research can be illuminated if we
consider the importance of ritual and myth-making/maintenance to the public service.
Alvesson and Billing (1997) describe three basic formulations through which corporate
culture is expressed and reproduced, i) through artefacts - physical objects like
furniture, logos, and dress that convey meaning within an organisation; ii) through
metaphors – “culturally rich verbal expressions” (1997: 125), or verbal symbols,
creating “vocabularies to facilitate and guide interpretations” (ibid: 125) of what is
going on in an organisation, and lastly, through rituals. In this schema rituals are
activities that occur within and between corporate operators, corporations or
institutions and ‘outsiders’ that include certain repetitive patterns which contain
symbolic and expressive elements that confirm existing (or newly constituted) power
relations, institutional values and attitudes.

Suk-Young (2009: 3) describes how

ritual(s) serve an important function in organisational activity because of the part it can
play in enabling officials to overcome “coordination problems” (2009: 3), such as
external scrutiny of the policy making process or decisions about resource allocation.
Rituals also function to ensure that individuals and agencies represent themselves, to
each other and the public, as demonstrating (through actions and rhetoric) the core
ethics, principles and goals that drive organisational activity.

Therefore, myth-

maintenance (supported by ritual) is particularly helpful to organisations, including the
public service, for controlling internal coordination problems (i.e., competition within
and between agencies for finite resources) and external one’s (i.e., nullifying the
potentially politically damaging impact of independent, public scrutiny) “because
myths, by their very nature, disguise and manage the emotional impact of the stories
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they tell” (ibid: 5), and often play a useful role in hiding the ‘real story’ behind the intent
and likely impact of specific policies.

The rituals that form the basis of much of the policy industry’s activity can be grouped
into identifiable formations that are linked to shoring up myths that sustain the
authority of policy makers. These groupings include:

rituals of deceit - refers to activities such as carrying out research or a literature
review that involves purposely ignoring evidence, research, etc, that contradicts
the pre-determined political/policy platform of an agency or Ministerial directive;

rituals of inactivity - are employed by agencies facing highly charged, political
issues and can include such activities as establishing unnecessarily large
interagency committees, overly complicated work programmes, etc, aimed at
slowing down political/public scrutiny of previous and current agency (in)activity;
and

rituals of deception - commonly used by criminal justice officials who need to
retrofit research or policy to a social issue for which it is unsuited, or to a predetermined policy work-stream (see Tauri, 2011c).

Many of the rituals highlighted were brought into play by policy workers when it
became apparent that Michael’s research posed a potential ‘coordination problem’,
namely a) a potential loss of ‘control’ over problem definition, b) the possibility of
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publication of community criticism of previous policy responses and c) having to engage
with participants over the identification of solutions. The rituals of deceit are apparent
in policy representatives having organised the inter-agency work programme without
the research input and ignoring key findings of the research that contradict the preestablished policy position of various agencies. Even more apparent was the blatant use
of rituals of deception by officials, highlighted in the policy implementation phase where
Roguski’s research was clipped and retrofitted onto the Plan. Potentially annoying
sections were ignored; those sections that demonstrated the ‘youth gang’ crime wave
was little more than a media/politician and police induced moral panic, and
demonstrated that the community thought little of government’s tendency to hoist upon
it imported programmes ill-suited to the social context they lived in. And of course
there was the section that gave voice to participant’s desires for their communities to be
empowered to find solutions to their issues. What they got instead, was business as
usual, in the form of a reallocation of existing funding to pre-established programmes
for which agencies could offer little evidence of socio-cultural viability, or positive
outcomes.
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PART IV

Discussion
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Introduction
The following section provides an overview of the main arguments and key findings
presented in the eight papers that make up the thesis. It also demonstrates how the
disparate arguments and foci of the papers combine to offer a critique of the ways – the
colonial projects - through which the settler-colonial state, in particular its crime
control functionaries, and the discipline of criminology, interact to subjugate Indigenous
peoples.

Whether it emanates from the criminal justice sectors of settler-colonial governments
or the discipline of criminology, much of the literature and rhetoric about the wicked
problems of Indigenous over-representation in the criminal justice system and our
aspirations for self-determination and resistance to the imposed justice ordering, has
either silenced or marginalised the Indigenous experience. As this thesis is being
written significant effort is being made by Indigenous scholars and our critical, nonIndigenous colleagues, to expose Indigenous experiences of settler-colonial crime
control. This activity includes the recent publication of a special edition on Indigenous
counter-colonial perspective in the African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies,
the development of an Indigenous justice journal through the University of Wollongong
that will commence publication in 2016, and the expected launch in 2017 of an
International Indigenous Justice Congress designed to provide intellectual, financial and
peer support to Indigenous justice academics and students. This thesis should be
viewed as a minor contribution to this emerging, globalised movement in critical
Indigenous justice scholarship.

291

What the movement will eventually be named is an issue for debate amongst its
growing number of adherents. Given the material included in this thesis it would be
imprudent to presume that it will be called Indigenous Criminology. The reason is
straight forward: any focus on the criminal justice system by the Indigenous academy
will involve significant critical analysis of the discipline of criminology and its impact on
Indigenous peoples.

After all, as Biko Agozino (2010) has succinctly argued, the

discipline is a control freak. As Paper 2 demonstrated, the discipline has not always
been particularly supportive of Indigenous peoples and their justice issues. Indeed, it
has provided the settler-colonial state with many of the nefarious policies and strategies
that have resulted in the perpetuation of colonial violence against Indigenous peoples;
the 3-strikes legislation and sentencing structure introduced into Australia’s Northern
Territory in the 2000s providing a powerful, contemporary example.

With this in mind, the thesis sought to answer to the following broad questions:
1.

What techniques of neutralisation and control are employed by the policy sector in
its attempts to deal with the wicked problems of Indigenous over-representation
and resistance?

2.

What part does criminology/the academy play, if any, in the criminal justice
industry’s war of manoeuvre against Indigenous self-determination in the realm of
justice?

3.

How has the settler-colonial state responded to Indigenous challenges to, and
resistance of, its hegemony over justice?

4.

What effect, if any, is the expansion of a globalised crime control market having on
indigenous peoples in neo-colonial jurisdictions?
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Together, the eight papers offer some significant and original statements about the
Indigenous experiences of criminal justice as it is practised in settler-colonial societies,
and of the activities of criminologist, and justice entrepreneurs. This section discusses
how the papers link together, and how, as a body of work, they fulfil the overall aims of
the research as expressed in the key questions.

Linking the Papers to the Key Questions
The following discussion sets out to demonstrate how individually, or collectively, the
eight papers enable us to answer the questions that formed the focus of the thesis:

1.

What techniques of neutralisation and control are employed by the policy sector in
its attempts to deal with the wicked problems of Indigenous over-representation and
resistance?

The research and papers that structured the thesis identified a range of techniques and
strategies deployed by the policy sector in response to the wicked problems of the
Indigenous over-representation, and resistance to the state’s hegemony over responses
to Indigenous crime and Indigenous political activism. Deployed at various levels of the
web of social control that includes criminal justice institutions, are a range of colonial
projects that simultaneously control Indigenous resistance, and enable a government to
be seen to respond to these wicked problems. As identified in Paper 1 (Criminal Justice
as a Colonial Project in Contemporary Settler-Colonialism) criminal justice deploys
projects across what Woolford (2013) described as the interconnected web of
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governance; from the meso-level deployment of strategically targeted (over) policing, to
the micro-level development of Indigenous-focused policies and interventions
developed without Indigenous input described in Papers 2 (Indigenous Critique of
Authoritarian Criminology) and 3 (A Critical Appraisal of Responses to Māori
Offending).

Papers 6 (Ritual and the Social Dynamics of Policy Development in New Zealand) and 8
(The Politics of Gang Research in New Zealand) provide case study-informed analysis of
the micro-strategies of neutralisation and control deployed by the policy sector. Paper
6 demonstrates the importance of myth and ritual to the policy making process. Whilst
these strategies can, and often are deployed against communities other than Indigenous
peoples, they are particularly potent in their impact on these communities from their
ability to silence the ‘other voice’, and shore up the policy sector’s (and as a result,
government) ability to control both the definition of a social problem, and development
of political responses to these issues.

It can be strongly argued that mythologies were extremely powerful colonial projects
deployed to subjugate Indigenous peoples during the colonial eras of all four settlercolonial jurisdictions (Papers 2 and 3). The mythologies related to ideological policy
positions of the inherent superiority of western coloniser and their culture(s) over that
of Indigenous peoples were essential to the development of a number of damaging
policies, including child removals, the banning of Indigenous cultural practices and
technique of knowledge transmission, amongst many others. These mythologies and
attendant rituals of disempowerment (as described in detail in Paper 6) were vital to
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the establishment of the settler-colonial states control over the policy sector, and the
involvement of ‘problem populations’, such as Indigenous peoples, in that process. In
the contemporary context, ritual and myth, as techniques of subjugation have particular
resonance for Indigenous peoples. As described in Papers 6 and 8, issues of significant
importance for Māori communities, such as youth justice and gang activity, are both
heavily impacted by the rituals of deceit, which in turn support the myths of the
primacy of evidence and a public-focused policy sector.

2.

What part does criminology/the academy play, if any, in the criminal justice
industry’s ‘war of manoeuvre’ against Indigenous self-determination in the realm of
justice?

A significant focus of a number of the papers contained in the thesis was the issue of the
role of the discipline of criminology, and the wider academy in supporting the criminal
justice sectors endeavours to control the realm of justice. The entirety of Papers 2 and 3
focused on this issue, and concluded that a particularly virulent form of contemporary
criminology had arisen in Australasia of late, that brought with it a reinvigoration of
administrative criminological evangelising on the ‘Indigenous problem’ in these
jurisdictions.

This reinvigoration is built on a strategy of discrediting any/all

Indigenous approaches to criminological research and dissemination of our knowledge,
as unscientific, and therefore unworthy of serious consideration for the development of
contemporary crime control policy. This example of the criminological knowledge wars
has at its base similar ideological foundations to the eradication of Indigenous culture
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and knowledge that highlighted colonial projects during the initial and intermediary
phases of colonisation.

Further to the discussion above, Paper 5 (Resisting Condescending Research Ethics in
Aotearoa New Zealand) highlights processes internal to the Academy that demonstrate
the difficulties Indigenous peoples face when attempting to privilege their knowledge
gathering processes when pursuing social research. Focusing on the hegemony of REB’s
within western academic institutions, this paper found that in both the New Zealand
and Canadian jurisdictions, Indigenous scholars and service providers reported
significant difficulties in developing ethics protocols that ensured the Indigenous voice
was appropriately ‘recorded’ during the research process.

Coupled with the findings in Papers 2 and 3 the research demonstrates that the
Indigenous Academy is fighting the war on two fronts, the first is in combating the
Eurocentric ideological bases and privilege that permeates the western academic
institutions in which many of us work. This conflict has the potential to derail our
attempts to give authority to Indigenous experiences of crime control in settler-colonial
contexts, by channelling us towards research ethics protocols and methodologies
unsuited to the Indigenous (social) context. The second conflict arises from attempts by
the western academy to ‘control’ access to the Policy Industry. In part, this leads to the
development of strategies designed to silence research undertaken by Indigenous
scholars and communities. The result is the exclusion of Indigenous knowledge and
experience of the social context of settler-colonialism from the development of
meaningful policies and interventions aimed at alleviating the wicked problem of
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Indigenous overrepresentation. More pertinent, attempts to silence our experiences of,
and approaches to, social harm have the potential to halt our rights to selfdetermination in the realm of justice.

3.

How has the settler-colonial state responded to Indigenous challenges to, and
resistance of, its hegemony over justice?

The research carried out for this thesis highlights a number of ways in which the settlercolonial state has resisted Indigenous opposition to its hegemony over responses to
social harm. The majority of papers in this thesis deal with this issue in some way or
other. For example, Papers 1, 2, 3, 6 and 8 all expose various strategies and colonial
projects that are formed in response to the wicked problems of Māori offending and
resistance; be it the rituals described earlier that insulate the policy makers from the
external scrutiny of critics (especially those vulnerable communities against whom
policies and interventions are often directed, such as Indigenes), or the structured
violence of contemporary policing strategies. However, the paper that most directly
deals with this question is Paper 7 (The Waitangi Tribunal and the Regulation of Māori
Protest). The extant literature on this forum is unequivocal; it was intended to be an
informal justice process, developed in direct response to the radicalisation of Māori
politics, and rise of a young, confrontational Māori leadership. But it was not intended
to enable Māori a forum through which their political aspirations for self-determination
in justice, social policy and economics self-sufficiency could be realised. That it did
result in what is now referred to as the treaty settlement process, was in the main
unintentional; what Weber referred to as an elective affinity, in this case a powerful
297

alignment of an effective Māori utilisation of the formal court system, what the state (at
least) believed to be a militant judiciary, and the increasing ‘Māorification’ of the
tribunal process.

The Waitangi Tribunal can also be seen as an example of what happens when Māori
choose to participate in a state controlled forum. As stated, it was not intended to be a
Māori-led process; indeed the first hearing held in the late 1970s, took place in a hotel,
with little Māori input into process. By the late 1980s it had, at least in terms of process,
become a forum driven by tikanga; Māori laws and protocols of formal negotiation
between equal parties. However, we should always remember that while tikanga
dominated the rituals and processes of the tribunal (lore), Pakeha (white) law held it at
bay as a process that could directly bring self-determination to Māori claimants: the
state was, and still is not, beholden to uphold the decisions reached by the tribunal.

4.

What effect, if any, is the expansion of the globalised crime control market having on
indigenous peoples in neo-colonial jurisdictions?

Lastly, a key focus of the research was the impact, if any, of the seeming increasing
globalisation of crime control policy and interventions, with a particular focus on the RJ
industry.

Paper 4 (An Indigenous, Critical Commentary on the Globalisation of

Restorative Justice) focuses on this question, and was based on empirical research with
Indigenous communities in Canada. The research focused on the impact of the travel of
RJ interventions on Indigenous peoples, namely the New Zealand invention, the FGC
forum.

Re-packaged and franchised by Australian and North American policy
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entrepreneurs, the forum has proved popular with jurisdictions in all four settlercolonial societies. The research (and the paper) exposed some of the reasons for this
situation, not least of all the successful marketing of the forum as an exemplar of
Indigenous dispute resolution, one heavily imbued with Māori justice philosophy and
practice. The research revealed this to be little more than marketing rhetoric: Māori
had little direct input into the formulation of the forum, which was influenced more by
the move across western jurisdictions towards a reinvigoration of the justice model for
dealing with youth offending, while retaining some of the social developmental
components of the ‘failed’ welfare approach (see Adler and Wundersitz, 1994).

As the saying goes, ‘don’t let the truth get in the way of a good story’. Discussions
between the author and RJ advocates and practitioners on this issue have often resulted
in comments like ‘well even if it isn’t a truly Indigenous intervention, isn’t it a good thing
that it allows you to practice your justice’; or ‘isn’t it better that other Indigenous
peoples get to use a programme that is at least partly based on Indigenous approaches’.
The research provided answers to both questions is: it depends on whether you are an
RJ practitioner, or a franchise company, or an Indigenous peoples looking to reignite
your own, traditional-based justice processes. As the example of the Stó:lo First Nation
of the Fraser Valley demonstrated, the eroticisation of RJ via the marketing of the FGC as
a Māori forum impeded the ability of this Indigenous community as it went about
resurrecting traditional justice process. It did not halt their move towards judicial selfdetermination, but it did mean they had to utilise a process that was in fact no more
‘indigenous’ than the interventions then prevalent in the formal Canadian justice
system.
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Issues with the Research
Whilst no significant issues arose from the actual project itself, some did arise from
activities that were peripheral to the research that made it difficult for the author to
focus attention on the thesis. These issues arose in response to a project the author was
involved in, namely the development of a special edition of a journal on the topic of
Indigenous, counter-colonial criminologies. Conflict between the authors and senior
members of the academy related to administrative issues resulted in the special edition
being cancelled.

The edition was subsequently moved by the author and the

contributors to a new journal, the African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies and
published in early 2015. Attempts to take ownership of the project from the author and
the contributors to the special edition, plus ongoing breaches of accepted principles of
ethical engagement with Indigenes, resulted in the loss of a significant amount of time
the author had allocated to completing the thesis over the last ten months. However,
the issues that resulted from the conduct of a small group of senior academics, whilst
delaying completion of the thesis, did have one positive effect, which was to reveal the
ongoing impact of racism and unethical conduct by members of the western academy on
Indigenous scholars (and our critical, non-Indigenous collaborators). The Indigenous
scholars involved in the special edition began talking to each other about similar
experiences of racism and unethical conduct directed against them. As we began
sharing our experiences it became clear that this issue, the ongoing subjugation of
Indigenous peoples by the academy, was in need of further focus, an issue picked up in
the following section.
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Future Directions
This thesis was not just the culmination of six years part-time research into the issues
contained in the eight papers; it was in effect the end-point of 18 years of research on
and activism for, Indigenous peoples and their justice issues. The results reported here
reveal a number of avenues for further research. Most urgent of all relate to the
difficulties that beset the thesis over the last 12 months, described in detail above. As
the Indigenous academy expands in numbers we will as a consequence come into
greater contact with the western academy. As mentioned previously, some of our
academic colleagues still cling to stereotypes of Indigenous peoples and institutional
practices that can only be described as colonialist in orientation. The behaviours
experienced by the author, his Indigenous and critical non-Indigenous colleagues,
brought home the urgency of research that exposes the depth and nature of this
subjugating conduct.

It is imperative that the impact of this behaviour on Indigenous scholars and the wider
Indigenous community is empirically investigated, and the racism exposed and
challenged. If time had allowed, one more paper would have been added to the eight
included here. At the time of writing, the author and a colleague from the University of
Auckland, New Zealand, have begun a project on this particular issue. Results and
publications are expected to be made public in the second half of 2016.

While the thesis attempted to plug gaps in our knowledge, other related issues still need
further exploration. For example, while the paper ‘An Indigenous, Critical Commentary
on the Globalisation of Restorative Justice’ exposed the nefarious impact of the co301

option of Indigenous cultural artefacts by the restorative justice industry, we are yet to
document Indigenous responses to the activities of policy entrepreneurs and RJ
franchise justice companies to any significant extent.

This information is vitally

important if Indigenous peoples are to offset the types of disempowering conduct
prevalent across the academy, especially within conservative factions such as
authoritarian criminology. If we are to challenge the perception that our ways of
responding to social harm are little more than quaint, traditional artefacts, then we
need to detail in full the theoretical and conceptual bases to our responses. We need to
demonstrate that they are working for our communities. We urgently need to gather,
control and disseminate this information if we are to challenge western criminology’s
position as the intellectual font of all relevant knowledge on crime and responses to it.

Related to this issue is the gap in our knowledge of Indigenous resistance. Indigenous
peoples resist many things, including the bastardisation of our life-worlds by cultural
entrepreneurs, franchise companies and the like; or the importation of western,
globalised crime control products which we are forced to use in place of our own, more
appropriate processes. And of course, we continue to resist the settler-colonial state’s
ongoing manoeuvres to frustrate our aspirations for self-determination. This is the area
most in need of empirical research analysis and theorising. The importance of the issue
of Indigenous resistance cannot be over-stated: we need to mindful of portraying
Indigenous peoples as (more often than not) the non-responsive, passive recipients of
White Man’s Law and the gifts of western crime control.
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We Indigenous peoples are not without agency; and we are not always ‘as one’ in how
we deploy it.

Sometimes we acquiesce to the activities of policy makers and

entrepreneurs by accepting and implementing the imported, Indigenised products
discussed in this thesis. Some of us perform significant roles in the construction,
dissemination and utilisation of these products. The periphery is not simply the site of
unchallenged reception of imported policies and interventions: it is often “a space that
defies simplistic perceptions of chaos and social exclusion; it is marked by potential,
innovation and creativity, organisation of new social movements and new conceptions
of citizenship” (Aas, 2009: 415). This we can see playing out in the Idle No More
movement in Canada, and the South American Spring that emerged in Brazil in late June
2013.

At other times our resistance to state and criminological impositions is forceful, even
violent, as occurred at Oka, Wounded Knee and Bastion Point. But more often than not
our resistance is subtle and ingenious, such as when we accept the criminological gifts
imported from the high-crime western jurisdictions, and begin immediately to chip
away the Eurocentric coating in order to apply a more suitable, Indigenous sheen over
time. To employ a powerful Foucaultian terms, our counter-conducts and creative
strategies of resistance, are multifarious and sophisticated (Foucault, 2004). This is no
different when it comes to the international transfer of crime control products like
FGCs, sentencing circles or corrections-based bicultural therapeutic programmes.
Counter-conduct abounds and is expressed in a variety of ways, including “flight,
deflection, ruse, attempts to overturn the situation of domination, direct confrontation
with the dispostifs of power, etc…” (Lazzarato, 2009: 114). However, for there to be
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resistance of any kind, there needs to be something for us to resist in the first place. The
impacts of the various players on the globalised crime control market on Indigenous
peoples is very real, and the criminological players on that team, the restorative justice
theorists, practitioners, those making money marketing their products to state and
Federal governments, should consider the consequences of their continued use of the
Indigenous life-world for the benefit of themselves and the Industry they participate in,
because they can be sure that the critical Indigenous gaze is now firmly turned towards
them.
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Glossary – Māori Words and Terminology
Aotearoa

land of the long white cloud, Māori name for New Zealand.

Hapu

sub-tribe.

Hui
Iwi

gathering, meeting.
tribe.

Karakia

to recite ritual chants, say grace, pray.

Kaupapa

topic, policy, matter for discussion.

Kawa

marae protocol - customs of the marae.
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Marae

courtyard - the open area in front of a meeting house, where formal
greetings and discussions take place.

Mihi

speech of greeting, acknowledgement, tribute.

Pakeha

New Zealander of European descent.

Te Puni Kokiri

Ministry of Māori Development.

Tikanga

correct procedure, custom, habit, lore.

Whanau

extended family, family group.
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